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Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c6.s5: II. Tarka-kāla (The Age of Arguments)

Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c6.s5

Language
English

Contents

II. Tarka-kāla (The Age of Arguments)

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The beginnings of the age of arguments which is spread over the whole millennium between 500 BCE to CE 1000, were marked with the emergence of the six systems of Vedic philosophy and the onslaught of various heterodox systems — Cārvāka, Ājīvaka, Jainism and Buddhism.

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The essence of philosophical thought under diverse schools was put in the texts comprising the Sūtras. The word heterodox is an English equivalent of the term *nāstika* and has been used in a wider sense not only to denote śramaṇa and Jaina traditions alone, but also all *nāstika* (non-orthodox, not subscribing to the final authority of the Veda or Śruti) systems.

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The school of Cārvāka is perhaps the oldest of all philosophical systems. It was cultivated in non-Vedic traditions, although the ideas of Cārvāka philosophy are reflected in the Vedic Saṁhitās and the Upaniṣads. In *Mahābhārata*, a brāhmaṇa named Cārvāka, said to be a friend of Duryodhana, confronts Yudhiṣṭhira with disturbing questions, and is eventually killed by other brāhmaṇas. Subsequently, Śrīkṛṣṇa explains the genesis of Cārvāka and his philosophy through a story. Cārvāka accordingly was a *rākṣasa*, who attained brāhmaṇahood by performing rigorous penance.⁷⁷

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The course of the development of the Cārvāka philosophy incorporates several stages during the course of its prolonged development. It was ritualistic during the stage of its early formulation, then had affiliations with tantric cults, and gradually embraced epistemological considerations. Some of the hymns of *Ṛgveda* record the earliest versions of the propositions by the Cārvākas. There are copious references to non-believers and transgressors.⁷⁸ The view that *sat* (being) came out of *asat* (non-being) — is repeatedly cited in Vedic and Upaniṣadic texts and taken up for a debate. It can be taken as the first assertion by the Cārvākas. The seer of *Ṛgveda* X.72 is Laukya Bṛhaspati. The word *laukya* would mean the son of Loka. On the basis of this, Athawale⁷⁹ believes that Loka, father of Bṛhaspati, was the originator of the Lokāyata philosophy. Bṛhaspati is said to be the founder of this philosophy. *Lokāyatasūtra*, supposed to have been authored by him, is no more extant. Patañjali informs in his *Mahābhāṣya* (VII.3.8) that a philosopher named Bhāguri had authored *vārttikas* (a form of commentary) on Bṛhaspati's *Lokāyatasūtra*. Athawale has referred to Bharadvāja, son of Bṛhaspati, who also upheld the Lokāyata philosophy.⁸⁰ Bharadvāja has given a detailed exposition of Bhūtavāda (materialism) as described at length in *Mahābhārata*.⁸¹ Cārvāka, the demon appearing after the Mahābhārata war and rudely questioning Yudhiṣṭhira, is identified as Cārvāka the philosopher.⁸²

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That Lokāyata continued to be a dominating force is evidenced by its presentation in several literary works: *Samrāiccakahā* of Haribhadra, a narrative in Prākṛt; *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacarita* of Hemacandra or *Yaśastilakacampūḥ* of Somadeva.

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*Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa, *Mīmāṁsāsūtra* of Jaimini, *Sāṁkhyasūtra* of Kapila, *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali, *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama and *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda were composed in the BCE era. These herald the beginning of six systems of orthodox philosophy — all of them accepting the Veda as authority. Of these, Vedānta alone is pure idealist, Sāṁkhya and Yoga are realists but have leanings towards idealism; remaining systems of the orthodox philosophy are all realists.

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Of these, the Sāṁkhya system is one of the oldest and has remained a potential challenge in the debate for all other systems except the Yoga. Kapila, its proponent, was of the earliest of non-conformists. He stood against the rituals. *Baudhāyana* II.vi.30 says that before Kapila there were three *āśramas* — *brahmacarya*, *gṛhastha* and *vānaprastha*. Kapila introduced the fourth — the *saṁnyāsa*. The order of Kapila was accepted by Āsuri of *asura* descent.

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The Mīmāṁsā system had its beginnings in theoretical/interpretative discussions and speculations. Mīmāṁsā has also been termed as Vicāraśāstra (the discourse in thinking) in the chapter on Mīmāṁsā in *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*. The process of analysing was also termed as *mīmāṁsā*. *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* III.5.7 says : *mīmāṁsante brahmavādinaḥ* (the philosophers speculate). The means of arriving at truth is Mīmāṁsā. The Upaniṣads therefore describe the philosophers conducting the Mīmāṁsā with regard to the questions about what is self, what is *Brahman*?⁸³

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The Vaiśeṣika system was not basically concerned with physics, rather than metaphysics and devoted itself to the study of nature. The Ārambhavāda (atomic theory) as envisaged in this system viewed the universe as formed by the conjunctions of atoms — the subtlest form of matter.

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Rājaśekhara, a well-known poet, dramatist and rhetorician of tenth century CE, enumerates six philosophical systems as Ānvīkṣikī, all of them being argumentative. Out of these, Buddhism, Jainism and Cārvāka system form the prima facie view, and Sāṁkhya, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika belong to the *uttara-pakṣa* (the theory to be accepted). These six systems utilize the techniques of debate — *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*.⁸⁴

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There are grounds for agreement between the orthodox and heterodox schools, especially between Śāṅkara-Vedānta and Buddhist schools of Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda who regard the knowledge acquired through *pramāṇas* as not absolutely real. They assign to it a level of practical reality — *vyāvahārika sattā* or *saṁvṛti-satya*. On the other hand, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā and Mādhva Vedāntin regard knowledge gained through *pramāṇas* as absolutely real. There is no place for *māyā* (illusion) in the world-view of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mādhva Vedānta. To the Naiyāyika the whole world is formed of real entities, which become objects of *pramā* (knowledge) that cannot be contradicted. The existence of these entities is defined by *jāti* or *sāmānya*.

