瑜伽師地論略纂 5

English (machine translation) 5

Language: English

1. Explaining the contextual purpose. Among the seventeen bhūmis, the first nine bhūmis explain the objects of the three vehicles, divided into four [categories]: The first two bhūmis are the essence of the object, because all [phenomena] take consciousness as their nature. The next three bhūmis are the characteristics of the object, because coarse and subtle differ. The next two bhūmis are the function of the object, because functions are initiated at the two times of concentration and distraction. The last two bhūmis are the states of the object, because the two states of with-mind and without-mind differ. Because essence relies upon characteristics, possesses functions, and differs in sequential states, the objects of the nine bhūmis are established. Among the two essences of the object, easy to know and difficult to know serve as their sequence. Among the three characteristics of the object, the coarse, intermediate, and subtle grades serve as their sequence. Among the two functions of the object, superior and inferior grades serve as their sequence. Among the two states of the object, manifest and unmanifest times serve as their sequence. The two bhūmis below explain the function of the object, taking superior and inferior as their sequence; this is the contextual purpose of this bhūmi.

5.3

2. Explaining the names of the bhūmis. "Samāhita": here translated as "equipoise" (dengyin). Formerly called "sanmati" (sanmati), which was an erroneous abbreviation. This has seven names: First, "samāhita." The Vibhāṣā explains it as the bhūmi of superior concentration, free from torpor and restlessness, which can equally induce, or induces equality, or is induced by equality; hence it is called the bhūmi of equipoise. Later in this fascicle it says: "It is not one-pointedness of mind in the desire realm, because this concentration and so forth are induced by lack of regret, joy, and pliancy." That is, it explains equipoise with three meanings: first, can equally induce; second, induces equality; third, because it is induced through equal expedients; both the inducer and that which is induced are equal. "Samā" means equal; "hita" means induce. Second, "samādhi": here translated as "concentration" (dengchi). "Samā" is as before; "dhi" means holding. Formerly called "sanmei", which was erroneous. Third, "samāpatti": here translated as "attainment" (dengzhi). "Samā" is as before; "patti" means attainment. Formerly called "sanmabati", which was erroneous. Fourth, "dhyāna": here translated as "meditation" (jinglü). Formerly called "chan", whose meaning was incomplete. Fifth, "citta-ekāgratā": here translated as "one-pointedness of mind." "Citta" means mind; "eka" means one; "agra" means point/object; "tā" means nature. Formerly called "single-mindedness" (yixin), which was an abbreviation. Sixth, "śamatha": here translated as "calm abiding" (zhi). Seventh, "pleasant abiding in the present life" (dṛṣṭadharmasukhavihāra). In fascicle 63 it explains the meanings of samādhi, one-pointedness of mind, śamatha, and abiding. Among these names, regarding the bhūmi of equipoise, the Vibhāṣā has three explanations: In terms of the actual meaning, it extends to both with-mind and without-mind, consisting solely of all virtues in states of concentration. Because the principle of the three meanings of equipoise applies universally, all distracted states are not of this bhūmi. The name "samādhi" designates the single mental factor of concentration among the specific mental factors; it universally subsumes one-pointedness of mind in all states with mind, extending to both concentrated and distracted states, as distinguished in the four alternatives in the Vibhāṣā. However, various sūtras and treatises, referring to the superior, merely speak of emptiness, wishlessness, and so forth as samādhis. "Samāpatti" universally designates all concentrations themselves within all concentrated states, both with-mind and without-mind; yet various sūtras and treatises, referring to the superior, only speak of the concentrations associated with the five actualizations and so forth as samāpattis. "Dhyāna" extends to with-mind and without-mind, contaminated and uncontaminated, defiled and undefiled, relying upon the four stages of the form realm and not other stages; yet various sūtras and treatises, referring to the superior, mostly speak of the pure virtues with mind of the form stages as dhyāna. The essence of one-pointedness of mind is itself concentration, because it extends to defiled and pure, and because one-pointedness of mind explains concentration. "Śamatha" exists only in states with mind, not without mind; only in pure states, not impure states; only in concentrated states, not in distracted mind. "Pleasant abiding in the present life" consists only of the fundamental states of the four dhyānas, not their preparatory stages; it is pure, uncontaminated mind, not distracted or of the formless realm. Therefore, because equipoise universally subsumes all virtues in concentrated states, both with-mind and without-mind, and is comprehensive and broad, it is specifically established as the name of the bhūmi.

5.4

3. Revealing the essential nature. In the Vibhāṣā there are three masters, with four paired alternatives, all detailed as in that work. Within this bhūmi, it first concludes the preceding and introduces what follows to begin the treatise; later it relies upon questions and answers. Within the answers there are three parts: first, stating the verse; second, explaining the verse; third, extensive explanation. The final miscellaneous meanings enter into the fifth, the doctrinal essentials of the sūtras. Within those essentials, it explains the sūtras on various dharma characteristics such as the eight liberations listed below; those miscellaneous meanings also explain the scattered, miscellaneous meanings of the various sūtras. Because both explain sūtras, they form a single portal. In portals such as establishment, it only explains dhyāna, not liberation, samādhi, or samāpatti, because they are only explained below in the essentials. The extensive explanation has four parts: first, general heading; second, establishment; third, manaskāra and ālambana; fourth, explaining the sūtra. The third and fourth are explained together, so there are four sections. In the general heading there are two parts: first heading the four portals, and later explaining them individually.

