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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c7: The Second Part of the Vedanta System: Cosmology

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c7

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Contents

The Second Part of the Vedanta System: Cosmology

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OR

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THE DOCTRINE OF THE WORLD.

XV. Preliminary Remarks and Arrangement

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As before, our efforts will be directed, in the further course of our work, to the most faithful reproduction of the thoughts of Bâdarâyaṇa and Çaṅkara; we shall therefore abstain from all liberties with these thoughts and shall indicate unmistakably as such our own incidental remarks. This fidelity extends to the whole material content of the work which we have to analyse, but not to its form as well; we take the thoughts as we find them, but in their arrangement and systematic connection, we allow ourselves to be guided only by the inner necessity which lies in the coordination of thought itself; this frequently compels us to deviate considerably from the arrangement of the original work.

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That the latter does not in fact correspond to the nature of the subject, is due to several causes. To begin with, the tendency of the Brahmasûtras is chiefly polemical. The controversy with the opponents of the Vedânta teaching, which we, in following out our present aim, only introduce when it sheds new light on the system itself, is put in the foreground by our authors; while the most essential dogmas not seldom receive a subordinate treatment, just because they are not new and strange to Indian thought, as they are to us, but are matters of common currency and to a certain extent self-evident. Moreover it is the chief endeavour of the philosophers of the Vedânta to derive all their teachings directly from the Veda, and only in passing and as an appendix to show their rational basis although this is by no means lacking; thus what is really the fundamental idea often appears as a dependent thought. Besides this it is characteristic of Indian philosophers, that on the one hand they exhibit wonderfully profound conceptions reached by no other people of antiquity, and at the same time, on the other hand, a total lack of feeling for æsthetic form; in consequence of this they constantly allow themselves to drift without organising their material and are chiefly guided by the desire to find a *pro and contra* for every question, thus satisfying a highly developed taste for dialectic disputation, whether this leads to an explanation of the subject, or merely hinders and confuses it.⁹³ The consequence is, that the same fundamental thoughts are dealt with again and again to the point of weariness, without a true insight into their connection with the system as a whole, and thereby an insight into the thoughts themselves, being gained after all.

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⁹³ Great as is the resemblance in this, to the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages, yet in other ways the contrast is as great: there we have the Bible, here the Veda (cf. note 52), there Aristotle, here original thought, there a compulsory belief, here a choice of the Vedic basis from free conviction.

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If while reproducing the content of the system of the Vedânta we did not at the same time refrain from reproducing its external form as it comes before us in the Brahmasûtras, it would be difficult to perceive the excellence of Indian thought; Colebrooke's praiseworthy study has had so little effect, for the sole reason that, apart from its brevity and the (very questionable) introduction of different commentaries, it confines itself to unmethodical extracts from the original work; by this course a full insight into the inner unity of the system is lost, not only by the reader, but even by the writer himself; the outline of the teaching according to the Vedânta-sâra, which was added as an appendix from a sense of this deficiency, cannot supply it, because it builds up the system on a basis essentially different from that of Çankara.

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The confusion in the treatment of the work on which we are engaged, is nowhere more noticeable than in the department of Cosmology, treated in 1, 4, 23—2, 3, 15, along with which are to be taken the conclusion of 2, 4 and 3, 2 (namely 2, 4, 20—22 and 3, 2, 38—41) and certain sections of the Division on Transmigration 3, 1 (e. g. 3, 1, 20—21. 3, 1, 24).

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In Chapter VI and the translations from 4, 3, 14 which are added to it as an appendix, we have shown the existence of the antithesis between the exoteric and esoteric doctrine in all parts of the system. If this antithesis exists, it cannot of course fail to be decisive for the disposition of the materials. But this is not the case with our authors: in their Section on Cosmology they give a general sketch of the exoteric teaching as to Creation, thereby involving themselves in a series of contradictions, which they seek to explain by appeals to the esoteric teaching, and then go on quietly with their empirical picture of the universe, just as if nothing had happened, while the whole realism on which this picture rests has been again and again overthrown and exposed in all its inadequacy. Nowhere do we find sharp lines of demarcation; but rather we have a tendency (very pronounced in the passage above page 110) to explain the exoteric passages of Scripture in the sense of the esoteric, an attempt which, especially in the Section on Cosmology, has given rise to an enquiry, as difficult as it is unsatisfactory, into the idea of causality.

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In order to bring clearness into the subject, and yet in no wise to do violence to our authors, we shall first of all treat of Brahman as Creator (Chap. XVI), and then (Chap. XVII) of the creation of nature, taking both in the exoteric sense, after which the few traces of natural science scattered here and there in the work can be gathered together. In another chapter (XVIII) we shall bring together all the problems that occur on our way, whose explanation our authors have reached by passing over to the esoteric teaching as to nature. Before we turn to the latter, we must deal further with our philosophers' conceptions of the idea of causality (Chap. XIX), for in it they find the justification of the esoteric teaching of the identity of the world with Brahman, apart from purely theological arguments. Only after explaining this doctrine of identity (Chap. XX), can the problems raised three chapters earlier find the solution dependent on this doctrine, according to the materials existing in the original work (Chap. XXI).

XVI. Brahman as Creator of the World

1. The Motive of Creation

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Sûtras 2, 1, 32–33.