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Even though the six systems — Vedānta, Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya and Yoga — are said to be the Vedic *darśanas*, there are fundamental differences and issues for debate amongst them. One very crucial question is with regard to the validity of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Both the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems uphold the principle of *parataḥ pramāṇa*, i.e. the validity of a *pramāṇa* is to be ascertained by a source other than the *pramāṇa* itself. Jaimini on the other hand, postulated *svataḥ prāmāṇya* — the theory of holding that a *pramāṇa* does not require its validation from an external source, it is valid by itself. These two opposite views create a situation of a neck-to-neck fight between the Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā systems. To the Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika, even the authority of the scriptures is not to be considered as something independent and irreducible, it has to be established through inference. To the Mīmāṁsaka, the Veda is eternal — not created by any conscious being — divine or human, and does not require validation.

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The Sūtra texts are structured as quintessential of several prolonged discourses and discussions in search of certain specific queries. The word *jijñāsā* (inquiry) occurring in the very first aphorism of *Brahmasūtra* and *Mīmāṁsāsūtra* is suggestive of inherent questions and discussions. Jaimini used another term *parīṣṭi* (investigation) for a critical examination of diverse views on any issue.⁸⁵ In its prescriptive and descriptive forms, the Mīmāṁsā system appears to be least concerned with issues for debate. But even as a Sūtra text, it searches for the solutions of certain fundamental questions, whether *vidhi*, *arthavāda*, *mantra* and *nāmadheya* are *pramāṇas* or not in the first chapter of the *Mīmāṁsāsūtra*.

The Continuance of Ānvīkṣikī

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Even though the proponents of the Nyāya system treated their philosophy at par or identical with Ānvīkṣikī, the Ājīvakas and Cārvākas continued to practise Ānvīkṣikī in their own way. Sañjaya Kātyāyana, Purāṇakaśyapa, Makkaliputta Gosāla (Maṅkhaliputra Gośāla), Ajitakeśakambalin, Kakuda Kaccāyana belonged to this tradition of philosophy. They argued against ritualism, theories of *karma* and denied the moral consequences of all actions. Maṅkhali Gośāla (died about 493 BCE) was a contemporary of Mahāvīra. He came from the lowest strata of society. His father was a beggar. Bhadrā, his mother, gave birth to him in a cow’s pan; hence he was called Gośālaka or Gośāla. He embraced maverick asceticism. He spent a few years of his life in association with Mahāvīra and quit him to found the Ājīvaka sect. The Ājīvakas propounded the thesis of 84,000 *yonis* (births circles) to explain the evolutionary process. This process also imbibes an unalterable destiny for the human beings, as there is no escape from it. Sagar Mal Jain finds him identical with the Sage Maṅki, as described in *Mahābhārata*. Maṅki is also said to have propounded the philosophy of Niyativāda.⁸⁶

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Amongst the Upaniṣadic seers there were some who propagated materialism. Uddālaka argued that mind, life and speech have their genesis in the intake of food, water and heat respectively. A man’s comprehension, retention and memory depend upon the way he feeds himself.⁸⁷

Buddha’s Dialectical Method of Discourse

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Buddha developed a unique method of resolving contradictions. It seems that he was often criticized for accepting opposite stand-points. He himself is reported to have remarked that he has propounded the doctrines which are *ekāṁśikas* (one-sided) and also the doctrines which are *anekāṁśikas* (many-sided). Matilal (1981: 6) says that “the word *anekāṁśika* was probably another name for *anekānta* and Buddha’s method of *anekāṁśika* could be taken to be a precursor of the Jaina Anekānta doctrine”.

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In *Majjhimanikāya* (*sutta* 99) Buddha proclaims that he is not an Ekāntavādin, he is a Vibhajyavādin. Through Vibhajyavāda, Buddha presented his own analytical method. Vibhajyavāda consisted of division, classification, qualified negations or qualified affirmation. The analysis is to be made by way of questioning each part of a theory to be discussed, with the acceptance or rejection of each one on fair grounds. Vasubandhu defines a Vibhajyavādin in the following terms:

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Those who say that everything exists — past, present and future — are Sarvāstivādins. But there are Vibhajyavādins who say that only certain things exist, viz. — the present *karma* as well as the past *karma* which have fructified — they exist. The future *karma* which have not fructified do not exist.⁸⁸

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By his analytical method, Buddha classified all the philosophical questions into four categories — *ekāṁśa-vyākaraṇīya* (answerable in affirmative or negative terms), *vibhajyavādena-vyākaraṇīya* (answerable by division and analysis), *pratipraśnena-vyākaraṇīya* (answerable by putting counter-questions) and *sthāpanīya* (to be answered by silence or to be set aside). This was in accordance with his philosophy of avoiding extremes — the *madhyamā pratipad* (the middle path). There can be two aspects emerging out of any theory and they may form two extremes. Avoidance of these two extremes is *madhyamā pratipad*. Buddha followed the middle path by rejecting the two extremes. In the theory of Anekānta also, middle path is accepted albeit with acceptance of the two extremes as well. Matilal (1981: 18) explains Buddha’s way as “exclusive middle” and the Anekānta theory as “inclusive middle”.

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The way Buddha applied the technique of Vibhajyavāda in his discourse led to the development of Anekāntavāda. He not only presented an alternate world-view, he also encouraged arguments and discussions. Before his enlightenment he had met a number of philosophers and thinkers of his times. His quest for enlightenment has been termed *ariyapariyesana* (The Noble Quest) in Pāli canons. During his restless wandering and search for knowledge, he met Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta.⁸⁹ Sañjaya Kātyāyana, Purāṇakaśyapa, Makkali Gosāla and Ajitakeśakambalin — these were Buddha’s contemporaries. Kakuda Kaccāyana was a humpbacked philosopher, belonging to the Ājīvaka sect in fifth century BCE. These philosophers have been raising questions on prevailing norms. It is perhaps to condemn them that the interpolation in Vālmīki’s *Rāmāyaṇa* comprising Jābāli’s conversation with Rāma was added. Buddha rejected their views. He is reported to have described, Makkali Gosāla, an exponent of Ājīvaka sect, as “a burden on earth” a person responsible for leading people astray.⁹⁰ He also launched a crusade against the hypocrisy of the priestly class. Pratap Chandra (1977) says:

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There is little doubt that Buddha treated the priestly class with a contempt and rejected their claims of supremacy with disdain. They are always treated as ideal gossipers with no worthwhile contribution to make to general religious debate.