5.5

The alternate names of the four dhyānas are explained as in the commentary notes on the preceding fifth fascicle; their establishment, rejection, increase, and decrease are as in [fascicle] sixty-three. Among [the expositions of] samādhi, there are eleven gates. The eleventh is not explained because it is easy, and also because it will only be explained in the "Śrāvakabhūmi".
Regarding the "four cultivate[d] samādhis": first, for the sake of obtaining abiding in happiness in the present life; second, for the sake of obtaining knowledge and vision; third, for the sake of obtaining discriminating prajñā; fourth, for the sake of obtaining the exhaustion of the āsravas.
Regarding the "five noble knowledges", they are: knowledge of self-nature, knowledge of the pudgala, knowledge of purity, knowledge of the fruit, and knowledge of the marks of entering and exiting absorption.
Regarding the "five noble limbs", abiding in happiness in the present life constitutes four, and relying on closely scrutinizing the phenomena of pratītyasamutpāda and cutting off the remaining fetters constitutes the fifth.
Regarding the "noble right [samādhi] possessing causes and requisites": the five [factors] of right view, right thought, right speech, right action, and right livelihood are called "possessing causes"; the three [factors] of right view, right effort, and right mindfulness are called "possessing requisites". This is because these seven limbs act as causes for noble right samādhi.
Among [the expositions of] samāpatti, there are six gates. The eight abhibhv-āyatanas and the ten kṛtsnāyatanas, being explained in the context of vimokṣa, have already been briefly explained and will not be explained again; and because the four ārūpyas are explained in the "Viniścaya[saṃgrahaṇī]" and elsewhere as not different from vimokṣa, they are also not explained here.

5.6

In the gate of establishment, discrimination is made through five gates: first, establishing the samāhita-bhūmi; second, establishing the joy and pleasure born of separation, and so forth; third, establishing the hindrances; fourth, establishing the limbs; fifth, establishing alternate names. In establishing the bhūmi, as for "because these absorptions and so forth are induced by absence of regret, delight, and ease-and-pleasure": because one upholds the precepts, the mind has no regret; because there is no regret, there is delight; because there is delight, there is ease-and-pleasure; and because of ease-and-pleasure, one attains samādhi. Therefore, this samāhita is not found in the desire realm, nor is it that the desire realm is entirely without correct and close observation of phenomena.

5.7

In the second, the establishment, there are three [parts]: first, citing the sūtra to state [the topic]; second, explaining each separately; and third, from "the World-Honoured One, regarding the mundane upāya" onward, resolving difficulties concerning the sequence of samādhi and vimokṣa.
"The joy induced by desires" and so forth displays that which is to be separated from, because the unconditioned [state] of āśraya-parāvṛtti that is realized is called separation.
"Furthermore, having practiced and perfected the five dharmas" displays the dharmas produced through āśraya-parāvṛtti. Gladness and joy both have joyful feeling as their nature; [they are] established as two differences because of the truly deep jubilation induced by absence of regret. Tranquillity and ease both have pleasant feeling as their nature; [they are] established as two differences because of the adaptability induced by separating from all dauṣṭhulya, and the two kinds of pleasant fruit induced by adaptability. This is what was referred to in the preceding fifth fascicle as joy and pleasure born of separation. However, since these two feelings are both pleasing and both born of manas, they are collectively called "joy"; therefore here it only speaks of joy born of separation. If it were not so, the various passages would conflict.
As for not speaking of equanimity among that which is induced by desires: equanimity induced by desires is not delight, and because one is weary of desires, it is not what is to be abandoned; whereas equanimity induced by unwholesomeness, being unwholesome by nature, is precisely what is to be abandoned. Therefore their statements differ.

5.8

As for "'gladness' means that a practitioner whose conduct has been pure from the beginning observes the pure conduct cultivated on the stage of provisions" and so forth: the meaning expressed here is that only at the stage of the prayogamārga does one cultivate samāhita, so abiding in the provisions, one only then cultivates pure conduct, and the purity of upholding the precepts generates absence of regret and so forth. Alternatively, when cultivating samādhi, the prior distant upāya requires that one's precepts first be pure, which is called the stage of provisions; it is not necessary that one must have entered the path before cultivating samāhita.