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WE have learnt to know Brahman as an intelligent being; as such, he seems to require a motive for his actions. For we see in life that an intelligent being, who thinks before he acts, for example a human being, prepares for no undertaking, whether great or small, unless a motive leads him to it (p. 488, 12). The application of this rule of experience to Brahman is, as it seems, confirmed by the scriptures, when they teach (above, p. 173) that the world is dear to him not for the world's sake, but for the sake of his own self (p. 489, 2).—If we ascribe to God a motive which determined him to create, this contradicts his all-sufficiency (paritriptatvam), but if we do not ascribe such a motive to him, creation becomes impossible (p. 489, 6). —Or shall we take it for granted that Brahman, like a thoughtless man, proceeded to create at random, and without a motive? This again would contradict his omniscience (sarvajñatram).

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We must then take it for granted that, as a prince or some great man who has all that he requires, undertakes something without a motive, purely for sport and pastime (p. 490, 1), or as outbreathing and inbreathing go on by themselves, without external motive (p. 490, 2), so too God created the world of himself and without a motive, purely for sport (lîlâ; cf. the παῖς παίζων of Heraclitus); for a further motive is not to be found by reflection or revelation of the scriptures 94 and it is impossible to ask God himself about it (p. 490, 6). Moreover it is only to us that the arrangement of this terrestrial disk appears such a difficult thing, for God, on the contrary, through the power of his immeasurable omnipotence, it is mere sport (p. 490, 8). And if in life a slight motive must be present even for sport, for God we need assume nothing of the sort, for the scripture forbids us to attribute any desire to him (p. 490, 9). That he could not for this reason proceed to act, is contrary to the teaching of the scripture concerning creation; that he acted without thought, and by chance, is contrary to the teaching concerning his omniscience (p. 490, 11).

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⁹⁴ Such a motive is certainly to be found in the system, and our author does not find it only because he cannot separate the idea of a motive from that of personal (egoistic) interest. According to the Vedânta,

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Above all (thus Çankara concludes this section), we must not forget that the whole teaching as to creation refers to this world of names and forms, founded on Ignorance, and it has really only the aim of teaching the identity of nature with Brahman (p. 491, 1);—an observation that will also hold good for what we have to put forward further, and which arises from the endeavour to hold fast to the exoteric teaching of the scripture as completely valid.

2. Brahman is the efficient and at the same time the material Cause of the World

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Sûtras 1, 4, 23-27.

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Brahman was defined at the outset of this work (1, 1, 2) as "that by which the world originates, etc. (subsists, and perishes)," (cf. the definitions above p. 123), and therefore as the cause of the world. The word "Cause", however, may mean two things, either the material cause (*prakṛiti*, *upâdânam*), or the efficient cause (*nimittam*); so the cause of the vessel is, on one hand, the clay, and on the other the potter, that of the golden ornament is on one hand the gold,

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it is the inner destination of this world to become the stage for the reward of the deeds of an earlier existence, and the chain of these existences stretches back for each individual *ad infinitum*. According to these earlier deeds alone, God apportions weal and woe; and in them alone is to be sought the reason that he must create the world anew after each disappearance; for the fruit of deeds done outlasts that disappearance and requires each time a new creation for their explanation.

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and on the other the goldsmith (p. 396, 10).—The question is, in which sense is Brahman to be regarded as the cause of the world?

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It might be thought that Brahman can only be held to be the efficient cause of the world, because it is said of him, before he proceeds to create: "he intended" (above p. 135), and because he is called "the Lord" (īçvara); both these seem only to apply to an efficient cause (p. 397, 5, 8).—To this is added, that cause and effect must be of like nature; the world, however, is manifold, unspiritual, and unclean (p. 397, 10), which does not apply to Brahman and seems to require a material cause besides him, which shall possess these qualities.

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The answer to these considerations is, that Brahman is both the efficient and material cause of the world (p. 398, 3).

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The proof of this assertion, in the introductory passage of the Cosmology which we here treat of, is purely theological (based on references to passages of the Vedas) and, from the point of view which we now occupy, cannot be otherwise, because (quite apart from the consideration raised, as to the unlikeness of nature of the world and Brahman, which is here passed over by our author, and only taken up again, and brought under consideration, in a later discussion, cf. Chap. XVIII, 1, a) a solution of the idea of matter, from the empirical standpoint, which we have not yet transcended here, is impossible, for the only true consequence of this standpoint would be the eternal duration of matter.

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Under these circumstances, it is comprehensible that Çaṅkara here contents himself with references to the scripture according to which, with the knowledge of Brahman, all is known, and in which Brahman is compared to the clay, all the transformations of which are also clay; as, for example, it is expressly said: Before the beginning of creation, there was one only, without a second, Brahman desired to become manifold, he himself made himself, he is the birthplace of beings, he limits them from himself, and reabsorbs them into himself, as the spider with her thread, etc. etc. (p. 398—403). In conclusion, our author disposes of the objections given above, and the appeals to experience, by the explanation (translated above p. 93), that we need not here remain in accord with experience, for here we have not to do with an object of rational knowledge (anumânam), but with revelation (403, 7), and further refers to subsequent investigations.

3. Brahman creates without Instruments

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Sûtras 2, 1, 24--25.