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Rather than launching a movement for protest, Buddha kept open all the doors for debate and discussion. It was because of the dialogic nature of his discourses, the correspondences between Vedic philosophies and Buddhism were accepted and Buddha was accepted as one of the ten incarnations of Viṣṇu. Buddha also did not launch a rebellion against the prevalent religions. A rebel would not consider an established viewpoint he is refuting at par with his own views. In all fairness, Buddha limited all his debates to a fair criticism without being hostile or destructive, never to cause any violence.

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Buddha and his followers developed a specific method of indulging in *kathā* (discussion). It has been termed as *paṭipucchā kathā* (*pratipṛcchā kathā* — delivering a discourse by the way of asking questions). In *Nandakavāda Sutta* of *Majjhimanikāya*, Nandaka exemplifies this method of *kathā*. In the same way, *Anumānasutta* and *Upālisutta* in the same scripture present the concept of inference and *vāda* in the sense of a controversy. The debating skills of the monks like Vāseṭṭha and Bhāradvāja are described in the Piṭakas or Buddhist scriptures. Buddha’s debate with Saccaka is also described.⁹¹ The genre of *dhammakathā* (discussion of *dhamma*) was cultivated and practised with the advent of Buddha. The basic tenets of the theory of *kathā* were also evolved with Buddha’s discourse on *dhamma*. *Kathāvatthu* in *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* which composed around 255 BCE mentions *anuyoga* (inquiry), *udāharaṇa* (illustration), *paṭiññā* (proposition), *upanayana* (application of reason), *niggama* (conclusion) and *niggaha* (capture or defeat) as various techniques of *kathā*.⁹²

Mahāvīra and the Tradition of Debate

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The practice of Vibhajyavāda in later śramaṇic traditions culminated into the theory of *anekānta*. Avoidance of *ekānta* (one-sidedness) is Anekānta. Matilal (1981: 1) explains the philosophy of Anekānta as “the theory of non-one-sidedness” or “the theory of many-sidedness of reality”. Because of its acceptance of many-folded nature of reality, Anekānta had the capability of traversing on different *nayas* (standpoints) offering justification of each. Each standpoint has its conditionality and if stated without any conditionality, it remains unjustified. Accepting any doctrine or system unconditionally would mean exclusion of all rival doctrines and systems. Anekānta requires an understanding of the truth behind diverse standpoints and also the conditions of these standpoints, overruling every prejudice.

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Accepting the view of Dalsukhabhai Malvania that the practice of Vibhajyavāda in later śramaṇic traditions culminated into the theory of Anekānta, Matilal (1981: 4) further suggests that the moral doctrine of *ahiṃsā* (non-violence) was “partly responsible for the development of the Anekānta attitude in Jaina philosophy”.

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Matilal (1981: 25) rightly described the methodology of Anekāntavāda as taking its flights on two wings — Nayavāda (the doctrine of standpoints) and the Saptabhaṅgī (the doctrine of sevenfold predications). The later is also named as Syādvāda and is also taken as synonymous to Anekānta, because the prefix *syād* in it signifies manifold nature of any category.

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In fact, the philosophy of Saptabhaṅgīnaya developed from the *trairāśika* as propounded by Ājīvaka Gosāla. Gosāla said that everything has triple character — existence, non-existence and both. Matilal (1981: 49) finds this doctrine of triple character of every entity as more akin in spirit and logically closer to the later Jaina doctrine of sevenfold formula as well the Anekānta.

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Haribhadra in his *Anekāntavijayapatākā* (pp. 13-26) explains the theory of Anekānta as Saṁhāravāda (the theory of integration), Sarva-vastu-śabala-vāda (the theory of manifoldness of every real entity), Ākulavāda (theory of accepting opposites) and Saṅkīravāda (the theory of intermixture).

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With this kind of openness, Mahāvīra’s tradition of *vāda* distinguished between *naya* and *durnaya*. *Naya* is accepting one standpoint with full awareness of other standpoints in relation to it, and *durnaya* is accepting one standpoint by excluding others.

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presents a complete structural design for the analysis of a *vāda* text. The thirty-two *tantra-yuktis* enumerated by Kauṭilya are — *adhikaraṇa* (chapter), *vidhāna* (table of contents), *yoga* (scheme of sentences), *padārtha* (explanation of words), *hetvartha* (indicating the reasons), *uddeśa* (listing of contents), *nirdeśa* (elaboration of contents), *upadeśa* (advice), *apadeśa* (reference to other views), *atideśa* (incorporation of one theme in the other), *pradeśa* (separating the topics to be discussed subsequently), *upamāna* (explaining through similitude), *arthāpatti* (implication), *saṁśaya* (doubt), *prasaṅga* (application of one context to the other), *viparyaya* (vice versa, contrariety), *vākyaśeṣa* (incomplete sentence to be explained through inherent meaning), *anumata* (acceptance of the views of others), *vyākhyāna* (heightened speech), *nirvacana* (etymological explanation), *nidarśana* (illustration), *apavarga* (ending), *svasaṁjñā* (explaining a word through another one), *pūrva-pakṣa* (the prima facie view), *siddhānta-pakṣa* (the principle), *ekānta* (exclusive view), *anāgatāvekṣaṇa* (summing up the issues to be taken up later), *atikrāntāvekṣaṇa* (resume), *niyoga* (demarcation), *vikalpa* (option), *samuccaya* (simultaneity) and *ūha* (investigation).⁹⁵

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In fact, Kauṭilya has employed all these thirty-two *tantra-yuktis* to make his voluminous compendium a subtle text in *vāda*. At the very outset of *Arthaśāstra*, he has used the first four of the above *tantra-yuktis* by the way of giving a complete outline of the whole text. On each and every topic, he takes into account all the *pūrva-pakṣas* (the prima facie views), then the *uttara-pakṣa* (rejoinder) together with *ekānta*. Along with these, he discusses the facts, gives copious references and illustrations, agreements and disagreements, contrarieties, resume, summing up, etc. References to previous portions and the alternatives are provided, and implications are specified.