5.9

In resolving the difficulties concerning sequence, there are differences among three sūtras: first, speaking first of samādhi and afterwards of vimokṣa; second, speaking first of vimokṣa and afterwards of samādhi; third, speaking of the two as simultaneous. That which was cited above regarding separating from the five evil dharmas—first speaking of vimokṣa, of cultivating the five dharmas, and afterwards speaking of samādhi—corresponds to the second sūtra. Since these conflict, an explanation is now provided. Here, the fundamental absorption is called samādhi, and the cutting off and subduing of defilements is called vimokṣa. Since within the undefiled one mostly relies on the fundamental bhūmi to cut off the defilements, it first speaks of samādhi and afterwards of vimokṣa; it is not that one cannot rely on the threshold [concentration] to first cut off defilements and afterwards attain the fundamental bhūmi. In the defiled, one mostly relies on the threshold [concentration], using six manaskāras to first subdue the defilements, and enters the fundamental bhūmi through the seventh, the prayoga-niṣṭha-phala-manaskāra. There is also the case where the seventh manaskāra is in the threshold bhūmi as the vimuktimārga, and only afterwards does one attain the fundamental [absorption]; therefore it says here that because, having realized the prayoga-niṣṭha-manaskāra-phala, defilements are cut off, one only then attains the fundamental samādhi. If it were not so, it would contradict the statement in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and elsewhere that the seventh manaskāra is in the fundamental bhūmi. In the clause on simultaneity, both manaskāra and samādhi are undefiled; being simultaneous with vimokṣa, they cut off the seeds of defilement. This means that when the prayoga-niṣṭha-manaskāra in the threshold concentration induces the phala-manaskāra to enter the fundamental dhyāna, which is called samādhi, the dhyāna simultaneous with this is the vimuktimārga realizing unconditioned vimokṣa; therefore it says that samādhi is simultaneous with vimokṣa, not that the dhyāna simultaneous with the prayoga-niṣṭha-manaskāra is called samādhi.
Regarding "and in the other ānantaryamārga-samādhi" and so forth: this means that the prior upāya is in the threshold bhūmi, and relying on the fundamental bhūmi one gives rise to the undefiled ānantaryamārga. In the samādhi that is simultaneous with the vimuktimārga induced by these two, because this can cut off affliction, it is called simultaneous with vimokṣa; it does not mean that the previous two defiled manaskāras that can subdue affliction are called the other ānantaryamārga. This is because they are not simultaneous with samādhi, and the vimuktimārga induced by them also does not enter the fundamental bhūmi. That both defiled and undefiled are called upāya is because before attaining the perfection of the fruit of the aśaikṣa, they are called upāya, since cutting off affliction is spoken of as vimokṣa. Having spoken of the initial joy born of separation, the others, born of samādhi and so on, can be known accordingly. Alternatively, this clause on simultaneity refers to the ānantaryamārga in the threshold bhūmi being called samādhi; because it can liberate from hindrances, it is called vimokṣa. Because their entities differ from the previous samādhi and vimokṣa, they form the clause on simultaneity, since their perspectives are different.

5.10

In establishing the hindrances, there are two parts: first, clarifying the characteristics of the hindrances; second, clarifying the nutriment of the hindrances. The characteristics of the hindrances have two parts: first, stating and listing them; second, explaining them individually.
In "the hindrance of torpor and sleepiness", first the characteristics are explained individually, and afterwards the reason for establishing them together as one hindrance. "Not guarding the sense faculties" and so forth is as explained in the "Śrāvakabhūmi".
"The mind is extremely dim and abbreviated" is as explained in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*.
In explaining the combined establishment of the hindrance, there are first two alternative explanations, and afterwards a conclusion establishing the sense of their mutually conforming arising.
In the hindrance of agitation and regret, first the two characteristics are explained individually, and afterwards the reason for establishing them together as one hindrance is explained. In the reasons, there are two alternative explanations: first, explaining that because both take relatives and so forth as their common object-support, they are combined into one hindrance; second, explaining that because their active aspects are similar, they are combined into one hindrance. In the previous individual explanation of the characteristics of regret, there are three times: first, when one was in secular life.
As for "for what reason did I go forth at a young age?" and so forth: the initial time of going forth.
As for "or due to recollecting what was previously experienced" and so forth: the time after going forth.
In the text explaining the similarity of their active aspects, there are also three passages.

5.11

"Regarding what should be done up to not doing what should be done and doing instead what should not be done": this explains the regret of the first two times, [namely,] what should be done, what should not be done, and not doing what should be done and doing instead what should not be done, which all apply to both secular life and the initial time of going forth.
Next, removing the regret born of prior repentance and the distinctions of born regret: this second part explains the regret arising after having gone forth.
"Removing the regret born of prior repentance" and so forth: this removes the regret arising in secular life.
"Yet still unable to relinquish this entanglement of regret": this refers to the regret arising at the initial time of going forth that one is still unable to relinquish.
"Subsequently generating again the regret of sorrow and longing": this is because it arises from recollecting past amusements, laughter, and so forth; this is yet another distinction of regret after going forth. The above two kinds subsume all the regrets of the three previous times. For secular regret, its basis may arise and can share the same sphere of objects as agitation; for the regret arising initially upon going forth, because its active aspect ought not to arise, it is called regret over an improper basis. Therefore, the third part of the treatise summarizes it, stating that the improper regret born immediately before and the regret arising after going forth, although their loci are not equal to that of agitation, their characteristics are similar; it is not merely that they share an object, but regret, sorrow, and longing are established together with agitation. The two objects after going forth are not the same, but both regret and sorrow/longing are combined into a hindrance; it is not that the entity of agitation does not pervade defiled minds. However, as the active aspect increases, it does not exist at this time; because it is said that their loci are not equal, this does not contradict the principles of *Vijñaptimātratā*.

5.12

In doubt: "regarding the Teacher" refers to the two jewels of the Buddha and the Saṃgha. "Regarding the Dharma" refers to principle; "training" refers to practice; "instruction" refers to teaching; "realization" refers to fruit. These are precisely the four Dharma jewels of teaching, principle, practice, and fruit. Because one harbors doubt regarding the Three Jewels, one cannot enter the path of vigorous upāya, which is the truth of the path, nor the quietude of correct abandonment, which is the truth of cessation.
Alternatively, "upāya" is the prayogamārga; "correct abandonment" is the truth of the path; and "quietude" is the truth of cessation.