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Widely separated from the enquiry treated of above, although in fact standing in close relationship with it, and even in part coinciding with it, is the question of the instruments which Brahman uses. As the demonstration was reached there by quotations from the Veda, so it is here reached by examples from nature; if it is (from the cause stated above p. 224) no less inadequate on this account, it still possesses a certain interest, because it contributes to make clear the view of nature held by the Hindus; for this reason we give the Adhikaranam in question 2, 1, 24--25 (p. 475--479) almost word for word:

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It might be objected that it is not feasible to assume the spiritual Brahman alone and without a second as the cause of the world, because in order to mould anything, all kinds of instruments are needed; thus in actual life the potters etc. when they wish to make vessels take all kinds of things, as the clay, the stick, the wheel, or thread as instruments, and thus we cannot assume that Brahman created the world without instruments. We reply to this, that creation takes place by the specific quality of the substance (dravya-svabhâva-viçeshâd, that is, Brahman) in much the same way that the change of milk into curds or water into ice takes place without exterior instruments. Certainly warmth assists in turning milk sour, still the milk follows nothing but the laws of change inherent in itself, and the process is only hastened by the warmth. Were the power to become sour not already in the milk, the warmth could not help it to change; since, for example, wind or ether cannot be changed to curds by warmth. The addition of the means only completes the process; but even such a completion is not needed in the case of Brahman, for he possesses all the necessary powers (*çakti* of which immediately) perfect within himself.

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It is true that milk etc. are unintelligent substances, and we see that beings with intelligence, like potters etc., call in the aid of instruments. Thus we may suppose it to be with Brahman, as he also is an intelligent being.—To this can be opposed the fact that gods also, and ancestors, and Rishis, who are certainly beings possessed of intelligence, through their own power, without external means, according to their innate sovereignty, and through meditation alone, creat many variously shaped bodies, palaces, carriages etc., as the Hymns and Brâhmaṇas as well as the epic and mythological works attest. Further, we must remember that the spider puts forth her thread from herself, that female cranes become fertilised without seed, and that lotus-flowers wander from one pond to another without outward means of transit. The applicability of these comparisons may be contested, because the gods accomplish their deeds only by taking bodily forms to aid them, and not by the spiritual Self alone, because the saliva of the spider, after it has been stiffened by eating smaller creatures, becomes threads, because the female cranes are fertilised⁹⁵ when they hear the voice of the thunder, because the lotus-flowers do not wander among the ponds by means of their unintelligent bodies, but precisely because they are endowed with intelligence, as climbing plants find their way to trees;—but to all this we can reply that the creatures named do not, like the potter, use [external instruments in

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⁹⁵ p. 477, 15: *balâkâ ca antareṇa eva çukram garbham dhatte*; p. 768 6: *balâkâ api antareṇa eva retaḥ-sekam garbham dhatte*, *iti loke rûḍhiḥ*; p. 478, 8: *balâkâ ca stanayitnu-rava-çravaṇâd garbham dhatte*. These indications may serve to clear up the passage *Meghadûta* v. 9, which, as appears from Stenzler's note on page 29, has hitherto been understood differently:

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*garbha-âdhâna-kṣaṇa-paricayân nûnam âbaddha-mâlâḥ*
*sevishyante nayana-subhagam khe bhavantam balâkâḥ*

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"Surely wilt thou [O Cloud], when thou floatest in the air, rejoicing the "eye, be honored by the female cranes in their serried ranks, because "they conclude (*colligunt*) [from thy arising] that the moment for receiv-"ing the fruits of the body [in the tempest] draws near."

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their activity, and that, like them, Brahman does not, in creating, use any outward means to assist himself, which is what we wished to arrive at.

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—The defective knowledge of nature, and the weakness of the arguments on this ground require no further comment, besides the examples we have given.

4. Brahman and the Powers of Nature

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Sûtras 2, 1, 30 and 1, 3, 30.

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In all considerations of this section, it is well to keep in mind that the Indian idea of creation differs essentially from our own. For whilst by creation, we understand something done once for all, and therefore at a given time, the consciousness of the Vedântin is dominated by the concept that from eternity to eternity the world periodically emerges from and again returns to Brahman; and it emerges and returns times without number: "the past and future world-periods (kalpa) are measureless," as the Purâna passage quoted on p. 495, 10, declares.

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But how comes it that the world, through all its new creations, remains the same in character?—This question compels us to seek the basis of this uniformity in Brahman himself.

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Further: how can the manifold manifestations of the world arise from the uniform Brahman?—For this multiplicity, there must also be a sufficient reason in Brahman.

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In these postulates we must seek for the motive of the manifold powers (çakti), which Brahman contains, the resemblance of which to the Platonic teaching of ideas we have already referred to, above pp. 69—70.

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This valuable thought is unfortunately only slightly developed in our system; it only appears sporadically, and its position is uncertain; sometimes the powers of Brahman appear simply as the expression of his omnipotence, sometimes they mean the fructifying power of those things which, at the destruction of the world, enter as a germ into Brahman, to come forth again at the new creation. We will briefly gather together what is to be found scattered here and there, on this subject.

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"That the uniform Brahman produces the diverse manifestation of the phenomenal world," so is stated on p. 486, 10, "is to be explained through His providing Himself with various powers." To prove this, certain Vedic passages are mentioned, which, however, do not appear to assert anything more than the omnipotence of Brahman ('all-working is he, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-tasting'): Brahman is furnished with all powers (p. 1125, 8), is connected with the unfolding of many powers (p. 445, 11), the Îçvara possesses innumerable powers (p. 490, 8), as appears from his being the cause of the origin, subsistence, and destruction of the world (p. 1126, 1); these powers without which Brahman could not create (p. 342, 6), are deduced from the multiplicity of their effects (p. 486, 2); as to their relation to Brahman, from the expression used on p. 476, 8, that Brahman "is filled with powers," (*paripūrṇaçaktikam*), we may conclude that these powers are believed to be immanent in Brahman.

