成唯識論演祕 4

English (machine translation) 4

Language: English

4.2

Commentary: 'The non-Buddhists laughed and said: "Even fools understand..."'

4.3

Question: The Tathāgata's teaching of the Dharma is free from the four faults; how could the non-Buddhists hear the sūtra and give rise to slander?

Answer: The Great Being's pedagogical conversion brings great benefit; though that group showed slight disparagement, those who attained benefit were vast, and because of this the Tathāgata is termed free from the four faults. Furthermore, although those non-Buddhists temporarily slandered at first, in the end they availed themselves of this as the essential path of deliverance, suffering loss first and gaining benefit later, which precisely accords with the appropriateness of conversion; thus in movement and stillness, nothing is not the work of the Buddha.

4.5

Commentary: 'Fascicle sixty-six says that the subsumption of nutriment is via various alternatives...'

4.6

According to that treatise: 'Question: If there is material substance, is it also nutriment? Supposing it is nutriment, is it also material substance? Answer: As appropriate, four alternatives should be made: There may be material substance that is not nutriment, meaning material substances that cannot nourish the faculties and great elements; there may be nutriment that is not material substance, meaning if there is contact, volition, or consciousness that can cause the faculties and great elements to be nourished; there may be that which is both nutriment and material substance, meaning material substances that can cause the faculties and great elements to be nourished; there may be that which is neither material substance nor nutriment, meaning if there is contact, volition, or consciousness that cannot nourish the faculties and great elements. As with this, the remaining contact up to consciousness form four alternatives as appropriate.'

4.7

Commentary: 'Fascicle sixty-six says it is called contact-nutriment...'

4.8

Being an object that can generate contact-nutriment among the four, the cause is named after the fruit and called contact-nutriment. According to the Sarvāstivāda school, when it has not yet transformed and broken down at first, it can also be called nutriment, because it removes hunger and thirst. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā says: 'Nutriment performs the function of nutriment at two times, and at both it is called nutriment: first, at the time of initial eating, it can remove hunger and thirst; second, after digestion, it sustains the faculties and great elements.' An opinion holds: In Mahāyāna, in actual principle, initial eating can remove hunger and thirst and may also be called nutriment, the meaning being the same as the Sarvāstivāda school; the Yogācārabhūmi and Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya speak only of superior nutriment, saying that it is called nutriment at the time of transformation and breakdown.

4.9

Examination: Although this principle might seem so, clear teachings are hard to contradict. Thus the Yogācārabhūmi says: 'If material substances, at the time of swallowing, cause the mind to be joyful and the faculties delighted, at that time it is not called material nutriment, but only contact-nutriment. If after consumption they are peacefully transformed and digested, increasing joy and pleasure, then at the time of transformation and digestion it is called material nutriment. If there is cooking and transformation that cannot nourish the well-being of the faculties, though it undergoes transformation, it is not called material nutriment. If material substances at the time of swallowing do not produce joy, nor can they cause the faculties to be delighted, at that time it is not called nutriment at all.' Since the text is so deliberate in distinguishing this, how could one reconcile it by saying that it speaks provisionally in terms of the superior? Furthermore, in the Yogācārabhūmi and so forth, it is called nutriment only in view of nourishing the faculties, benefiting, transforming, and breaking down; if it merely removes hunger and thirst temporarily without yet benefiting the faculties through transformation, breakdown, and digestion, where is the meaning of nutriment? For this reason, we do not accept it.

4.10

Question: In the desire realm, odor, taste, and tangibles can be material nutriment; since tangibles exist in the form realm, is material nutriment established there?

4.11

Answer: According to the Abhidharmakośa's differentiation of the eighteen realms in the three realms, what is bound to the form realm is only fourteen kinds, excluding the objects of odor and taste, and the olfactory and gustatory consciousnesses. Odor and taste are excluded because their nature is material nutriment, and only by being detached from desire for material nutriment can one be born there; the olfactory and gustatory consciousnesses are excluded because they lack intentional objects. If so, then the tangible realm should also not exist there, just like the objects of odor and taste. Because their nature is material nutriment, the tangibles that exist there are not of the nature of material nutriment. If so, odor and taste should also be of the same class! Odor and taste have no other utility apart from material nutriment; tangibles have other uses, such as supporting the faculties, clothing, and so forth. Being detached from the desire for nutriment, odor and taste have no use; because there are faculties, clothing, and so forth, tangibles are not absent. For this reason, although the form realm has tangible dust, it has no material nutriment. The rest of the extensive questions and answers are as in the chapter and the Liaoyi deng.

4.12

Treatise: 'Because of this, the visual form base is not material nutriment...'

4.13

Moreover, the tenth fascicle of the Abhidharmakośa also explains that visible form is not nutriment, saying: 'Visible form can also be made into pieces to be drunk and eaten; for what reason is it not nutriment? Because it cannot benefit its own corresponding faculty or one who is liberated. What is called nutriment must first benefit the great elements of its own faculty, and only afterwards reach the others. When drinking or eating visible form, it does not even benefit the great elements of its own faculty, much less reach the others! Because those faculties and objects are each distinct. If sometimes seeing visible form generates joy and pleasure, it is contact born of the condition of visible form; that is nutriment, not the visible form. Furthermore, non-returners and arhats are liberated from greed for food, so although they see various superior and wonderful food and drink, there is no benefit.' For this reason, the visible form base is not called nutriment. Moreover, tradition transmits two explanations of the Sautrāntika: One says that the four dusts excluding sound constitute its essence, because sound is insubstantial and diffuse, lacking supportive utility. The second says that only three dusts constitute its essence, because when visible form and sound undergo change, they lack supportive utility.