Other Knowledge Texts

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*Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali reflects the maturity and growth of *vāda* traditions. It also uses several technical terms related to the theory of *vāda*, viz. — *anaikāntika* (inconclusive), *itaretarāśraya* and *anyonyasaṁśaya* (mutual dependence), *atiprasaṅga* (over-application), *lāghava* (parsimony), *ubhayataḥ pāśā rajjuḥ* (dilemma), etc.⁹⁶

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*Kāmasūtra* of Vātsyāyana (around second century bce) is also structured on these very lines; it cites several views on any issue and then presents a resolution.

Buddhist Councils, Debates and Split

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Buddha could instill the essence of *vāda* tradition in the dialogues and discussions he engaged in with his followers. After his final departure, his followers continued his legacy. This necessitated *vādas*. Differences with regard to interpretations of *buddha-vacanas* surfaced. This led to calling a number of *saṅgītis* (councils). These councils provided platforms for debates and they also caused split in the *saṁgha*.

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Raising doubts and questioning must have been a practice in the order founded by Buddha. The repercussions of this practice are reflected in *Kathāvatthu*, a text which has already been referred here. Sometimes such doubts and questions could also cause a split in the order. One Mahādeva, as referred in *Kathāvatthu*, had questioned the very authenticity of the *arhat*, alleging that the *arhat* might be sexually tempted, might have a residue of ignorance, might have doubts himself, or might depend upon others for his own enlightenment.⁹⁷

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Buddha had a premonition of this situation and had forewarned his disciples of the possibilities of split. The split cannot be caused by reasons external. Monk Nāgasena in *Milindapañho* rightly said:

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The householders do not break the order, nor a nun, nor a newly initiated nun under probation, nor a novice (*sāmanera*). It is the ordained monk, belonging to the same communion, to the same parish, living within the same boundary, who can break the order.⁹⁸

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In response to a question by Upāli in *Cullavagga* of *Vinayapiṭaka* (chap. VII) he enumerates eighteen possible causes for the split of the *saṁgha*. There can be a split if the followers of the *saṁgha* start explaining non-*dhamma* as *dhamma*, non-obedience as obedience, attributing things to *tathāgata* which he did not say, attributing practices to him which he did not practise, attributing tenets to him which he did not propound, explaining no offence as offence, slight offence as serious offence, a curable offence as incurable, a bad offence as a good offence; as well as the vice versa of these take the number up to eighteen. These causes are enlisted in the chapter on the split of *saṁgha* (*saṁghabhedasutta*) of *Aṅguttaranikāya* (5.93) in a more compact way, reducing the number to ten.

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*Saṁghabheda* (split in the organization) as a category is repeatedly discussed in Buddhist canons. Forming a separate circle for any practice to be done collectively in the *saṁgha* causes *cakrabheda*, and *cakrabheda* leads to *saṁghabheda*. The canons differentiate between the division amongst the monks by forming separate circles within the order and the split. The former is called *saṁgharāji*, and the latter is already described as *saṁghabheda*. The *saṁghabheda* will be supposed to have occurred if the total number of the monks raising a dispute exceeds nine. The canons also describe the situations of cakrabheda which were already occurring in the *saṁgha*. The causes of split rested either on doctrinal differences or adoption of different practices.⁹⁹

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Buddha is reported to have propagated *nairātmya* (the theory of no soul), but even amongst his followers there were reputed philosophers like Sthavira Vatsa who believed in the existence of soul. He was a contemporary of Kālāśoka (395-67 BCE). The followers of Sthavira Vatsa had formed their own school and were known as the Vatsīputrīyas or Sammatīyas during the rule of Nanda, the grandson of Kālāśoka. There are records to prove that this school continued to exist during the third-fourth centuries and became influential during the reign of the King Harṣa (CE 606-47). Harṣa’s sister, Rājyaśrī was a Sāmmatīya.

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After Buddha, a number of councils were held to systematize his ideas and precepts. These councils fall in two categories — the canonical and the non-canonical. The sole purpose of the former had been to compile and systematize the *buddha-vacanas*. The first council was held in the year of Buddha’s death itself in 483 BCE. King Bimbisāra sponsored it by donating a site. Five hundred monks were selected to participate in the proceedings. Upāli, one of the direct disciples of Buddha, recited the Vinaya texts comprised of the disciplinary rules for monks, and Ānanda recounted Buddha’s discourses which were then called as a *Suttapiṭaka*.

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One hundred years after Buddha’s *mahāparinirvāṇa* (final departure), the second council was held at Vaiśālī. Seven hundred monks are said to have attended this council to debate on the issues related to indiscipline in the *saṁgha*. A concord was re-established. A non-canonical council after 137 years of Buddha’s *mahāparinirvāṇa* was held in Pāṭaliputra, when King Mahāpadma Nanda was requested to mediate in a dispute between rival groups of monks. This council initiated Buddhism as a sectarian movement.

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The first division in Buddhist *saṁgha* occurred in this council. The monks of Vaiśālī vehemently disagreed with regard to the status of the *sthaviras* (elders), and alienating from the conservative *sthaviras* (the elders); they formed a liberal group of their own. This group was known as the *mahāsaṁgha* (great community) and its members were called the *mahāsāṁghikas*.

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The third canonical council was convened by King Aśoka around 250 bce in Pāṭaliputra. Moggaliputta Tissa alias Upagupta supervised over its proceedings. Around one thousand monks are reported to have joined this council. Lively debates between the orthodox Theravādins and orthodox/heterodox sects concerning various doctrinal points were held in this council. These debates have been recorded in *Kathāvatthu* (points of debate) a Pāli text, which forms the fifth book of *Abhidhammapiṭaka* under the Theravāda tradition.