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The Scripture (Çvet. 1, 3) leads to the assumption of one power of the highest God, which orders and creates the whole world (p. 358, 5). It is this godlike power not unfolded in name and form, which is the original state (*prāg-avasthā*) of names and forms (p. 358, 10); in this original state, the now manifested world existed before manifestation, in a state of seed-force (*vīja-çakti-avasthā*, p 341, 9); "if" (it is said on p. 342, 2 in the polemic against the Sāṅkhyas) "we acknowledged a self-subsisting original state of the world as cause, we should make room for the assumption of a material cause (of the world); we assume though that this original state of the world was not self-subsisting, but dependent on the highest God. Such we must of necessity take it to be, and on good grounds. For without it, the creative work of God is impossible, for an activity of God devoid of his powers is unthinkable... This unmanifested (*avyaktam*) seed-force, as it is called, resting in the highest God, is in its inherent character Ignorance (*avidyā*), a deep sleep produced by glamour (*māyā*) in which lie those wandering souls, who have “not awakened to the knowledge of their real nature [the “knowledge of their identity with Brahman].”

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According to these passages, it appears that 1. the creative power of Brahman, 2. the seed-forces of things, and 3. individual souls existing by means of their subtle bodies, are all confused together in the indeterminate idea of the powers of Brahman. We have already seen (above p. 70) that these powers were not annihilated at each destruction of the world, but remained in existence as its root (p. 303, 1), and in such a way that their character remained unchanged (p. 303, 2). From this, it follows, that in spite of the continual destruction of the world, the same elements (earth, etc.), the classes of beings (gods, men, animals), and the worldly distinctions (castes and Âcramas), come forth anew (p. 303, 4).

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The multiplicity of these powers does not contradict the unity of Brahman who contains them, since the power of multiplying (*vibhâga-çakti*), before and after the existence of the world, as well as the tendency to multiplicity (*vibhâga-vyavahâra*), during the existence of the world, rest on false perception (*mithyâjñânam*) (p. 433, 13); as we shall see more in detail, in the esoteric cosmology.

XVII. The exoteric Picture of Creation

1. General

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Two passages of the Upanishads, which we now give, are the main standards for the ideas of the creation of the world.⁹⁶

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⁹⁶ A third important passage, *Aitareya-Up.* 1, 1, is only touched upon incidentally in 3, 3, 16—17, and plays no further part in the system. We give the beginning of this passage here, for the sake of comparison: "Truly, this world was Âtman alone in the beginning; there was "naught else there to open the eyes. He conceived the idea: 'I will now "create worlds.' Then he created these worlds; [they are:] the floods, "the rays, death, the waters [*Çankara* reads p. 871, 8 *mara*, *âpas*]. Yonder "is the flood, beyond the heavens; heaven is its support; the rays are the "atmosphere; death is the earth; underneath are the waters."

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1) *Taittirîya-Upanishad* 2, 1: "Truly from this Âtman the "Âkâça came forth; from the Âkâça, the wind; from the wind, "fire; from fire, water; from water, the earth; from the earth, "plants; from plants, nourishment; from nourishment, seed; "from seed, man."

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2) *Chândogya-Upanishad* 6, 2, 2—3, 2: "Existent, alone, dear "one, was this in the beginning, one alone and without a second. "It conceived the idea (*aikshata*): 'I will become many, I will "propagate myself'; so it created fire (*tejas*).—This fire con- "ceived the idea: 'I will become many, I will propagate my- "self'; so it created water. Therefore, when a man is hot "and sweats, from the heat arises water.—This water con- "ceived the idea: 'I will become many, I will propagate my- "self'; so it created food. Therefore, when it rains, much "food arises, for from water arises the nourishment that man "eats.—In truth, these beings have three sorts of seeds (i. e., "origins), those born from the egg, those born alive, and those “born from the germ. That deity conceived the idea: ‘Verily, “I will enter into these three deities (fire, water, food), with “this living Self [the individual soul], and spread forth into “names and forms; and I will make each one of them three-“fold.’—Then that deity entered into these three deities, with “this living Self, and spread forth names and forms; and each “one of them it made threefold” [of this, later].

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As we see, in the first place five elements, Âkâça, air, fire, water, and earth, are mentioned, but in the second, only the last three. Our authors detailed discussion of the absence of contradiction in this, because in the second, Âkâça and air must be supplied from the first, may very well be omitted, since they are wholly exegetical in character. This, however, occasions a controversy of considerable interest, concerning the origin of Âkâça. For Âkâça, usually translated ether, is not so much this, as all-permeating, all-present space,—as may be understood from the popular expression, quoted for other purposes on p. 609, 7: *âkâçam kuru*, “make room,” *âkâço jâtaḥ*, “room has been made”; but still it is space, as something corporeal, as an element;—a conception that is not far from the ideas of all those which take space to be something self-existent (that is, independent of our intellect) and therefore real. In this sense, the Indian thinkers make it the medium of sound (e. g. p. 557, 14), which therefore they did not recognise as a vibratory movement of the air, and, in consequence, the element of air receives a more concrete meaning, approaching the idea of wind. Of this material apprehension of space, Çaṅkara (p. 558, 1) objects against the Buddhists, who define Âkâça as purely negative, as “the absence of hindrances” (*âvaraṇa-abhâva*), that, in that case, there could be no Âkâça in the space taken up by a body, a flying bird, for example; so that we must recognise in the Âkâça not the absence of hindrances, but that reality, through which the absence of hindrances is constituted, literally: characterised (*tad vastu-bhûtam, yena âvaraṇa-abhâvo viçishyate*),—all this in reality comes back to the verbal contention as to whether a negative can still be called real, and it clearly shows that the conception of the Âkâça wavers between that of space, and something material. It has the same character in the following controversy with Kaṇāda, who correctly recognizes the heterogeneity of Ākāça and the elements, and as a consequence, places Ākāça as a connecting link between corporeal nature and the power of nature manifesting itself therein (Brahman).