4.14

Question: Sound, the faculties, and so forth are all not called nutriment; why is visible form singled out for exclusion?

4.15

Answer: What can be eaten in pieces, drunk, and eaten, and provides nourishment and benefit, is called nutriment. Visible form can be eaten in pieces, so there is potential confusion and it is excluded; sound is insubstantial and diffuse, and mind and so forth have no pieces; the faculties are that which is nourished and lack the meaning of being drunk and eaten, so with no potential confusion, they are not singled out.

4.16

Treatise: 'Third, volition-nutriment has hope as its characteristic...'

4.17

Question: Volition has the characteristic of creating, being the direct cause, and so forth; why is it now said to be hope?

4.18

Answer: As analyzed in the Liaoyi deng. An opinion gives two explanations: The first explanation is the same as the Liaoyi deng. The second explanation says: By virtue of associated dharmas, it causes volition to give rise to an activity of hope toward the object.

4.19

If so, citta and so on are conjoined with desire and so on, so citta should also have hope as its characteristic by virtue of associated dharmas.

4.20

Answer: There is no fault in citta and so forth having hope due to volition; likewise, when citta and so forth are conjoined with feeling and so forth, giving rise to experiencing and so forth does not contradict principle, because citta and so forth are all capable of giving rise to multiple activities; however, the activity of its own characteristic is its primary activity, not others, and so on the basis of primary activity, citta and so forth are not confused.

4.21

Examination: In principle, I fear this is not so. Both the Yogācārabhūmi and this treatise say that citta and so forth have the same ālambana, but not the same ākāra. Therefore this treatise says that citta and caitasikas share the same supporting faculty, their ālambana are similar, but their ākāras are distinct, because their functions of discerning, experiencing, and so forth are each different. Nor can one say that it is spoken in terms of own-characteristic; just as with the aspect of the intentional object, the nimitta-bhāgas are distinct, yet they are said to be similar. If their ākāras were identical, why would it not be stated so? Since the teaching has no basis for this, subjective judgment is difficult to rely upon, and one should follow the first explanation.

4.22

Commentary: 'Fascicle fifty-seven says that it causes consciousness to grow and flourish...'

4.23

This is fully cited in the Liaoyi deng, so it is not repeated here.

4.24

Commentary: 'Furthermore, it is common to out-flowing...'

4.25

There are separately four nutriments, which are explained extensively in the chapter topics.

4.26

Treatise: 'These four can maintain the bodies and lives of sentient beings...'

4.27

Furthermore, according to the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle one hundred and twenty-nine: 'What is the meaning of nutriment? It has the meaning of receiving, the meaning of continuing, the meaning of sustaining, the meaning of producing, the meaning of nourishing, and the meaning of increasing.' This is largely identical with this.

4.28

Treatise: 'Contact- and volition-nutriment... according to the presence or absence of consciousness...'

4.29

An opinion holds: One should only speak of relying on the presence or absence of the six consciousnesses; since the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are not shared [by other schools], now in setting forth the commonly accepted meaning against other traditions, one should not speak of following the seventh and eighth.

4.30

Examination: Observing the trend of the preceding text, it explains the principles of our own school without the intention of confronting other schools. What fault is there in explaining that they follow one's own assertions based on the seventh and eighth consciousnesses? If one says that the preceding text is entirely directed against others and therefore excludes the seventh and eighth, then in determining the essence of consciousness-nutriment, it should also only be six; why then does it state that the eighth is its essence? Hence, it is certain that the preceding text was spoken by oneself in relation to the seventh and eighth, and this principle is without error.

4.31

Commentary: 'Although the present... can establish the valid reason...'

4.32

This explains a tacit objection. The objection says: If what is not present is not nutriment, could it be that all present things are nutriment? Because the present is the causal condition of nutriment, this answer arises; by reflecting on this, it can be understood.

4.33

[On the phrase of] the Treatise: "Nor can it be maintained [...] because it has sāsrava seeds":

4.34

The correct explanation is as in the Commentary. Further, as a supplementary explanation: The opponent's salvaging intent is to say, 'The anāsrava consciousness itself maintains the sāsrava seeds, and takes the maintained sāsrava seeds as its nutriment; what fault is there in this?' Therefore, raising [this position] to refute it, [the Treatise] says: Since the anāsrava does not maintain sāsrava seeds, when there are no sāsrava seeds, nutriment is also not established. Were it not so, earlier it was already challenged that the anāsrava is not nutriment; why bother with this challenge? For the meaning would not be distinct. If one claims that this later challenge is made with respect to a difference in maintaining seeds, how could it be termed nutriment solely in regard to maintaining seeds? Therefore, we know they take sāsrava seeds as nutriment. Even if their own school does not maintain this doctrine, provisionally setting out their theory, there is no error in the logic of their shifts in doctrine.