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One of the earliest councils related to Theravāda was organized in 25 bce when King Vattagmaṇī's rule was restored at the Mahāvihāra of Anurādhapuram, the capital city of Sri Lanka, to resolve religious unrest in Buddhist community. The compilation of Tripiṭakas — the Buddhist scriptures as per the Theravāda tradition — was initiated in this council.

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Another important council was organized by Kaniṣka in the country of Gāndhāra around ce 100 at the instance of Pārśva, a Sarvāstivādin monk. Vasumitra, one of the foremost philosophers of Buddhism, presided over it. The council was attended by 499 monks and Aśvaghoṣa, a great Sanskrit poet and scholar of Buddhism, actively participated in it. It is also said that under the guidance of Vasumitra commentaries in Sanskrit on all the three Piṭakas — *Suttra*, *Vinaya* and *Abhidhamma* — were prepared in this council. Composition of a commentary *Mahāvibhāṣā* on *Jñānaprasthāna* of *Abhidhamma* was taken up in this council. *Mahāvibhāṣā* was later on accepted as a standard text on *Abhidhamma*. *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubadhu is one of the most important texts in Buddhist literature. It is based on *Mahāvibhāṣā*.

Kuṇḍalakeśī: The Lady Debater

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There is no doubt that Buddha and his followers initiated debates that have sustained the intellectual discourses for more than a millennium in India. Bhadrā, as described in *Therīgāthā*, first accepted the Nirgrantha order. She was called Kuṇḍalakeśī when her curly locks grew up again. She learned the texts from the Nirgrantha monks and became adept in debating. She had debates with the great scholars and preachers of her times. She would visit villages and cities and at the gate or entrance of the city or village she would place a rose apple tree on the heap of sand with the declaration that who so ever tramples this bough of the rose apple tree will have to enter into a debate with her; she would wait for a challenger for one week and depart to other place to resume her victorious journey. When she reached Śrāvastī, Sāriputra had a debate with her. First Kuṇḍalakeśī chose to ask him the questions. When the stock of her questions was exhausted and Śāriputra had answered them all, it was the latter’s turn to confront her with questions. He asked only one question to her — What is that which is one? And she fell silent.

Milindapañho

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*Milindapañho* is a meta text of debate in Pāli compiled around second century BCE. It forms the dialogues and debates between Milinda (Greek ruler Minander) and Buddhist monk Nāgasena. Milinda is said to be well versed in the practice of *vitaṇḍā* (destructive debate) and it was difficult to conquer him in arguments.¹⁰⁰

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He first asked monk Nāgasena — “Bhante Nāgasena! will you enter into *saddhi* (debate) with me?” Nāgasena said — “If you want to have Paṇḍitavāda with me, I will talk to you, but if you want to have Rājavāda with me I will not talk to you.” Asked about the difference between Paṇḍitavāda and Rājavāda, Nāgasena says:

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The paṇḍitas argue with each other, one of them would refute what the other has said, but he will not be punished for this refutation. This is Paṇḍitavāda. But if one enters into a debate with the king and refutes what the king has said, he will be punished. This is Rājavāda. I can have a Paṇḍitavāda with you and not the Rājavāda.

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Being assured by King Milinda or Minander that he intends to enter simply into a Paṇḍitavāda with the monk,¹⁰¹ the latter enters into a discussion with the king, which leads to one of the most fascinating, intense and profound debates in the world history of *vāda* as recorded in *Milindapañho*.

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Milinda is inquisitive; he goads the monk with piercing queries, but also allows and facilitates the discussion with persistent request for illustrations. Nāgasena obliges him by using profuse illustrations to corroborate his theses.

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It is in the fourth chapter titled as Meṇḍakapañho that Milinda assumes a challenging tone, and confronts the monk with sharp questions. The word *meṇḍaka* stands for the horns of rams ready to fight. Milinda finally praises the debating skills of Nāgasena and agrees that Nāgasena has crushed the theories of the rivals (*paravādas*).¹⁰²

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Nāgasena rules out the migration of soul from one body to other and also establishes the theory of rebirth. He explains it with the example of lamp enlightened by another lamp.¹⁰³

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Sometimes the debates turned into secret talks, not to be made public. For this both the debaters had to be highly proficient in their own branch of learning. Earlier this had happened in the debates of scholars with Yājñavalkya. During the course of prolonged discussions between Monk Nāgasena and King Milinda, both the discussants felt the needs to move to a secluded place. Milinda prepared for such a debate after observing eight vows for seven days,¹⁰⁴ and then sought a meeting with the monk in a completely secluded place where they might not be disturbed.

Aśvaghoṣa: His Debates with Buddhists and Non-Buddhists

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The life and history of Aśvaghoṣa, a great poet and Buddhist philosopher, provide a glorious exemplification of the *vāda* tradition. He wrote *Vajrasūcī* in refutation to the caste system. This text is being discussed in Chap. 5 of the present work. According to the biographical details about him as recorded in Chinese sources, Aśvaghoṣa was born in a brāhmaṇa family and was very proud of his scholarship. Kumārajīva has given a life sketch of Aśvaghoṣa. Accordingly, Pārśva, a monk who commanded scholarship with spiritual powers, reached a monastery in central Asia. To his surprise, he learnt that the monks and novices in the monastery do not strike the bell as a part of the ritual. Upon asking the reason for this departure from the norm, he was informed that a heretic recluse has forewarned the members of the monastery not to strike the bell, as striking it would mean a challenge to him for a debate. Since the members in the monastery are afraid of entering into a debate with the awesome recluse, they have since long stopped ringing the bell. Hearing this, Pārśva asked the monks to strike the bell. This being done, the recluse appeared and asked Pārśva whether he intends to enter into a debate with him. A debate between Pārśva and the recluse was ensued on the condition that the loser will become the disciple of the winner. Pārśva used his spiritual powers to silence the opponent. The opponent became his disciple and received ordination under him. He continued to display his skills in debate for propagation of Buddhist order and he was named Aśvaghoṣa because of his resounding voice.¹⁰⁵

Debates within Buddhist Schools

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In the first millennium CE, various philosophical schools grew under the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism and *bhāṣyas* on the Sūtra texts were composed. This was the age of interpretation and reasoning. These Buddhist schools also initiated intense philosophical debates with non-Buddhist rivals on problems of universals, philosophies of logic, language and other issues. Nāgārjuna rejected the concept of *svabhāva* and emphasized the idea of *madhyamā pratipad* (the middle path). He also established the invariable relationship of the philosophy of Śūnyavāda with Buddha’s concept of *pratītyasamutpāda* (interdependent origination). *Nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra* to him are the forms of one and the same reality.