2. The Origin of Space (Ākāça)

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Sūtras 2, 3, 1-7.

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With unconcealed irony, Çaṅkara mentions those who follow in the footsteps of the illustrious Kaṇabhuj, (a nickname for Kaṇāda): "that we cannot conceive an origin of space" (p. 608, 6).—We will see how far this irony is well founded, by picking out from the chaos of discussion, the essential arguments and counter-arguments.

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Space can have had no origin, says Kaṇāda, for the following reasons: (1) How can one conceive the causal relation between space as an effect, and its cause? The cause (kāraṇam), of an effect (for example, a textile fabric) has three moments, as samavāyi-asamavāyi-nimitta-kāraṇam, that is, inherent cause (the threads), non-inherent cause (the union of the threads), and efficient cause (weaver and loom). The inherent cause consists of a substance, which is (a) homogeneous (ekajātīyaka), (b) manifold (aneka) [like the atoms of Kaṇāda]. "Now for space, there is no homogeneous and manifold substance, from which, as inherent cause, together with the union of the same (that is, of its particles), as non-inherent cause, space could originate. And if this does not exist, much less can we think of an assisting efficient cause for space" (p. 608, 8 ff.).

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(2) In the case of created elements (for example, fire) we can picture to ourselves a difference between the time before, and the time after they had come into being. This difference we cannot conceive in the case of space [na sambhāvayitum çakyate p. 609, 4), that is, therefore, we cannot picture a condition in which space was not]. "For how can a man assume that before the creation there was no place, no vacuity, no opening?" (p. 609, 5).

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(3) Space did not originate, for it is of a different nature (vidharma) from the earth, &c., in so far as its distinctive character is, that it penetrates all things (vibhutvam) etc. (p. 609, 6).

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(4) Lastly, in the scripture itself, space is called “undying, all-present, eternal” (p. 610, 3).

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According to all this, we must assume that before the creation, when, as the scriptures say, there was “one only, without a second,” space must have formed an all-penetrating, formless unity with Brahman, like water mixed with milk; and this separated at the creation in such a way that space remained immovable, while Brahman exerted itself (yatate) to produce the world (p. 612, 3).

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After Śaṅkara has pointed out that water and milk, although mixed, yet remain different essentially, whilst for the existent before the creation, an essential unity was required (p. 617, 15), he sets himself to refute Kaṇāda’s arguments; first however he gives the following positive proof of the origination of space:

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(p. 618, 13) “Whenever we see anything that has originated through transformation, whether it be pitchers, pots, and pails, or bracelets, clasps, and rings, or needles, iron arrowheads, and swords, we see division also in the world. On the contrary, a thing without origin can never be thought of as divided. The division of space is, however, shown by the earth, etc. (that is in space); therefore space also must be a transformation” (that is: all that has an origin is divisible; but space is divisible; ergo—!).

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Probably from a perception of the weakness of this argument, our author at once passes from it to the domain of metaphysics, where he is more at home: Ātman, he says, is not divided by the earth, or anything else; for space (the principle of division) originates in Ātman; consequently Ātman is no transformation. With this thought, which takes its root in the profound perception that that which exists in itself is spaceless, Śaṅkara goes on to the fine statement of the Self-existence of Ātman, which we translated in Chapter VIII, 6 (above p. 127). He then turns to the arguments of Kaṇāda mentioned above, to refute them one after another.

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(1) The cause need not necessarily be homogeneous and manifold; (a) not homogeneous: for the threads and their combinations need not be homogeneous, and still less the efficient cause, the loom (but no one ever maintained this).— Or is homogeneity to be asserted of the inherent cause only? That cannot be maintained unconditionally. For a single cord is twisted out of yarn and cow-hair; and many cloths are woven from thread and [unspun] wool. Or does the homogeneity of the cause only demand that it must be one being and one substance? That is self-evident, and the requirement is superfluous. (b) Further, the cause need not be manifold. For also the atoms of Kaṇāda work each for itself. It is not necessary that the cause should consist of several factors; for the effect can also be the result of transformation, since a substance passes into a different condition, and is then called the effect. The substance in this case may be manifold, as the earth and the seed that go to form plants, or uniform, as milk, which becomes curds. And so, according to the scripture, from the uniform Brahman, the manifold world, with space and all creatures, has sprung (p. 621, 5—623, 4).

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(2) It is absurd to assert, with reference to space, that a difference cannot be imagined between the time before, and the time after creation; for that space, with all bodies, is there now, and that nothing was there before, is precisely the difference. [But here Kaṇāda is not even understood, much less disproved.] Besides, the scripture expressly declares (Brih. 3, 8, 8, translated above p. 133), that Brahman, amongst other things, is spaceless (anākāçam, “not-ether,” as we translated above p. 133) (p. 623, 5—12).

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(3) It does not hold good, either, that space had no origin, because it is different in essence from the earth and the other elements. For, firstly, where the scripture contradicts this, a logical conclusion of the impossibility of its origin is fallacious, and, secondly, its origination follows even as a logical conclusion: for space is not everlasting, because it possesses qualities which are not everlasting (sound perhaps?—that would, however, under no circumstances be an essential quality of space;) therefore we must postulate a beginning for it, as for vases, etc. Do you maintain that, in this, it is not distinguished from Âtman?—For of Âtman, no one has ever yet demonstrated to a follower of the Upanishads that he is the bearer of non-eternal qualities. Furthermore, it has never been proved that space is all-pervading (vibhu) (p. 624, 5; the same monstrous assertion p. 700, 4).