4.35

Question: The anāsrava is contrary to the sāsrava, and you do not allow the anāsrava to maintain sāsrava seeds; the sāsrava is contrary to the anāsrava, so the eighth [consciousness] in the causal stage should not maintain anāsrava [seeds].

4.36

Answer: Manifest anāsrava dharmas directly counteract the sāsrava; therefore, one cannot use the anāsrava to maintain the sāsrava. Since seeds of anāsrava dharmas are not the counteractive agent itself, the fundamental consciousness in the causal stage maintains the anāsrava seeds.

4.37

[On the phrase of] the Treatise: "kāya-saṃskāra, vāk-saṃskāra, and citta-saṃskāra" and so forth:

4.38

Question: In meditative absorption, citta and speech are quiescent, so these two saṃskāras may be absent; how can the kāya-saṃskāra of inhalation and exhalation be absent? Answer: According to the Mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra, fascicle twenty-six, it is due to four conditions that kāya-saṃskāra operates: First, the physical body which serves as the basis for inhalation and exhalation; second, unobstructed wind paths, namely the mouth, nose, etc.; third, the opening of hair pores; fourth, the manifestation of a coarse mind based on the level of breathing. If any one among these four conditions is lacking, kāya-saṃskāra does not operate. For example, during the four stages of kalala, arbuda, peśī, and ghana born in the desire realm, there is only the fourth—the manifestation of a coarse mind—without the preceding three factors; hence breathing does not operate. In stages such as praśākhā, the faculties and physical form are complete, and because all four factors are present, breathing then operates. For instance, being born in the desire realm or the lower three dhyānas and entering an absorption without mind or an absorption of the formless realm: although having the first three, one lacks the fourth, so breathing does not operate. Entering the fourth dhyāna, although having the first two, one lacks the latter two, so breathing likewise does not operate. Furthermore, inhalation and exhalation operate dependent on a coarse mind; on the levels from the fourth dhyāna upward, the mind is extremely subtle, so breathing does not operate. Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra states: 'When entering the fourth dhyāna, the body has no hair pores, because that samādhi is extremely solid and dense, inducing the great elements of the fourth dhyāna to pervade the body.' It is precisely on this account that the venerable Vasumitra said: 'Upon entering that absorption, the body's hair pores close; entering absorptions, whether sāsrava or anāsrava, is all like this.' If, born in the fourth dhyāna, one gives rise to a mind of the lower three dhyānas or of the desire realm, although possessing the first, second, and fourth conditions, one lacks the third condition, so breathing does not operate. If one gives rise to a mind of one's own level, a formless mind, or an absorption without mind, although possessing the first two, one lacks the latter two factors, so breathing does not operate. If born in the formless realm, all four factors are absent, so breathing does not operate. Hence in the absorption of cessation, kāya-saṃskāra is also absent. According to the Great Vehicle's doctrine, the non-operation of kāya-saṃskāra conforms further with the Sarvāstivāda school, and should likewise be without flaw.

4.39

[On the phrase of] the Commentary: "However, wishing to cite an example of an analogous dharma from the sūtra" and so forth:

4.40

Vitality is not destroyed, nor does it depart from warmth. This is an analogous dharma. Adducing this as an example, one analogously requires that the consciousness-substance be present during absorption. The passage on citta-saṃskāra and so forth likewise applies to this.

4.41

[On the phrase of] the Commentary: "The Karmasiddhi-prakaraṇa [...] as in that treatise" and so forth:

4.42

Below, under the absorption of cessation, the Commentary has already cited it fully; hence it is not repeated here.

4.43

[On the phrase of] the Commentary: "It would have to be rebirth":

4.44

Dying and being born again.

4.45

[On the phrase of] the Treatise: "Because all absorptions lack the five groups of consciousness":

4.46

Question: Does this reason not incur the fallacy of svataḥ-asiddha (unestablished for oneself), since below it is allowed that during absorption the ear hears sound?

4.47

Answer: Here it follows the other school; below it relies on our own doctrine, since the Hīnayāna holds that one hears sound upon emerging from absorption. Furthermore, regarding the syllogism formulated in the Commentary, some argue in refutation: 'The Commentary says that because this reason applies to fainting and the like, it has an inconclusive fallacy; this view is incorrect. If the thesis were formulated as "All absorptions must be called absorptions without mind", then since states like fainting are not absorptions without mind, one could say the preceding reason has an inconclusive fallacy. But since the word "absorption" does not appear within the subject of the thesis, there is no inconclusive fallacy.'

4.48

We evaluate: If one simply examines the explicit verbal expression, it seems as they object. But if one traces the intended thesis, the Commentary's purport is subtle and profound. That is, absorption lacking mind and non-absorption lacking mind are different; if the reason does not specify 'absorption', then in fainting and so forth, the reason operates, and compared with the intended thesis it becomes inconclusive. Only when the word 'absorption' is included in the reason is this fallacy averted; therefore the meaning is correct as [stated].