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The difference between the Sautrāntika (Representationalism) and Vaibhāṣika (Direct Realism) lies in their view of cognition of external phenomena. The Vaibhāṣikas hold that all external things are known through perception. The Sautrāntikas say that they are known only through *anumāna* (inference). The Vaibhāṣika developed as a branch of Sarvāstivādin School under the Hīnayāna.

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Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda attempt a liberal interpretation of *buddha-vacanas* and they are more inclined towards metaphysical thinking. These two fall under the Mahāyāna (the great vehicle) and the other two, i.e. the Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika fall under the Hīnayāna (the little vehicle).

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But there were divergences of opinions and differences of views even amongst the followers of Śūnyavāda as well as those of Vijñānavāda. The different interpretations of Buddhapālita (CE 470–540) and Bhāvaviveka, also known as Bhavya (CE 490–570) created a split in the Mādhyamika system or Śūnyavāda. Buddhapālita stuck to the dialectical demolition of all theories. Bhavya, however, postulated that *śūnya* or *niḥsvabhāva* can be understood in a positive way.

Debates between Buddhist Logicians and Naiyāyikas

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The history of intellectual debate between the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy on one hand and the schools of Buddhist philosophy on the other is a unique phenomenon as far as world philosophy is concerened. It presents one of the finest examples of intellectual refinement through *vāda*. As both the sides sharpened their weapons for attacking their adversaries, they enriched and sharpened their own systems of thought and tools of analysis. Nāgārjuna was the forerunner of one of the most prolonged traditions of scholastic debate. He vehemently criticized Gautama's logic in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and *Vaidalyasūtra*. While acknowledging the greatness of Nāgārjuna as a philosopher, it must also be accepted that he was able to take the argumentative traditions to the peaks through the steps of logic as envisaged by Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra*.

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Nāgārjuna flourished between CE 150–250. The essence of his Mādhyamikaśāstra lies in shunning all standpoints:

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When one accepts any standpoint, one is captured by the cunning poisonous serpent of the impurities. Those, having their mind cleansed of every standpoint, are not captured.¹⁰⁶

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His *Mūlamādhyamikakārikā* of twenty-seven chapters and approximately 450 verses is the greatest sourcebook for Mādhyamikaśāstra. *Dvādaśadvāraśāstra* and *Vigrahavyāvartanī* are his other works. *Vigrahavyāvartanī* heralded an era of debate between the Buddhist philosophers and Naiyāyikas, which became one of the most enduring, most fruitful and long-living intellectual fights. Nāgārjuna was also the first philosopher to have used the method of *vitaṇḍā* (cavil) through which he could dismantle his opponents on the basis of their own arguments.

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Nāgārjuna provided a firm footing to the intellectual discourse leading to a prolonged series of *vāda* between the Buddhist logicians and the orthodox Naiyāyikas. He became a legendary name subsequently. In *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, the Buddha is made to issue the following prophesy:

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In Vedālī, in the southern part, a *bhikṣu*, most illustrious and distinguished [will be born], his name is Nāgāhvaya (Nāgārjuna), he will be the destroyer of the one-sided views based on being and non-being.
He will declare my vehicle, the unsurpassed Mahāyāna, to the world; attaining the stage of joy he will go to the land of bliss.¹⁰⁷

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In fact, Nāgārjuna came to be deified as second Buddha.

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Nāgārjuna challenged the followers of the rival schools of orthodox philosophies and initiated debate with them. He discarded all labels and ideologues — absolutism, monism, radical pluralism, nihilism, negativism, relativism or any form of dialectics. He appears of be elusive but his philosophy is solely based on the middle path “which can be termed the ontological inclusiveness, excellence, purity and supreme state of being”.¹⁰⁸ He restrained himself from adopting any counter-thesis, “because that would entail yet another position”.¹⁰⁹ His philosophy is defined as the philosophy of no-position. He himself declares that “he has no views to offer and therefore he must be absolved from all errors”.¹¹⁰ Nāgārjuna asserted that common intellect is unmindful of the four relational conditions: *hetu-pratyaya* (causal component), *ālambana-* pratyaya (objective component), *samānāntara-pratyaya* (sequential component) and *ādhipateya-pratyaya* (dominant component).¹¹¹ Any reality or experience therefore can only be categorized in negative terms, viz. non- extinction, non-origination, non-destruction, non-eternal, non-identity, non-differentiation, non-coming into being and non-being. In fact, by *śūnyatā*, Nāgārjuna gave a potential tool for reasoning and refuting the opponents view:

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When a refutation is based on *śūnyatā*, and an opponent refuses, he is not able to counter everything since counter-refutation will be the same nature as the contention (*sādhya*). When an exposition is based on *śūnyatā*, and an opponent censures, he is not able to censure everything since the censorship will be the same (nature) as contention.¹¹²

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Gautama, the author of *Nyāyasūtras*, is said to have criticized Nāgārjuna in some places, but these portions appear to be interpolations.¹¹³ Vātsyāyana, the author of *Nyāyabhāṣya*, certainly gives a refutation to Nāgārjuna’s *Mādhyamikakārikā* in his discussion on *Nyāyasūtra* V.1.39-40 (without naming him) for his (Nāgārjuna’s) acceptance of only three categories (*pratijñā*, *hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta*) out of the group of five as propounded by Gautama. The Buddhist institutions and Buddhism were confronted with forceful challenges of a reinvigorated Brāhmanism.