5.13

Below, nutriment and non-nutriment are clarified. "Nutriment" has the meaning of nourishing and promoting, being the condition that increases and generates the hindrances; "non-nutriment" refers to the dharmas that cut off and extinguish the hindrances.
Regarding "if one can distance oneself from a defiled mind with respect to this" and so forth: it merely adduces the reason for the sign of purity and attractiveness.
The nine bases of vexation are as explained in [fascicle] fifty-eight.
Regarding the "light of the Dharma": it means that such as when someone, according to what has been received, what has been contemplated, and what has been experienced, matches respectively to the prajñā of hearing, contemplating, and cultivating.
"Observing all dharmas" applies across all three above prajñās.
Regarding "furthermore, realizing observation can counteract the darkness of torpor and sleepiness": "realizing" refers to the prajñā of cultivating the Dharma, meaning that touching and encountering [it] within absorption is called realizing. Through the light of the Dharma, the prajñās of hearing, contemplating, and so forth remove delusion and doubt; at the stage of cultivation, they can remove sleepiness. Because it can make distinct the nature of all dharmas, it is called the light of the Dharma and serves as non-nutriment.
Regarding "laughter means such as when someone, due to open discussion or combined discussion" and so forth: explicit speech is called open discussion; veiled speech using metaphors, combining them so as to bring about understanding, is called combined discussion. Opening the mouth and smiling is called showing teeth. Making a sound in the throat is called chuckling.
Regarding the "nine states of abiding mind", they are explained as in the thirtieth fascicle of the "Śrāvakabhūmi", the tenth fascicle of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and elsewhere.
Regarding "possessing conditions and conditioned origination": "possessing conditions" refers to the resultant dharmas; "conditioned origination" refers to the causal dharmas.

5.14

Fourth, within the establishing of the limbs [of dhyāna], there are three [parts]: first, establishing the number according to the bhūmis; next, explaining what is rejected and established; and finally, discrimination through questions and the like. Together, they are distinguished by seven headings. / 1. Explaining the names: 'Limb' (aṅga) refers to a component limb, as in the limbs of the path of awakening (bodhyaṅga). The Sarvāstivādins say: samādhi is dhyāna and is also a limb of dhyāna; the rest are limbs of dhyāna, but are not dhyāna [itself]. According to the correct meaning, they are like the four limbs of an army, because each serves as an antidote. Equanimity, mindfulness, and discernment, based upon the state of concentration, are jointly able to eliminate hindrances, and are called 'internal serene clarity', because they clarify and purify all hindrances. The remaining names are readily understood. / 2. Identifying the essential nature: Although eighteen in number, their essential natures are only seven: first, vitarka; second, vicāra; third, sensation (vedanā); fourth, samādhi; fifth, upekṣā; sixth, smṛti; and seventh, prajñā. The joy of the first two dhyānas is simply the sensation of pleasure (sukha-vedanā) and not plabaddhi (lightness/tranquillity). One is omnipresent (sarvatraga), namely sensation; three are object-determining (viniyata), namely mindfulness, samādhi, and discernment; one is wholesome, namely equanimity; and two are indeterminate (aniyata), namely vitarka and vicāra. Because of 'internal serene clarity', the sixty-third [fascicle] explains that it consists precisely of equanimity, mindfulness, and right discernment (saṃprajanya). Therefore, their number is only seven, neither more nor less. / 3. Distinction of kinds according to bhūmi: Only pure and undefiled states possess these limbs; defiled dhyānas do not. Concerning defiled concentrations, Kośa fascicle twenty-eight says: the first defiled concentration lacks joy and pleasure, because they are not produced by renouncing defilements; the second defiled concentration lacks internal serene clarity, because it is disturbed by defilements; the third defiled concentration lacks right mindfulness and discernment, because it is confounded by defiled pleasure; the fourth defiled concentration lacks the purity of equanimity and mindfulness, because it is defiled by defilements. Now this may also be accepted. / 4. Relying on the bhūmis: In the threshold concentration (anāgamya-samādhi) and the first two dhyānas, [actual dhyāna] pleasure is omitted, while the rest may be fully present. Or it is based solely on the fundamental [absorptions], because concentration and discernment are balanced. The Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya states: in the formless attainments, no limbs are established, because their nature is uniformly śamatha alone. / 5. Distinction in cutting off hindrances: What is eliminated by the first and third dhyānas are five each; what is eliminated by the second and fourth dhyānas are four each. / 6. The reason for the increase and decrease among the five and four limbs: In the first dhyāna there is no mindfulness, discernment, or equanimity; in the second concentration it is called 'internal serene clarity'; and the fourth dhyāna is designated with the name 'purity'—all as explained in fascicle sixty-three. The reason right discernment is not established in the fourth dhyāna is that it is eclipsed and overpowered by the sensation of neither-pain-nor-pleasure, their natures being contradictory as light and darkness, sharp and dull. / Question: In the second concentration, joy is agitating and bounding, and giving rise to defilements can obstruct; hence it is called internal clarity. In the fourth concentration, the sensation of equanimity is dull; since it obstructs right discernment, it should also be non-clarity. / Answer: In the second concentration, because joy gives rise to defilements that generally obstruct all three, it is called internal clarity. In the fourth concentration, the sensation of equanimity only obstructs discernment, not equanimity and mindfulness; hence it is called purity. The cognitive aspect of the sensation of equanimity is dull and obstructs clear and sharp discernment; therefore, in the fourth concentration, right discernment is not established. It is not because it produces defilements that obstruct equanimity and mindfulness; thus the two are called purity. / 7. Within what is rejected and established, fascicle sixty-three, the Abhidharma[-samuccaya], and the Daśabhūmika-sūtra all speak of three: vitarka and vicāra as antidotes, joy and pleasure as benefits, and samādhi as the basis. Here, four are spoken of. / 'Vitarka and vicāra apprehend the objective support' means observing the corresponding object so as to serve as the antidote; samādhi is the basis; joy experiences what has been attained; and pleasure eliminates dauṣṭhulya. The sensation that gladdens the mind is called joy; that which can delight the body is called pleasure. Dauṣṭhulya resides in the body; when pleasure arises and dauṣṭhulya ceases, it is called eliminating it, not eliminating lower defilements. Eliminating lower defilements belongs solely to vitarka and vicāra. Thus it shows that where the limbs of benefit are spoken of in various passages, there are two meanings: first, experiencing the attained object; second, eliminating the hindrance of dauṣṭhulya. In the third and fourth concentrations, by experiencing what is attained one immediately eliminates dauṣṭhulya, with no distinct entity, as they possess both capacities, delighting the sense faculties and renouncing dauṣṭhulya. / 'Kindness' (kṛpā / anugraha) refers to beneficial virtue, for all these limbs show kindness to one who cultivates concentration. Fascicle sixty-three contains many further alternative explanations.