4.49

[On the phrase of] the Commentary: "Now, one should assist the challenge [...] is called the cessation of citta-saṃskāra":

4.50

The intent of this challenge is to say: The absorption is said to be 'without mind' and 'the cessation of citta-saṃskāra'. If 'without mind' is based on the five [consciousnesses] being called 'without mind', then the words 'cessation of citta-saṃskāra' should also be explained only in terms of the vedanā, saṃjñā, etc., associated with the five consciousnesses. Further, the statement 'Yet there are caitasikas [...] because of the word cessation, etc.' reinforces the intent of the challenge: because for those two schools the words 'cessation of citta-saṃskāra' are based on the sixth and not on the five consciousnesses, one knows that the cessation of consciousness is not stated in terms of the five.

4.51

[On the phrase of] the Treatise: "Or the consciousness in this state [...] is not the sixth consciousness":

4.52

Some argue: The syllogism formulated by the Commentary has the fallacy of contradiction with one's own words; therefore one should merely say: 'The consciousness in the state of cessation is not the sixth consciousness.'

4.53

We evaluate: Since the Commentary already states 'your [view]', does it not clearly eliminate this error? Otherwise, what purpose would the word 'your' serve? Although the fourth syllogism below is also refuted, it is explained in the same way.

4.54

Question: The opponent also uses this vitality and warmth as an example to challenge the Great Vehicle's school that the eighth [consciousness] in the absorption of cessation should not be consciousness. Since one has a contradiction oneself, how can one fault the other?

4.55

Answer: For us, vitality, warmth, and consciousness are neither identical nor separate; the thesis that it 'should not be consciousness' does not operate with respect to the example of vitality and warmth. They cannot be compared analogously.

4.56

[On the phrase of] the Commentary: "They themselves also say that in their own state there is no ākāra of consciousness" and so forth:

4.57

Although the substance of consciousness exists, there is simply no ākāra, because it is subtle. This should be read continuously. If not so, since the opponent admits that consciousness exists in absorption, how could it be said that 'in their own state there is no consciousness'?

4.58

[On the phrase of] the Commentary: "Because in dhyāna and the formless [attainments] their cultivation is superior":

4.59

In practicing these absorptions, dharmas such as feeling and conceptualization possess superior efficacy.

4.60

[On the phrase of] the Treatise: "If there were no caitasikas [...] because of being separate from caitasikas":

4.61

Some say that nirvāṇa without remainder is the example. Since that school allows mind in the absorption of cessation, the other mindless states should also be like that. Thus the Karmasiddhi states: 'Do all mindless states also possess mind? It should be as maintained by a group of Sūtradhāras, that subtle mind still exists in those states.' Therefore one should not use fainting as an example. Some argue: If so, the reason becomes inconclusive, because caitasikas are absent in states like fainting. Therefore it should be combined into: 'States such as cessation must lack the mental consciousness, because they lack the universal (mahābhūmika) caitasikas, just as in the states where eye consciousness, etc., do not operate.' Or nirvāṇa without remainder can also serve as the example, or a corpse, etc., can also serve as the example.

4.62

We evaluate: Above, having repeatedly refuted the existence of a subtle mental consciousness, what error is there in the example of fainting and the like? Moreover, if one refutes nirvāṇa without remainder, the example has an inconclusive fallacy, just as explained. If one uses the state where eye consciousness, etc., do not operate as an example, logically it is also inconclusive, because the isolated mental consciousness operating is also a state where the eye consciousness, etc., do not operate. Now, taking the example of a corpse to establish that in all mindless states the sixth [consciousness] is absent, although other mindless states are not in dispute, this stops the inconclusive fallacy so that the thesis has no error.

4.63

[On the phrase of] the Commentary: "Just as avijñapti-rūpa does not possess obstructive materiality":

4.64

The intent of this rescue is to say: Having obstructive materiality is termed 'matter' (rūpa); avijñapti, though unobstructed, is still termed matter. Mental dharmas, though associated, are still mental dharmas even when unassociated. If what is unassociated is not mind, then what lacks obstructive materiality should not be matter.

4.65

[On the phrase of] the Commentary: "However, excluding sleep and fainting":

4.66

Because the Sarvāstivāda does not accept that sleep, etc., are subsumed under states without mind. Contrasting with what is mutually accepted, these are excluded.

4.67

[On the phrase of] the Commentary: "Because there is nothing to be revulsed by [...] the king of mind is still present":

4.68

The various explanations take this text as clarifying why sleep and fainting are excluded. Our present explanation is not so; it merely clarifies that states such as mindless [absorption] lack mind. Saying 'because there is nothing to be revulsed by' adduces that because there is no revulsed caitasika, it reveals that mind is also absent. Saying 'where there is a revulsed caitasika, mind then does not cease' inversely establishes the reason why, earlier, when there is no revulsed caitasika, mind ceases. Saying 'it is not that because it is not revulsed the king of mind still remains' resolves a hidden challenge from outside. The outside challenge says: Caitasikas are what is revulsed, so in that state they may be said to be absent. Since the king of mind is not revulsed, in that state it should still remain. Therefore it is explained: It is not that not being revulsed causes it to remain; because caitasikas are absent, it ceases along with them.

4.69

[On the phrase of] the Treatise: "Because the mind is defiled" and so forth:

4.70

Although the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra also has this text, here the Āgama is cited, because the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra is not mutually accepted.