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Āryadeva flourished around CE 200. He is also referred as Kāṇadeva for being blind with one eye. He was one of the most renowned direct disciples of Nāgārjuna. Candrakīrti who commented on Āryadeva’s *Catuḥśataka* informs that he was the son of a king and was born in Siṁhala. Having renounced the world as a crown prince, he came to south India and studied Mādhyamikaśāstra with Nāgārjuna to become one of its foremost champions. He is said to have moved to Nālandā from Śrīparvata to defeat Mātṛceṭa in debate.

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Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are also referred to as brothers, the former being the elder. They probably belonged to Puruṣapura (modern Peshavar) and flourished around CE 320–400.

Debates within Orthodox Systems of Philosophy

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The doctrine of cumulative pursuit of *karma* and *jñāna* continued till Śaṅkara vehemently discarded it. He was criticized by his contemporaries and his immediate followers like Bhāskara also for this. They even called him a non-conformist and the charge heterodoxy was levelled against him.

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This era is also marked with serious debates and the employment of tactics of *jalpa*, *chala*, *jāti*, *nigrahasthāna* and *vitaṇḍā*. The term *vāda* came in vogue in this era and *brahmodyas* were replaced by *vādas* (in the sense of friendly as well as hostile debates). With growth of diverse philosophical schools, the debates assume a tone of confrontation and challenge, and are carried through written texts and public platforms with ferocity.

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Philosophical systems referred to as *matas* or *siddhāntas* and later on as *darśanas* developed under two schools — the realist and idealist. A more rational grouping of various *darśanas* has been attempted by Mādhavācārya, who authored a Saṁgraha text on these *darśanas* — *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*. Accordingly, *darśanas* are divided into two groups — the *nāstikas* and *āstikas*. The former are of two types — Ādhyakṣikas (those who uphold perception as the only means of knowledge) and Tārkikas (rationalists). The *āstika* philosophers are also of two kinds — the Saguṇātmavādins and the Nirguṇātmavādins. The Saguṇātmavādins are of two type — Tārkikas (rationalists) and Śrautas (those who hold the authority of Śruti or scriptures alone). The Tārkikas are again of two types: Spaṣṭatārkikas (direct rationalists) and Prachannatārkikas (indirect rationalists).

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The proponent and the respondent (*vādin* and *prativādin*) stood before each with daggers drawn, abuses we are hurled and piquant satires we are used. And this was the era when India’s intellectual genius reached its zenith reverberating with its fertile thinking and presenting sumptuous feasts in intellection. Philosophy became a celebration of intellectual skills. Both intra-sectarian and inter-sectarian debates were fought by Bādarāyaṇa, Vātsyāyana, Nāgārjuna, Diṅnāga, Kumārila, Prabhākara, Dharmakīrti, Śaṅkarācārya and Udayana. Buddhist philosophers like Nāgārjuna, Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti exemplified the theory and practice of debate not only through their writings, they also participated in debates on public platforms. *Vāda* was a means of propagation of Buddha's message for them.

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Diṅnāga was a debater par excellence. He remained conspicuous by his presence in the debates held at Nālandā University. There are references to some of the debates in which he proved the brilliance of his intellect. In one such debate, Sudurjaya, a brāhmaṇa scholar, received debacle at his hands.¹¹⁴

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The diversity of sects and their tolerant symbiosis were brought out by Bāṇa (seventh century CE) in his description of the hermitage of Divākaramitra. Harṣa sees here,

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devotees dead to all passion, Jaina monks in white robes, mendicants in white dress, followers of Kṛṣṇa, religious students, ascetics who had plucked off their hairs, followers of Kapila, Jainas, Lokāyatikas, followers of Kaṇāda, followers of Upaniṣads, theists, students of Dharmaśāstras, students of Purāṇas, experts of Vedic rituals, grammarians, followers of Pāñcarātra system of Āgama, all diligently following their own tenets, pondering, registering objections, raising doubts, resolving the objections and doubts, giving etymologies, disputing, studying, and explaining . . . .¹¹⁵

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Vātsyāyana had refuted the propositions of Nāgārjuna. Diṅnāga (CE 450–520) gave befitting rebuttal to him. Udyotakara subsequently refuted Diṅnāga, and then Dharmakīrti suitably replied to his critique of Diṅnāga. It was Vācaspati Miśra who further carried the fight against the Buddhist philosophers like Dharmakīrti. Kumārila had attacked the very foundation of Nāgārjuna's philosophy and questioned the validity of grading the truth — *saṃvṛti-satya* (the relative) and *paramārtha-satya* (the ultimate). But to Mādhyamika all phenomena remain indeterminate and indefinable.

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Bhāvaviveka (CE 490–570), also known as Bhavya and also as a commentator of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamādhyamikakārikā*, founded Svātantrika school under Mādhyamika Buddhism. He opposed Buddhapālita (CE 470–540), the founder of Prāsaṅgika school of Mādhyamika philosophy. He differed with Buddhapālita with reference to the concept of *paramārtha* (the ultimate) and *saṃvṛti* (the relative).

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Śāntarakṣita (CE 680–740) was one of the most brilliant philosophers of Buddhist thought. In collaboration with his disciple Kamalaśīla (CE 700– 750), he criticized Bhāvaviveka and repositioned it under Yogācāra-Mādhyamika system. In his *Tattvasaṁgraha*, Śāntarakṣita presented a critique of Sāṁkhya theories of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* and examined the concepts of *Ātman* and God in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems, Syādvāda and Cārvāka systems. Kamalaśīla wrote a *pañjikā* on *Tattvasaṁgraha*.

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The deliberations of Bhāvaviveka, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and other followers of Nāgārjuna show the sharp differences and debates even within the Mādhyamikas.