5.15

Fifth, within the explanation of establishing alternate names, there are five names: 1. superior mind (adhicitta); 2. dwelling happily in the present life (dṛṣṭa-dharma-sukha-vihāra); 3. nirvāṇa of that portion (tadaṅga-nirvāṇa); 4. differentiated nirvāṇa (viśeṣa-nirvāṇa); and 5. the occasion of transcending sensations. / The text is divided into four, because the third and fourth are distinguished together. 'Superior mind': the substance of concentration is called 'mind' because it can collect the mind; or the basis is called 'mind', and concentration can collect the mind, so being the superiority of the mind, it is called 'superior mind'. / Within 'dwelling happily in the present life', first pleasure is explained, next the present life is explained, and finally the reason why the formless [attainments] are not so named is explained. / 'Experiencing joy and pleasure' refers to the sensations of joy and pleasure. / 'Bliss' refers to the pleasure of plabaddhi. / 'Equanimous pleasure' refers to the pleasure of the sensation of equanimity. Everything that accords with and pleases body and mind is called pleasure. / 'Bodily and mental pleasure' refers to the pleasure that brings delight. / 'Happy dwelling': Fascicle sixty-three states that because the mind is tied within and does not drift away, the dwelling can induce pleasure, hence it is called 'happy dwelling'. Therefore, the 'Bodhisattvabhūmi' says: defiled pleasure is bound to the three realms; undefiled pleasure is subsumed under what is unbound. Now, based on the fact that both body and mind possess the four pleasures—the pleasure of joy, the pleasure of joy, the pleasure of plabaddhi, and the pleasure of equanimity—the four dhyānas receive the designation of 'happy dwelling'. The desire realm lacks the latter two, and the formless realm lacks the first two; therefore, although pleasure is present, they are not called 'happy dwelling'. / Furthermore, the pleasure of joy is the pleasure of the first and second dhyānas; the pleasure of bliss is the pleasure of the third dhyāna; and the pleasure of equanimity is the pleasure of the fourth dhyāna. 'Bodily and mental pleasure' serves to exclude the formless realm as the reason it is not a happy dwelling. / 'A forest-dwelling bhikṣu then voiced a criticism, saying: "I now ask him about the quietistic liberation that transcends form and the formless, yet he cannot explain it"'—the intent here is to say: formless concentrations are called transcending form, and undefiled concentrations are called transcending the formless; these two are called dwelling happily in the present life because they are quietistic liberations. Now it is explained that the concentrations of the formless realm are not happy dwellings; the four dhyānas of the form realm are called quietistic liberations and are dwellings of happiness in the present life. Because one portion of active defilements has been severed, while their seeds have not been severed and later regress and arise again—not being definitively determined—it is called 'nirvāṇa of that portion'. Even if it were undefiled dhyāna and unarrived [concentration], based on this it is also called 'nirvāṇa of that portion'. Moreover, because it is conditioned and not the ultimate unconditioned nirvāṇa, it is called 'differentiated nirvāṇa'.

5.16

Furthermore, because one portion is severed, pure concentration and one portion of undefiled [wisdom] suppress defilements; hence it is called 'nirvāṇa of that portion'. The undefiled [state] that severs defilements is not unconditioned; therefore, being called non-definitive, it is 'nirvāṇa of that portion'. / Furthermore, attaining non-analytical cessation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha) without the nature of severance, being able to realize dhyāna, is also called 'nirvāṇa of that portion'. True nirvāṇa is called 'nirvāṇa of this portion'; metaphorical nirvāṇa is called 'that portion', where 'that portion' has the meaning of similarity in kind. That metaphorical kind resembles the real, so it is called 'nirvāṇa of that portion'; it is also a differentiation of nirvāṇa, called 'differentiated nirvāṇa'.