4.71

[On the phrase of] the Commentary: "The statement that because the mind is defiled, sentient beings are defiled, etc., is as in the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle fifty-four":

4.72

Examining that treatise, it says: 'Because the perfumed consciousness can grasp and fulfill future internal bodies, through this successive grasping and fulfilling, one cannot relinquish the nature of ordinary beings; because one seeks and fulfills with respect to internal bodies, one's continuity within saṃsāra is determined.' It further says: 'Furthermore, because that consciousness is eternally purified, it does not depend on other causes, but spontaneously and naturally enters into cessation. Because the continuity of this consciousness is definitively cut off, it no longer wanders through the realms of the ten directions; because it does not yearn for life or death, it is called eternal detachment from desire.'

4.73

Explanation: The former is that sentient beings are defiled through the mind's defilement; the latter is that sentient beings are liberated through the mind's purification.

4.74

[On the phrase of] the Treatise: "Meaning that defilement and purity take mind as their root" and so forth:

4.75

The Commentary has four explanations, others have five explanations, fully detailed as explained elsewhere. Some further explain: Saying defiled and pure dharmas take mind as their root is a general clause covering sāsrava and anāsrava, conditioned and unconditioned. However, one should state that mind has two types: defiled and pure. The sāsrava defiled mind is common to both sāsrava and anāsrava, conditioned and unconditioned, serving jointly as their root. The anāsrava pure mind only serves as the root for anāsrava conditioned and unconditioned [dharmas], not as the root for sāsrava dharmas. 'Because they arise due to mind' jointly explains that sāsrava and anāsrava manifest activities arise due to the defiled mind, taking mind as their root; separately, it explains that anāsrava manifest dharmas arise due to the pure mind, also taking mind as their root, for a pure mind does not give rise to sāsrava dharmas. 'Because they abide dependent on mind' jointly explains that innate sāsrava and anāsrava seeds abide dependent on the defiled mind, so mind is their root; separately, it explains that innate anāsrava seeds abide dependent on the pure mind, so mind is their root. 'Because mind receives their perfuming and maintains their seeds' jointly explains that newly perfumed sāsrava and anāsrava seeds take the defiled mind as their root; separately, it explains that newly perfumed anāsrava seeds take the pure mind as their root. Although the pure eighth mind does not receive perfuming, because it was perfumed during the causal stage, in the fruitional state it maintains the seeds. Although the earlier and later commentaries have many explanations, their meanings are not comprehensive, not equaling this explanation where both the defiled and pure minds are taken as the root.

4.76

In detailed evaluation: The text of the *Guan jing* says: 'Because mind is defiled, sentient beings are defiled.' It is only formulated with reference to sentient beings and is not based on the Buddha; if it had also encompassed the Buddha, then it should not have said 'sentient beings' and so on. And the Tathāgata is not a sentient being, for as previously explained, sentient beings are established solely on the basis of the grasping aggregates, whereas the Buddha is free from the sāsrava and is not subsumed under sentient beings. Since the Treatise explains the sūtra, it must accord with the intent of the sūtra; if one were to say that he is designated a sentient being through manifestation, this also is untenable. According to the Treatise's explanation of the sūtra in the two gateways of defilement and purification—refuting others and establishing its own [doctrine]—neither mentions the pure consciousness of the Buddha-fruit; thus we know that the two Commentaries well understood the profound meaning. Furthermore, even if one were to explain it by also taking into account the pure mind, it would also result in a redundant view. Why is this? The statement that 'the mind is the root' is the general phrase for both defiled and pure, conditioned and unconditioned. Later, in contrast to 'being born due to the mind', it further says 'taking the mind as the root', separately explaining that unconditioned active dharmas are born due to the pure mind and also take the mind as their root. Since it spoke generally before, why speak particularly later? If one says that it is stated on the basis of that particular pure mind, if so, why would a particular defilement not be the root of that particular defilement? If you allow this to be so, why would it not be a separate explanation of active defilements? Moreover, if explained separately there might possibly be this rationale, but within a single explanation how could there be such a contradiction? The rest should be rejected accordingly.

4.77

On the Treatise's statement: 'If there were no this consciousness... all would lack a cause':

4.78

Asaṅga's root treatise is fully cited in the Commentary. Asabhāva's commentary states: ''From the non-conceptual [absorption] and so on' means passing away from a higher realm and coming to be born in the desire realm. 'At that time the afflictions and so on' refers to greed, hatred, and so on. 'The initial consciousness defiled by [them]' refers to the initial consciousness of birth-existence at the time of linking up [the streams of] existence, because at that time it is defiled by all the afflictions of its own plane.'

4.79

Question: Why cite one who has passed away from the non-conceptual [absorption]? Could it be that when passing away from other places there is a consciousness that holds the seeds?

4.80

Answer: There are two explanations. One is as explained in the *Deng*. The other says that, based on the *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna-sūtra* and the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, Uttarakuru definitely possesses karma with subsequent retribution of being born in heaven, and the non-conceptual gods definitely possess karma with subsequent retribution in the desire realm. In other planes it is indeterminate; hence it is singled out.