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(4) When space is said by the scripture to be immortal, it is only in the (relative) sense in which the gods also are said to be immortal (on this, above p. 67). When, however, it is said of Brahman, that he is, "like space, omnipresent, eternal;" that is simply a simile, as when it is said: "the sun flies like an arrow," whereby it is not meant that it has only the same speed as an arrow; then also it is said of Brahman: "greater is he than space" (above p. 163) and "what is separate from him, is afflicted" (above p. 142).—Thus the origination of space is proved (p. 624, 6—625, 7).

3. The Origin of Air, Fire, Water, Earth

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Sûtras 2, 3, 8—13.

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As Âkâça came forth from Âtman, so Vâyu (air or wind) came forth from Âkâça; its immortality and imperishability, as taught by the scripture (Chând. 4, 3, 1. Brih. 1, 5, 22) are to be taken as only relative (âpekshika), that is, in comparison with the other elements, which all come forth from, and return to it, and only hold good in the lower doctrine (p. 626, 5), which seems to mean that, in the passage in question (Brih. 1, 5, 22), Vâyu is the representative of aparam brahma. As from Âkâça proceeds air, so from this proceeds fire (2, 3, 10), from fire water (2, 3, 11), and from water, earth (2, 3, 12), for this, and not rice or barley, is to be understood by "food" in the passage of the Chândogya at the beginning of this chapter, firstly, because the context requires this, and this is of more importance than the use of words (p. 634, 5) and also because "the food" is spoken of further on (Chând. 6, 4) as "black" and this refers to the earth which in some parts, it is true, is white like milk, and red, like [glowing] coals, (p. 633, 9), but as a rule is black, for which reason it is also called Çarvarî (night) in the Purāṇas (p. 633, 11). Plants, according to other passages, spring from the earth later and therefore the word "food" refers to the earth.

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How are we to understand this emanation of the elements from each other? They are without intelligence (acetana), but (a weighty axiom of our system) without intelligence, no motion is possible (p. 635, 1; compare 528, 7). Therefore we must assume that God himself changes himself into the elements (p. 635, 3) and after he has become air, for example, he creates fire (p. 630, 10); his position in regard to the elements is this expressed by the passage of scripture (Bṛih. 3, 7, 3): "He who, dwelling in the earth, is different from the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, who inwardly governs the earth, He is thy soul, thy inward guide, the immortal" (compare above p. 149 ff.). Consequently, in all elements, Brahman is the inner guide and overseer, and as such, brings about their motions (p. 635, 7).

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It must, therefore, be borne in mind that the elementary creation, that is, the whole body of inorganic nature, as such, is inanimate, and therefore incapable of movement, like a cart without a horse (p. 507, 9. 727, 1) and that according to this, when, for example, water flows, not water, as such, but the Brahman in it, brings this about (p. 507, 12); and the contradiction is not important, if, in his stead, the nature-gods (created by him, and dependent on him) have the same functions assigned to them, of which we have spoken above p. 65 ff.

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Further, the psychic organs (Buddhi, Manas, and the senses) of which we shall learn more in our psychological section, are, like the elements, emanations of Brahman; whether it be assumed that they are of like nature, and therefore of like duration, with these (p. 640, 1), or that they are different in kind from the natural elements and must be looked on as having emanated before or after them (p. 640, 3). In any case, they, as well as the elements, are, in themselves, lifeless, and both elements and organs are only created as means to an end, as we shall see further on.

4. Incidental Remark on the Destruction of the World

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WE must assume that, in the periodical re-absorption of the world in Brahman, the elements, in the same way as they have emerged from one another, are withdrawn again into one another in reverse order; for so experience teaches us, as, for example, in a staircase, coming down is the reverse of going up (p. 637, 5); therefore, as the vessel becomes clay again, and the ice, water (p. 637, 6), so also the dissolution of the elements takes place in such a manner that the less subtle goes back to that which is finer, the more remote effect returns everywhere into the nearer (p. 637, 9), for it is not right to assume that the effect continues when its cause is destroyed (p. 638, 4).

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At the end of the Kalpa, therefore, the earth becomes water again; water, fire; fire, air; air becomes Âkâça, and Âkâça re-enters Brahman. This view is likely to throw some light on the scientific motive of the teaching of the gradual evolution and absorption of the elements, as to which we have no other information: the observation that solids dissolve in water, that water turns into steam through heat, that the flames of fire flicker out into the air (Chând. 4, 3, 1: *yadâ vâ' agnir udvâyati, vâyum eva api-eti*), air, according to the altitude, rarifies more and more into empty space, might lead us to the gradual progression of the dissolution of the world, and by inversion to its opposite, the creation of the world.⁹⁷

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⁹⁷ A classification of the elements (with the omission of Âkâça), according to their greater or lesser density, and corresponding perceptibility, is indicated p. 536, 7: "the earth, as capable of being smelt, "tasted, seen, felt, is gross (*sthûla*); water, as being tasted, seen, and "felt, is subtle (*sûkshma*); fire, as being seen and felt, is more subtle "(*sûkshmatara*); the air, as only to be felt, is most subtle (*sûkshmatama*)." As a rule, the Indians add to these a fifth, and still more subtle element, Âkâça, with the quality of audibility (also possessed by the other four). Cf. Aristotle, *de sensu* 2, p. 438 B, 17 ff.: φανερὸν ὡς δεῖ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀποδιδόναι καὶ προσάπτειν ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἑνὶ τῶν στοι- χείων. τοῦ μὲν ὄμματος τὸ ὁρατικὸν ὕδατος ὑποληπτέον, ἀέρος δὲ τὸ τῶν ψόφων αἰσθητικόν, πυρὸς δὲ τὴν ὄσφρησιν,—τὸ δ'ἀπτικὸν γῆς, τὸ δὲ