5.17

Fourth, the explanation. Fifth, within the occasion of transcending sensations, there are four [parts]: first, indicating the four and the one, citing sūtra passages to verify them; second, mutually subsuming them with the five elements conducive to renunciation (niḥsaraṇa-dhātu); third, explaining the sūtra on the six elements of renunciation on this basis; fourth, explaining the transcendence of faults as being called the support for renunciation.

5.18

Within the first, there are three [parts]: first, indicating the four renunciations; next, explaining the sūtra on renunciation; and finally, discrimination through questions and answers. Renunciation has three meanings: first, the meaning of non-occurrence; second, the meaning of extinguishing dauṣṭhulya; and third, the meaning of being freed from defilement. The first dhyāna's renunciation of grief has these three meanings. The second dhyāna's renunciation of suffering has only the meaning of extinguishing dauṣṭhulya, because defilement was already abandoned in the first [dhyāna], yet [suffering] still occurs later. The latter three renunciations possess both the extinction of dauṣṭhulya and the meaning of being freed from defilement. The signless renunciation of equanimity strictly requires the stage of non-learning (aśaikṣa); in other stages, being a partial renunciation, it does not obtain the name of renunciation.

5.19

Within the explanation of the sūtra on renunciation, there are two [parts]: first, explaining the sūtra on the renunciation of grief; next, extending the analogy to the sūtra on the remaining renunciations, as shown in the text: 'Thus for the rest, it should be understood accordingly.' / The first text has four [points]. / 'How is the preface (antecedent cause) known?': 'Preface' means the root-cause. / 'The faculties capable of generating' refers to the faculties, objects, and so forth. 'Seeds of ignorance': because ignorant people often give rise to grief. These are all called 'prefaces'. Even non-defiled grief is also said to arise due to delusion. / Furthermore, the seeds of all defilements can generate grief; with ignorance as their root, only those seeds are spoken of on account of the nature of this unwholesome faculty of grief. Being damaged by delusion, upon detachment from desire it is abandoned, and the rest likewise disappear, because ignorance is extinguished. Even if it is conceptualized and not innate (sahaja), upon detachment from desire it is also abandoned, because the companions of the innate faculty of grief are abandoned.

5.20

Within the questions and answers there are three [parts]: first, the characteristics of the faculties; next, clarifying the faculty of suffering; and finally, explaining the signless. / In the first dhyāna, 'the dauṣṭhulya of the faculty of suffering has not yet been severed': because all faculties of grief are induced by ignorance and the like, when one is freed from defilement, they cease to function altogether, and dauṣṭhulya is also abandoned. Even yearning and dejection regarding the unexcelled Dharma are induced by ignorance, and so upon detachment from desire they are abandoned. Because all faculties of suffering exist without being induced by delusion, when one is detached from desire they still function; therefore, their dauṣṭhulya—unadaptability—is only extinguished in the second dhyāna. / Question: The faculty of suffering arises upon detachment from desire, yet its dauṣṭhulya is extinguished in the second dhyāna; joy and pleasure are abandoned upon detachment from the lower, yet their dauṣṭhulya is eliminated in higher bhūmis. / Answer: The basis of the faculty of suffering as well as vitarka and vicāra exist in the first dhyāna, and therefore it is extinguished in the second dhyāna; the basis of joy and pleasure has no distinct inducement, and at the time of freedom from defilement, dauṣṭhulya vanishes. / 'If the faculty of suffering had already been severed in the first dhyāna, then when the practitioner enters the first dhyāna and the second, there would be no distinction in the dwelling produced by sensation' and so forth: the intent of this is to say that the first dhyāna extinguishes grief and the second dhyāna extinguishes suffering; thereby, although both are dwellings of happiness in the present life, they come to have distinctions. If suffering were already extinguished in the first dhyāna, the second dhyāna would not be distinct, and there would be no distinction in their dwelling happily in the present life, because the sūtras state that the dhyānas' transcending of sensations is distinct, causing their dwellings to be distinct. Furthermore, there is a distinction in this severing of sensations: in the first dhyāna, vitarka and vicāra are not quieted, so dauṣṭhulya is not severed and extinguished; in the second dhyāna, they are quieted, so dauṣṭhulya is only then severed and extinguished. If the faculty of suffering were already severed in the first dhyāna, this distinction would not exist. / 'Moreover, the signless' and so on: this refers to the concentration on emptiness entered by an aśaikṣa, called the concentration of the signless mind. Seeds of defiled equanimity bound by afflictions are metaphorically called anusaya, designated as dauṣṭhulya; entering into this concentration is said to sever them. Active undefiled equanimity is metaphorically called active entanglement (paryavasthāna); it still arises while in concentration, but it is not that those sensations, being defiled by afflictions, come to possess anusaya. It is precisely these anusayas that are called dauṣṭhulya; it is not that undefiled sensations lack seeds. The fact that the faculty of joy, the faculty of pleasure, and this faculty of equanimity are said to rely only on higher bhūmis is due to the superiority of the bhūmis, and not for any other reason.