4.81

On the Treatise's statement: 'After an undefiled mind...':

4.82

Asaṅga's root treatise is as clarified in the Commentary; Asabhāva's explanation will now also be briefly recounted. 'Counteracting afflictions and so on' refers, for example, to the initial stream-enterer fruit and path: when the path of counteraction against the afflictions abandoned by seeing arises, all other worldly consciousnesses have already ceased. At that time, if one were apart from the ālaya-consciousness, where would all the dormant tendencies of the afflictions abandoned by cultivation abide? It would not be reasonable for the counteracting consciousness to carry those seeds. 'Because this counteracting consciousness is liberated by nature' means that its nature is utterly pure. 'It does not coexist with the afflictions' because the counteractor and the countered are mutually contradictory, just like light and dark. 'Again at a later time' refers to the stage of the path of cultivation after the path of seeing; the remaining text is easily understood.

4.83

On the Treatise's statement: 'If there were no this consciousness to hold the seeds of karma and retribution...':

4.84

Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* is roughly cited in the Commentary, but Asabhāva's and others' commentaries are not mentioned by the Commentary, causing beginner students to waver and find it difficult to progress. Now the root [text] and commentary are cited in their essentials, in the hope that practitioners will not be impeded by omissions. Asaṅga's Treatise says: 'If someone passes away from this non-concentrated plane and, when being reborn, relies on the intermediate state mind to generate a defiled mental consciousness that links up birth in succession, this defiled mental consciousness ceases in the intermediate state, and in the mother's womb the consciousness and the kalala mutually blend. If that mental consciousness were to blend with it, then after blending, relying on this consciousness, a mental consciousness would turn in the mother's womb; if so, there would be two mental consciousnesses operating simultaneously in the mother's womb.' Asabhāva's commentary states: 'The 'non-concentrated plane' refers to the desire realm. 'Passing away' means dying. 'Relying on the state of intermediate existence' means relying on the intermediate period between the two existences of death and birth. 'Generating defilement' means it is accompanied by attachment and resentment, due to having inverted views.'

4.85

The exposition states: The male and female mutually give rise to greed and resentment toward the father and mother. It says 'mental consciousness' because the other consciousnesses have long since ceased at that time.

4.86

The exposition states: The other eye and other consciousnesses in the final state of intermediate existence have long ceased, and only the mental consciousness remains. In the beginning and middle of intermediate existence, all six consciousnesses exist; because it links and sustains birth, it is called 'succession' (saṃtāna); because it grasps and takes on birth, it is called 'linking up' birth. 'This defiled mental consciousness' is because it takes the birth-existence as its object.

4.87

The exposition states: The mother and father's impurities are the place where the consciousness relies, which is called 'birth'. Taking these impurities as its object, it regards them as its own and gives rise to greed and attachment; or taking the retribution of future birth-existence as its object, it gives rise to attachment, and therefore it is able to moisten birth. 'Ceases in the intermediate state': if this did not cease, there would be no birth-existence. 'In the mother's womb and so on' means that when this ceases, in the mother's womb there is the retribution-consciousness sharing the same safety and danger with the red and white [fluids], causing them to blend into the kalala.

4.88

The exposition states: The consciousness and the red and white [fluids] share harm and benefit together, blending to form the body. 'If that mental consciousness' means: if this were not the ālaya-consciousness. 'After blending' means: after taking birth. 'Relying on this consciousness' means relying on the retribution-consciousness.

4.89

The exposition states: This is the subtle mental consciousness. 'A mental consciousness turns' means: there is another evolving consciousness, that is, a conceptual mental consciousness associated with faith and so on, or greed and so on, accompanied by pleasant or painful feelings, which operates in subsequent states.

4.90

The exposition states: The three natures and three feelings are all easy to understand; from initial rebirth up to old age, this conceptual mind arises successively. Hence it says 'operates in subsequent states'. 'There would be two mental consciousnesses operating and so on' means: the retribution entity, which is the basic matter of a sentient being, is the non-defiled neutral mental consciousness operating without depending on current preparatory effort, and the mental consciousness associated with pleasant, painful, and other feelings whose object and aspect are discernible—these are two mental consciousnesses.

4.91

The exposition states: The retribution-consciousness is the subtle mental consciousness; the discernible consciousness is the coarse mental consciousness. They would have to operate simultaneously in one body, but this should not be accepted, because it contradicts the sūtras. As the verse states: 'There is no place, no possibility, / Not earlier, not later, / In the same body and of the same category, / For two consciousnesses to arise together.'

4.92

The exposition states: The opponent saves [their thesis] by asking: 'Why would two arising together contradict [anything]?' Hence the verse is cited as a challenge. The sūtra's intent is to state: There is no place where a body is received, and no possibility in principle, for two consciousnesses of the same category to arise together simultaneously—not differentiated as earlier or later—in the same body. Furthermore, one should not allow these two to be one, because their own-natures are different.

4.93

The exposition states: The opponent again saves [their thesis] by saying: 'These two consciousnesses have the same entity and distinct conceptual functions; their entity being one, it does not contradict the sūtra's prohibition against the simultaneous arising of the same category.' Hence it is now refuted: 'Because their own-natures are distinct, like the five consciousnesses such as the eye [consciousness].' Furthermore, the retribution-consciousness should not be interrupted, for once it has linked up succession, it would later have to link up birth anew in another place.