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Amongst the Jaina philosophers who entered into debate both with the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhist logicians mention may be made of Nīlakeśī, whose debates are described in the Tamil *kāvya* of the same name. Myth and imagination are interspersed in the whole texture of this text. By the time the text was created around fourth-fifth century CE, Nīlakeśī had become a mythical name. The debates described in *Neelakesi* are fictitious, but they bring out the perspectives with which Jainism encountered the other systems. Different sections in the text are named on the schools of thought or the masters belonging to these schools who are conquered by Nīlakeśī in debates, viz.:

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*daruma curaic carukkam*
*kuṇḍalakeśivāda carukkam*
*arulkkacandravāda carukkam*
*moggalavāda carukkam*
*biddhavāda carukkam*
*ācīvakavāda carukkam*
*saṁkhyavāda carukkam*
*vedavāda carukkam*
*bhūtavāda carukkam.*

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The debates are said to have been held at Ujjain, Padmapura, Kapilapura, Attināpura (Hastināpura) and Kākkalandī or Kāveripoompattinam.¹¹⁶

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Nīlakeśī is said to have debated with Bhadrā Kuṇḍalakeśī (referred above) at Campillī in the country of Pāñcāla; with Buddhist philosopher Arkacandra at Ujjayinī and Mokkala at Padmapura. After defeating these three, she went to Kapilapura and challenged Buddha himself and defeated him in the debate! In the same way Sāṁkhya-teacher Parāśara was routed at Hastināpura and Vaiśeṣika-teacher Lokajit at his hermitage. Nīlakeśī then met Vedic scholar Bhūtika in the town Kākanti and having defeated him finally she vanquished the teacher of Bhūtavāda (materialism), named Piśācaka in the royal court of King Madanajit.

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The issues taken up in the debates offer strong refutation from the Jaina point of view to various philosophical concepts in all the rival systems, but as Nīlakeśī is supposed to win all the debates, and the rival has to be silenced, the counter-positions from the opponents have not been properly stated.

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Haribhadra (6th century CE) enriched the Indian tradition of philosophical debates by his enormous contributions. He is one of the very few philosophers who always engaged in a constructive debate. Haribhadra exhibited extraordinary sensitivity to understand the point of view of his opponent. Even though he was a devout follower of Mahāvīra, he wrote a commentary on *Nyāyapraveśakasūtram* of Diṅnāga, in which he very faithfully elaborated upon the aphorisms of Diṅnāga. The propitiatory verse in the beginning of his commentary (*praṇipatya jineśvaram . . .*) is supposed to be a salutation for Mahāvīra and Buddha both. Haribhadra declared his commitment for remaining unbiased in his *Lokatattvanirṇaya*:

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I do not have any prejudice for Mahāvīra, nor do I foster any grudge for Kapila and others. (I believe in the principle that) whosoever speaks logically, must be respected.¹¹⁷

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It is said that Haribhadra had authored as many as 1,444 works, as he was asked to compose that many works by his *guru*, as an atonement for having finished 1,444 Buddhists (in debate?).

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Notable amongst his philosophical works are: *Ṣaḍdarśana- samuccaya* and *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya*, *Anekāntajayapatākā* (Victory Flag of Perspectivism) and *Lokatattvanirṇaya*. In the last work he refuted the concepts of *Īśvara* (God) and *Ātman* and considered the world as essential. With his faith in the theory of Anekānta, he criticized the opponent's view, but also tried to see it with another perspective and to unveil its validity. This way of looking at another's view embraces both agreements and disagreements. Also, in his attempt to justify the view of his rival, Haribhadra gave it a twist, which might not at all be acceptable to the opponent. He was guided by the philosophy that ideologies aim at one and the same target, i.e. *mokṣa*, therefore the points of disagreement between them might be rectified. For the refutation of *nairātmya* (theory of nonsoul) he even cited the authority of Veda: *svayaṁ jyotiḥ sadā eva ātmā tathā vede api paṭhyate*.¹¹⁸

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Besides well-established schools of philosophies, several ideologues and schools of thought like Daivavāda (fatalism), Svabhāvavāda (naturalism), Kālavāda (pessimism) and Puruṣakāravāda (activism) had existed. Vātsyāyana in his *Kāmasūtra* and Yājñavalkya in his *Smṛti* had criticized some of these. Haribhadra also presented refutation of Daivavāda (fatalism), Svabhāvavāda (naturalism), Kālavāda (pessimism) and Puruṣakāravāda or Karmavāda (activism) in his *Śāstrārthavārtāsamuccaya*. He did not completely overrule these theories, he simply said that none of them was sufficient to explain the theory of causality singularly. *Kāla*, *svabhāva*, *niyati* and *karma* all collectively become the cause for world.¹¹⁹

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During sixth-seventh centuries, the Pallava and Pāṇḍya courts in south India had become vibrant centres of debates between diverse sects. Sundara Pāṇḍya, a philosopher of Advaita Vedānta who flourished before Śaṅkarācārya in Tamil Nadu, was also known as Pāṇḍyarāja Kubjavardhana and Kūna Pāṇḍya. He is said to have converted from Jainism to embrace Śaivism after discussions with Jñānasambandhar. He is worshipped amongst the sixty-three Nāyanārs (devotees of Śiva). Akalaṅka, one of the most brilliant logicians, was contemporary of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Śubhatuṅga or Kṛṣṇa I (eighth century CE). He is said to have defeated the Buddhists in the debates held in Pallava court, so that they were forced to migrate to Laṅkā.

Debates between Buddhists and Naiyāyikas

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In his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Diṅnāga had presented a refutation of *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama together with the *bhāṣya* on it by Vātsyāyana. Udyotakara came in support of the traditional Nyāya system and in his *Nyāyavārttika*, he gave a strong rebuttal to Diṅnāga. Dharmakīrti took up the position of Diṅnāga to give a rejoinder to Udyotakara in this work.

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It is Diṅnāga who posed a real challenge to these systems. His illustrious predecessor, Nāgārjuna was an arguer par excellence. The philosophers of the rival schools, however, could possibly ignore Nāgārjuna, it was not possible to ignore Diṅnāga or to avoid a tacit or a spoken confrontation with him. Diṅnāga also set the rules of the game. The challenges posited by Diṅnāga also led them to reconsider the scheme of their categorizations and postulations as well. Diṅnāga also criticized Bhartṛhari’s philosophy of Śabdabrahmavāda in his *Traikālyaparīkṣā*.

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