5. Organic Nature

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The creation of the world, properly speaking, which, as it appears, is to be thought of as a disk,⁹⁸ concludes with the creation of inanimate nature. For in organic nature, quite a new principle comes before us: it is the soul, which is incarnate in all the thousand phenomena of life, in all forms of gods, men, animals, and plants. It is true that souls also are an emanation from Brahman, from whom they, according to the Upanishads (for example Mund. 2, 1, 1, translated above p. 131 ff.; Kaush. 3, 3. 4, 20. Bṛih. 2, 1, 20) have arisen as the sparks from the fire, and into which they return in the same manner; but neither their origination from Brahman, nor their return to him, is understood by our system in the strict sense of the word. For the soul exists together with its organs (Prâṇas) and the "subtle body," from eternity—and, unless liberation is reached, to eternity; its entrance into Brahman in deep sleep, death, and at the dissolution of the world, takes place in such a manner that its seed remains, from which it proceeds again unchanged, with its organs. Of this later.

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⁹⁸ jagad-vimbam p. 488, 11. 489, 3. 490, 7.—The following expressions nâkasya priṣṭhe (frequent in the Veda, for example, Muṇḍ. 1, 2, 10; cf. Plato, Phaedrus, p. 247, C: ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ νώτῳ, and paro divo jyotir dîpyate viṣvataḥ priṣṭheshu (Chând. 3, 13, 7, translated above p. 169) seem to point to the idea of a sphere or hemisphere.

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By embodied souls, we are to understand all living beings (bhûtâni, more precisely [in contradistinction to the mahâ-bhûtâni or elements p. 140, 13] prâṇinaḥ p. 300, 5. 303, 4), therefore not only all gods, men, and animals, but also plants (therefore the expressions: brahmâdi-sthâvarânta p. 61, 11; brahmâdi-stambaparyanta p. 604, 2). Therefore plants (sthâvara) are also, as on p. 774, 5 it is expressly acknowledged, places of enjoyment (or suffering), they also have a living soul (kshetrajña p. 772, 5; jîva p. 773, 3), which has entered into

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γευστικὸν εἶδός τι ἁφῆς ἐστιν.—It should be noted that, while the Indians place fire between water and air, the Greeks, on the other hand, place air between water and fire.

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them in consequence of impure deeds (p. 774, 6), and they are sensible of enjoyment and pain (p. 772, 4), in which, however, the souls that return from the moon and stay for a while in plants as guests take no part. If the plant is cut, crushed, or cooked, the plant-soul dwelling in it passes out (*pravasati*), like every soul, when its body is destroyed (p. 773, 13 ff.). Plants must be in part endowed with perception, for, without it, the wandering of the lotus-flower from one pond to another, and the climbing of trees by creepers cannot be explained (p. 478, 9); for, as is often affirmed: without perception (*cetanâ*) there is no movement (*pravritti*).—It is true that the plant-world, as the immovable (*sthâvara*), is generally contrasted with the animal-world, as the movable (*jangama*) (p. 769, 4. 113, 1. 118, 17. 178, 5. 642, 1. 687, 4); it may serve as characteristic of the latter, that the cow (p. 507, 14) is said to have perception of, and love for, its calf, as also the goose (*hansa*) can distinguish both components in a mixture of milk and water, while we cannot (p. 799, 3); for the rest, in regard to the difference between animal and human perception, we are confined to what the passages translated in note 34, p. 57 above offer us.—It seems strange that p. 491, 7 to the gods is assigned a condition of infinite enjoyment, to man a mixed state, and to the animals, "infinite suffering." For the rest, such a conception could only be formed where the height of pleasure is to be measured by the degree of intelligence, and where, consequently, intellectual enjoyments are esteemed as the highest.⁹⁹

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⁹⁹ The argument on p. 102, 13 also rests on this view: if the (unconscious) primordial substance of the Sânkhyas were the place of the liberated, liberation would be a misfortune.

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We find a classification of organic beings 3, 1, 20—21, where they (as in the Ait. Up. 3, 3 p. 243) are divided according to their origin into
(1) *udbhijja*, born from a germ (plants),
(2) *svedaja*, born of sweat (damp heat, *sveda*, for which Bâdarâyana has the singular word *samçoka*), for example, vermin, (3) aṇḍaja, born of the egg,
(4) jarāyuja, born of the womb 100 (literally, from the Chorion).

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The two last classes originate by procreation, the two first, without it (p. 768, 10). The passage from the Chândogya-Upanishad, which we gave in the introduction to our chapter above p. 230, exhibits only three classes, for it joins the two first together, as if both came forth from germs, the one from earth, the other from water (p. 769, 3); yet the separation is justified, for the first class embraces immovable, the second movable beings (p. 769, 5).

6. Physiological Remarks

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Sûtras 2, 4, 20–22. 3, 1, 2.