4.94

The exposition states: The opponent again saves [their thesis] by saying: 'The blending mental consciousness and the separately arising mental consciousness arise alternately with interruptions before and after; this also does not contradict the sūtra's prohibition against the simultaneous arising of the same category.' Hence it is refuted again: 'The entity of the blending consciousness is conceded to be retribution; if it arose with interruptions, its entity would be interrupted. If so, subsequent linking would have to be called being reborn anew.' Therefore, a syllogistic refutation is framed: The blending mental consciousness should not arise with interruptions; because it is conceded to be retribution; like retribution materiality. Furthermore, the entity of retribution is only constantly continuous, having no other destiny.

4.95

The exposition states: The opponent again saves [their thesis] by asking: 'What prevents retribution materiality from being continuous while retribution mind is interrupted?' This is refuted again: The reason is the same as before, with the life-faculty serving as the example. Having roughly explained following the difficulties, the remaining easy points are not discussed.

4.96

On the Commentary's: 'Furthermore, if passing away from here... is definitely unattainable':

4.97

This is Asaṅga's text. Asabhāva's commentary explains: 'Having thus clarified that in the desire realm, if apart from the ālaya-consciousness, linking up birth in succession cannot be established, neither can it be established in the form or formless realms. Now it will be demonstrated. 'If passing away from here and so on' means dying in the desire realm and being born in a higher realm. 'Due to being non-concentrated and so on' means being associated with afflictions such as craving for and tasting the absorption of that plane.'

4.98

The exposition states: In the upper two realms, it is only by taking concentration as an object and giving rise to attachment that one is able to moisten birth. 'Apart from the retribution-consciousness, any other seed-entity is definitely unattainable' means: it is not that the death-mind belonging to the desire realm has the entity of those seeds, because arising and ceasing are not simultaneous.

4.99

The exposition states: And the opponent saves [their thesis] by saying: 'Within that death-mind belonging to the desire realm, there are the defiled mind seeds of that concentrated plane.' Hence there is this refutation: because concentrated and distracted minds do not arise simultaneously, and because perfuming is not established, the seeds of the higher defilement do not exist within the lower mind. It also says: 'Nor can the mind born in the concentrated plane be the entity of those seeds, because having seeds and seedness are incompatible within a single mind.'

4.100

The exposition states: The opponent again saves [their thesis] by saying: 'The mind born in concentration itself is the entity of those seeds.' Hence this is refuted by stating: A seed is a cause, and 'possessing seeds' is the result. Because this result contains the seed, it is called 'possessing seeds'; for cause and result to be simultaneous at the moment of arising is logically incompatible. Although in the Mahāyāna tradition cause and result are simultaneous, when refuting their tradition, this is also not contradictory. It also says: 'Nor can the mind belonging to the form realm and so on previously obtained in another lifetime be the entity of the seeds, because there is no other consciousness that holds that perfuming.'

4.101

The exposition states: The opponent again saves [their thesis] by asking: 'If the form-realm mind obtained in a past lifetime serves as those seeds, what flaw is there?' Hence it is cited and rejected: If you have no consciousness capable of holding those seeds, how could there be an entity of the held seeds? It also says: 'Nor can the continuum of materiality be the entity of the seeds, because there is no causal condition.' Explanation: The opponent again saves [their thesis] by saying: 'Past perfuming relies on the material sense faculties to serve as the seeds at the present time.' Again this is recounted and refuted: The statement 'there is no causal condition' has three explanations: 1. A sense faculty of a lower realm is not the cause for a mind of a higher realm; 2. Within lower materiality there are no seeds of a higher plane; 3. That which holds seeds must inherently be perfumed. The material sense faculties lack that causal condition of being perfumed, and therefore lack those seeds. The word 'causal condition' means the logical principle.

4.102

On the Treatise's statement: 'After a disparate dharma... there would also be no cause':

4.103

Asaṅga's treatise text is fully cited in the *Commentary*. Asabhāva's commentary explains: 'Namely, in the formless realm, when an anāsrava mind arises and the worldly mind ceases, there is no retribution subsumed under that destiny. Without exertion, one should naturally attain nirvāṇa without remainder, because when the counteracting [path] is present, all that is to be countered is forever severed.' It also explains 'extinguishing two destinies' and so on, saying: 'When born in the Peak of Existence and wishing to sever all afflictions of that plane, because ideation is subtle and weak, its own plane lacks the path; because the Sphere of Nothingness is bright and sharp, one gives rise to that anāsrava mind and brings it into presence. At that time, both destinies should be extinguished and abandoned—namely, the two destinies of the Peak of Existence and the Sphere of Nothingness would be extinguished and abandoned; at that time, sentient beings would become dead and extinguished, because the bases for the two destinies would both be absent. Anāsrava dharmas are not subsumed under a destiny, because they are unattached and because they counteract the destinies.'

4.104

Question: According to the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, the fault of extinguishing the two destinies is challenged, whereas this Treatise faults subsequent arising as lacking a cause; since the two treatises differ, how can the former be cited to substantiate the latter?