5.21

Second, concerning their mutual subsumption with the five elements conducive to renunciation (saṃniḥsaraṇīya-dhātu), the text has three parts: first, repeating and explaining the term renunciation; next, resolving objections; third, miscellaneous explanations of the sūtra. Regarding "Through renunciation of sensual desire, ill will, and harmfulness, there is said to be renunciation up to the faculty of pleasure," sensual desire, ill will, and harmfulness—these three thoughts—are what is to be renounced, while impurity [contemplation], benevolence, and compassion are called that which is capable of renouncing [them]. Since these three contemplations, as appropriate, extend throughout the four dhyānas, renouncing the four sensations constitutes the three renunciations. Regarding "Through renunciation of form, there is said to be renunciation of the faculty of equanimity of the fourth dhyāna," by attaining the concentration of the sphere of infinite space, because one renounces desire for the form realm, this is precisely renunciation of the faculty of equanimity of the fourth dhyāna. Regarding "Through the cessation of the real personality (satkāya-nirodha)," when one frees oneself from the defilement of the three realms by means of the concentration of the signless mind, at the final completion, this is said to be renunciation of the faculty of equanimity of the formless realm. These latter two kinds are together called renunciation of the faculty of equanimity. Regarding "What is the meaning of the words 'conducive to renunciation'?" and so forth, the intention here is to explain that ordinary people and trainees train in the contemplation of renunciation, yet they have not separated [completely] through renunciation; here, those who cultivate the five contemplations are non-trainees (aśaikṣa), who are already able to renounce, and so it is called 'conducive to renunciation,' because the fruit accords with the cause, which is the contemplation of renunciation. It does not mean that ordinary people and trainees renounce those [realms] by cultivating these contemplations; this element is spoken of for those who have already renounced desire for the three realms, attained the concentration of the signless mind, and realized the cessation of the real personality. Regarding "Although those renunciations are simultaneous," it refers to the precise moment of eliminating harmfulness. "With respect to cultivating the antidotes there are distinctions" is based on the distinct aspects and the stage of preliminary preparatory practice. "Above this, there is only one kind of countering and elimination": equanimity in the fourth dhyāna is eliminated by renouncing defilement of form, which is exclusively a single kind of antidote that contemplates emptiness; equanimity in the formless realm is a single kind of antidote that separately cultivates the contemplation of emptiness regarding the body of the four aggregates. These are not like the previous three. Since preliminary preparations are cultivated separately and their aspects differ, although they are severed at one time, three are established separately; the latter two are not so, and thus have no distinctions. Regarding "What is fierce vision?" and so forth, the explanation of the sūtra has twenty-eight phrases. The first thirteen phrases concern the path of preliminary preparation for renouncing desire; the subsequent fifteen phrases under "Contrary to this" concern the actual path of renouncing desire. The intention of this sūtra is to reveal that through the preliminary preparatory path of renouncing desire, defiled craving does not function in the arhat's body and the various afflictions do not arise, just like a red lotus flower to which drops of water do not adhere; hence cultivating the five contemplations is called 'conducive to renunciation.' Among the first thirteen phrases, the first eight phrases are the contemplation of non-attachment to desires, and the subsequent five phrases are the contemplation of revulsion toward desires. "Namely, by means of the attention of examination" is a general phrase; the lower two attentions are specific phrases. Intending to investigate whether the afflictions are severed or not yet severed, one again pays attention and examines the signs of purity that arise in accordance with them; this is the characteristic of the attention of examination among the seven attentions. Examining the subsequent antidotal attention is called attention directed toward superior matters. Repeatedly examining to advance and cultivate the antidote is called attention of fierce effort. This refers to the preliminary preparatory path of renouncing the defilements of the three realms, and therefore it is called the attention of examination, because it is the preparatory path for the attention of the culmination of practice (prayoganiṣṭha-manaskāra). For this reason, the attention of knowing the characteristic and so forth are not mentioned, because in renouncing the desires of the desire realm, the preparatory path for the three realms again is the attention of examination. By logical deduction, since separately renouncing the desires of the three realms involves three uninterrupted paths (ānantarya-mārga), the attention of examination is the preliminary preparatory path for renouncing formless defilement. Here it speaks of an arhat who has completely renounced desire and engages in the five kinds of contemplation. In accordance with this, in the subsequent text explaining the mind that has 'well gone' (sugata) within the path of actual severing, it states that abiding in accordance with the attention of the culmination of practice, when one is actually severing the afflictions, one will attain the path in which the mind wondrously abides in culmination, which is named 'well gone.' Regarding "What is well cultivated? It refers to having well cultivated the remaining attentions; one should know that this refers to the stage of severing and the stage of the preliminary path to severing," this means having well cultivated the stage of severing by the uninterrupted path of this attention of the culmination of practice, and having well cultivated the stage of the preliminary path to severing through the preceding attention of examination and so forth. 'Liberation' (jie) is freedom from active manifestations; 'release' (tuo) is freedom from bond to signs; 'unbinding' is freedom from the latencies (anuśaya). These are the three distinctions. Because these three are severed, dauṣṭhulya is extinguished accordingly. Regarding "The outpourings (āsrava) produced from conditions of sensual desire, excluding sensual craving," because one has already completely developed revulsion [toward it] in the preliminary preparations, it is therefore excluded. "Harm and deficit": being born in bad destinies is called harm; lacking wholesome fruits is called deficit. Regarding "Liberation, transcendence, and unbinding from them, in the order as before," liberation from active defilements is called transcendence; liberation from cognitive objects is called release; liberation from latencies is called unbinding. Regarding "Namely, based on the objective spheres of desires that are about to be obtained, are being obtained, or are recollected," these are, in respective order, the objective spheres of sensual desire of the future, present, and past.