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In the passage from the Chândogya-Upanishad, the beginning of which we translated above, p. 230, it is shown further how all things are triply mixed from the three original elements, fire, water, and food. So, for example, in natural fire, in the sun, moon and lightning, the red comes from the fire-element, the white from the water-element, and the black from the food-element. A preponderance of one of the three elements over the two others, brings about the differences of fire, water, and the other elements, in nature (p. 737, 13; natural fire is trivṛtkṛtaṃ tejas, "the triply formed fire," p. 144, 1, in contradistinction with the atrivṛtkṛtaṃ tejaḥ prathamajam p. 143, 7). The motive for this theory of commingling seems to be the wish to explain how the human body, although it only takes up single materials in nourishment, yet consists of all three original elements, of which the finer portion, like the cream on the milk, rises, while the coarser descends. Thus the body is made up of the three original elements according to the following scheme:

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| | Gross: | Medium: | Fine: |
| Food: | Faeces | Flesh | Manas |
| Water: | Urine | Blood | Prāṇa |
| Heat: | Bones | Marrow | Speech. |

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¹⁰⁰ These four classes are to be understood by the caturvidho bhūtagrāmaḥ p. 357, 5. 406, 7. 431, 10. 768, 9, while, on the other hand, bhūtacatuṣṭayam p. 956, 3 means the four elements.

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That which accomplishes this tripled mingling 101 in nature, and in the body, is, as is shown on page 733ff. not the individual soul, but Brahman.—That the body consists of the three elements, food, water, and heat, follows from the fact that their effects can be observed in it. On the other hand, it contains the three materials (dhātu): wind, gall, and mucus (p. 743, 8). It is not said in what relation these stand to the elements. In the body, watery substances preponderate, fluids, blood, etc. (p. 743, 11); "in another respect, indeed, the earthy "preponderates" (p. 743, 12; in what respect, remains unsaid); that, however, the human body is essentially watery, can be observed from the fact that it originally springs from two liquids, the (male) seed, and the (female) blood (p. 743, 13; cf. Aristotle, Met. H, 4 p. 1044 A. 35 and Ait. ār. 2, 3, 7, 3).

7. The Controversy with the Buddhists concerning the Reality of the Outer World

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Sūtras 2, 2, 28—31.

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Just as Kant, along with transcendental idealism, maintained the empirical reality of the external world, and defended it (against Berkeley), so the Vedāntins are not prevented by their doctrine of Ignorance as the foundation of all Being expanded in name and form from maintaining the reality of the outer world against the Buddhists of idealistic tendencies. (In order to guard against misunderstanding, we must bear in mind the passage translated in note 31, above p. 55.) Because of the high importance of this question, and the difficulty of the section of our work which treats of it, we shall translate the passage here at length.¹⁰²

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¹⁰¹ A pañcīkaraṇam, such as the Vedāntasāra § 124 teaches, is already found in Govinda's Gloss, p. 139, 21. 733, 17; but not yet in Ҫaṅkara's Commentary to the Brahmasūtras.

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¹⁰² In what follows, we translate vijñānam presentation; jñānam knowledge; anubhava sensation, feeling; pratyaya perception; upalabdhi, upalambha apperception; grahaṇam comprehension; avagamanam apprehension; saṃskāra impression; pratyaksham observation;—the meaning of these terms is, however, not so much to be gathered from the modern terms which we have chosen (in default of others), but rather from the context.

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Immediately before this, stands the discussion on Buddhist realism (2, 2, 18—27), to which the Buddhist idealist refers in the opening words.

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The Buddhist speaks:

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[p. 566, 12ff.] “Because the attraction of many scholars towards external things has been noticed, this doctrine of (the reality of) the outer world was put forward for their sake. But this is not the Buddha’s view; [p. 567] on the contrary what he desired, is solely the doctrine of the sole category (skandha) of presentation (vijñānam). According to the doctrine of presentation, the outward form is only in the intellect, (buddhi), and the whole worldly action of knowledge, what is known and [the enjoyment of] fruit is only something interior; and even if there were exterior things, yet without being in the intellect, this worldly action of knowing etc. could not take place.”

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“How then can it be proved that the whole worldly action is only something interior, and that beyond the presentation, there are no external things?—For the reason that they are impossible! For let it be taken for granted that there are exterior objects, e.g., solid bodies, they must be either infinitely small (paramāṇu) or an aggregate of the infinitely small; now that of which our perception can trace the limit as a solid body, etc., cannot be infinitely small, because the infinitely small is not visible and knowable; so also no aggregate of the infinitely small; for this can neither be thought of, as different from the infinitely small, nor as identical with it [p. 568] [not different, for it is made up of the infinitely small, for it would then escape observation in all its parts]. The same is true of species [jāti, which exist only in individuals].”

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“Further: if knowledge (jñānam), which is in its nature general, because it is produced by sensation (anubhava) alone, varies according to objects, as knowledge of columns, knowledge of a wall, knowledge of a vessel, knowledge of a cloth, this is possible only through the differentiation (viçeṣha) which concerns the knowledge.—Therefore we must unquestionably “grant the identity (*sārūpyam*) of the knowledge with the object. If we grant this, however, as the form of the object is determined only by the knowledge of it, the hypothesis (*kalpanā*) of the existence of things is superfluous.”

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“Then too, as apperception (*upalambha*) of necessity combines both, no division of the object from its presentation (*vijñānam*) is possible; for it is impossible to apperceive the one without apperceiving the other; and that would not be so, if they were different in nature, for then nothing would exist to prevent it. For this reason also, external objects do not exist.”

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“In this it is, for example, like a dream. As in dreams or hallucinations (*māyā*) there arise perceptions (*pratyaya*) of water in a mirage, Gandharva cities, etc., without outward objects in the form of apprehender and something to be apprehended; just so [p. 569] in the state of waking, must be the case with the perception of columns, etc., because we cannot distinguish them from the former, in so far as they are both perceptions.”

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