4.105

Answer: To highlight the literal text and discard the underlying intent seems like [separating] the Jing and Wei rivers, but if one grasps the principle and unfolds it, they are truly like milk and water. The fundamental intent of that treatise is to fault the absence of the root consciousness, whereby wholesome and defiled [minds] would lack seeds; lacking seeds is another name for lacking a cause, and seizing upon this, it went on to fault the extinction and abandonment of the two destinies. Thus the root treatise says: 'Furthermore, when born in the formless realm, if apart from the retribution-consciousness possessing all seeds, defiled and wholesome minds would lack seeds, and defiled and wholesome minds would lack a support.' Immediately below it faults that the two destinies should be extinguished; therefore we know that the two treatises are in fact identical, and adducing this as proof is without fault.

4.106

On the Commentary's: 'And furthermore, among karma...':

4.107

Previously in the Treatise, it refuted both result and karma together; below it solely criticizes karma and leaves aside result. Therefore it says 'and furthermore' to introduce the subsequent text.

4.108

On the Treatise's statement: 'Furthermore, volitional formations conditioning consciousness should not be established' and so on:

4.109

Asabhāva's commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha is fully differentiated in the Cheng weishi lun liaoyi deng. Vasubandhu's commentary states: "That 'formations as condition for consciousness' is inadmissible means that meritorious, non-meritorious, and immovable formations, having arisen, pass away into cessation. If one does not believe in the existence of the ālaya-consciousness, where will perfuming be established? For the collection of the six consciousnesses cannot sustain any perfuming."

4.110

The explanation states: this clarifies that in the absence of the ālaya-consciousness, there would be no consciousness that can sustain seeds; hence formations perfuming consciousness would be an impossible condition.

4.111

Question: In terms of its real entity, what does the Sautrāntika take as the branch of consciousness?

4.112

Answer: Based on the two commentaries on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, three explanations have been handed down: First, the consciousness that is perfumed by the three [types of] karma and capable of sustaining seeds is taken as the branch of consciousness. Second, the karma-seeds that are sustained are taken as the branch of consciousness. Third, both the consciousness capable of sustaining seeds and the seeds that are sustained are taken as the branch of consciousness. Alternatively, it is said that the defiled consciousness that links [lives at] rebirth is also it. One opinion decides: Although there are three explanations, only taking seeds as the branch of consciousness is correct; yet taking nominal seeds as the branch of consciousness, in accordance with the Mahāyāna, is considered correct. Hence the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya states that the function of the homogeneous cause producing its outflow fruit is taken as the branch of consciousness, which corresponds exactly to this.

4.113

Examination: If it were seeds alone, that would be the second explanation. Below, this Treatise states: 'Taking the seeds of karma as consciousness is not its real entity'—how then could one decisively say that it agrees with the Mahāyāna as correct? If one says it adopts that third explanation, since the third takes both that which sustains and that which is sustained, how could one decisively say that seeds alone are correct? vacillating back and forth involves contradictions, so it is feared to be a clerical error. Furthermore, based on the Kośa there seems to be the sense of seeds, but based on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha the characteristic of seeds is difficult to demonstrate. Therefore Asabhāva states: 'Eye and other consciousnesses arising together with desire and the like conditioned by formations are admitted as the branch of consciousness.' He also states: 'Those who admit the consciousness that connects rebirth as the branch of consciousness.' This also is not so. Examining these two passages, which cite the tenets of that school, the branch of consciousness is only actual [active consciousness]; Vasubandhu also takes it as actual, as the text cited above shows. Now one should state: Taking the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna together, there are three explanations. Based on the two different passages in Asabhāva's treatise, these constitute two explanations, both stated in terms of actual [consciousness]. Following the text of the Kośa, there is another explanation stated solely in terms of seeds, with the text as cited above. Or there are four explanations, the fourth universally taking both seeds and actual [consciousness] as the branch, for, as the text of Vasubandhu's treatise is general in wording, its meaning can be interpreted generally. The texts are as stated above; if examined carefully, this will become clear.

4.114

Treatise: 'The periods of time are distantly separated' and so on.

4.115

Someone, assisting the author of the Treatise, further challenges them, saying: In the desire and form realms there is form, so formations inducing it can be called a condition; in the formless realm form does not exist, so how can they be said to induce form?

4.116

Commentary: 'The fruit of form is in the future, up to eighty thousand kalpas' and so on.

4.117

Question: Even if the fruit is in the future, how can it be separated from the cause by so many kalpas?

4.118

Answer: If it is karma with fruition in the next life, the fruit is not necessarily remote; but if it is karma with fruition in subsequent lives, when the fruit is remote, how could it induce it? For example, only after experiencing eighty thousand kalpas in [the heaven of] neither-perception-nor-non-perception does one then experience retribution in human or other destinies. Looking back from the retribution to the past cause, they are separated by eighty thousand kalpas—is that not remote?

4.119

Question: For karma with fruition in the next life, such as slander and destruction [of the Dharma], since the fruit is not remote, should it not be called conditioned by formations?

4.120

Answer: Briefly, there are two explanations: First, merely because it is separated, it cannot serve as a condition; this does not concede that what is proximate constitutes a condition, because it refutes the treatises of others. Second, even for karma with fruition in the next life, cause and fruit belong to different lifetimes and are logically estranged, so it is also called distantly separated; even if there were no great distance, being separated entails that it is not a condition. The second explanation is superior. If so, how is it in our own school?

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成唯識論演祕 — Classical Chinese