5.22

Third, in explaining the Sūtra on the Six Elements of Renunciation, the text has four parts: first, citing the sūtra to verify and explain; next, clarifying the aspects of distinct elimination; third, resolving objections; fourth, explaining the distinction between the five and six elements. Regarding "Therefore, benevolence and the like are not the direct antidotes to ill will, harmfulness, and so forth," this shows that the beginner in practice still gives rise to arrogance and has not eliminated doubts; in order to subdue these and make them abandon wrong attachments, this element is established.

5.23

Within the aspects of distinct elimination there are two: first, distinct elimination in terms of three categories; next, distinct elimination in terms of six practices. Regarding "Because of examining the ultimate correct principle, the sixth is established," the emptiness of the self that is clung to within merely causes, fruits, truths, and actualities is called the correct principle; because of examining this, arrogance and doubt are extinguished. First, ill will; second, harmfulness; third, jealousy; fourth, delusion, craving, and ill will: the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* states that these are, respectively, what the four kinds—benevolence, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity—counter. Here, stating that sympathetic joy eliminates displeasure refers precisely to jealousy. Equanimity eliminates craving and ill will, but delusion is not mentioned because objects of love and hatred are not equal, and both give rise to the practice of equanimity toward these, so it is said to eliminate only these two; neutral objects are conducive to equanimity, so it is omitted from the explanation, but in fact it also eliminates delusion. Regarding "If one is free from arrogance, in oneself there is liberation," not clinging to arrogance and proceeding free from the clinging of arrogance is called liberation, whereupon one has no doubt regarding the realized truths and realities.

5.24

In resolving the objection, it says: "These renunciations can definitely renounce all ill will" and so forth. That is, an objection asks: since cultivating the six concentrations of benevolence and so forth definitely renounces the six kinds of things to be eliminated such as ill will, why was it previously stated that benevolence and so forth are not the direct severance of ill will, harmfulness, and so forth? Now it is explained: at the stage of the fulfillment of cultivation, these renunciations can definitely renounce all ill will and so forth; but at the time of preliminary preparation, because one has not cultivated them well, faults such as ill will may still actively manifest; therefore it was previously stated that they are not the direct elimination. Regarding "The first four are subsumed under the divine abodes (deva-vihāra)" and so forth, benevolence and compassion, when cultivated generally relying on dhyāna, are called divine abodes; when cultivated specifically relying on the immeasurables (apramāṇa), they are called Brahmā abodes (brahma-vihāra).

5.25

Fourth, explaining that freedom from various faults is called renunciation. In the [four] reliances, there are three parts: first, indicating that there are four kinds of reliances of renunciation; second, explaining the reasons for the aspects respectively; third, concluding with the gains and losses of the four kinds across the four times. The second section has two parts: first, indicating the establishment of the four kinds due to differences among four kinds of persons; afterward, explaining the aspects in detail. Regarding "Because of deceit, it is said that the Dharma is the reliance, not the individual (pudgala)," and so forth, there are deceitful persons who consider their teacher supreme; seeing their deportment and demeanor, they promptly rely on and learn from them. Now, it causes them to rely on the Dharma and not on the person: one must debate, distinguish, and analyze with them, and only then verify and know for oneself, rather than verifying and knowing merely by approaching the person.

5.26

Regarding "Within this there are further distinctions," it re-explains the preceding reliance. The Buddha accords with worldly convention with two kinds of verbal expressions: first, persons; second, dharmas. Now, it causes one to rely on the Dharma and not on the person; one must not hear the Buddha's words that accord with persons and thereupon also rely on persons, because the Buddha's conventional expressions should not be clung to as reliances. Under "Dharmas are also of two kinds," it explains the second reliance. Because of according with the world, words are spoken to express meanings and principles; one should not merely hear the words that accord with the world and take them to be ultimate, and therefore one is caused to rely on the meaning. Regarding "Sūtras spoken by the Buddha either have definitive meaning (nītārtha)..." and so forth, it explains the third reliance. Although one is caused to rely on the meaning, one must not take one's own views as supreme according to personal preference, and therefore one relies on sūtras of definitive meaning. The four levels of definitive meaning are as explained in the treatise. Regarding "The World-Honored One sometimes preaches on the basis of destinations..." and so forth, it explains the fourth reliance. For the causes of humans and devas, he speaks of consciousness (vijñāna); for the cause of nirvāṇa, he speaks of wisdom (jñāna). Within sūtras of definitive meaning, he speaks of consciousness for beginners, and he speaks of wisdom for long-practicing ones. Some hear what is for beginners and cling to it as the ultimate; now, to prevent this, he therefore speaks of relying on wisdom, so that one takes hold of the ultimate.

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瑜伽師地論略纂 — Classical Chinese