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Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c6: 2. A Brief History of Vāda

Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c6

Language
English

Contents

2. A Brief History of Vāda

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<p style="text-indent: 0;">RIGHT from the inception of Indian civilization, the art of debating was taken up seriously and cultivated assiduously. There are situations of debate described in the Vedic Saṁhitās. The Upaniṣads use the term *brahmodya* for *vāda* and give a number of specimens — great debates revealing with insights of seers and intellectuals.</p>

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The history of debates in India can be classified into four successive ages:

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* The Age of Revelation (around 3000 BCE to 500 BCE): was the period when *mantras* were revealed to the seers through their vision.
* The Age of Argument (around 500 BCE to CE 1000): was the most fertile period for the development of concepts related to *vāda* and it was also marked with most serious debates.
* The Age of Diversification (around CE 1000 to CE 1800): sectarian debates and debates between diverse philosophical schools were intensely carried on in this age.
* The Modern Age (around CE 1800 onwards).

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The divide between first two is very aptly suggested by Yāska in his *Nirukta* (700 BCE) through the following mythical narrative:

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The seers were departing from this world for ever. The human beings asked them — "who will be our seer if you are leaving us?" The seers replied — "henceforth *tarka* (argument) will be your seer".

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Yāska rightly concludes this story by stating that the age of *mantras* is over, now by exploring the *mantras* through *tarka* (argument), *ūha* (confutation) and *abhyūha* (investigation) one can reclaim the *ārṣa* — the vision of the seers that has been lost by their departure.¹

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Yāska exemplifies both in theory and practice how argument and investigation can be made tools to unravel the meanings of the *mantras*. Every *mantra* unfolds a vision (the *mantradṛṣṭi*) and this *mantradṛṣṭi* embraces high and low contentions, it does not traverse through linear paths.²

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Yāska also shows that the seers themselves applied the method of *abhyūha* by taking up the example of *Ṛgveda* X.71.8. The word ohabrahmaṇaḥ in this passage according to Yāska actually means *ūhabrahmāṇaḥ* (those seers for whom the process of *ūha* {confutation} conversation.⁶ In this way, inquiry and conversation formed as integral part of the life and culture of Vedic people as sacrificial rituals. Those who did not rejoice at sharing spaces through dialogues were unwelcome.

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The very existence of Indra, the supreme deity is questioned by some.⁷ There are hymns in which perennial questions regarding life and destiny are raised.⁸ In the hymn on the creation of *Ṛgveda*, the seer dares to say that gods do not know how this creation came out, and even if there is a Supreme Being who presides over this creation, we are not sure whether he knows or knows not as to how this creation proceeded. There is *vāda* going on within the poet-seer.

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There were democratic institutions in Vedic age, i.e. *sabhā* and *samiti* (like perhaps the lower and upper houses of parliament today), where discussions and debates could materialize. While *Yajurveda* simply mentions *sabhā*,⁹ *Atharvaveda* presents a glorified picture of *sabhā* and *samiti*, calling them the two daughters of *prajāpati*. It was expected that the people gathered in a *sabhā* or *samiti* will maintain decorum and will make suitable remarks only. The *sabhā* is called *nariṣṭhā* — attended by best of men, and the members of a *sabhā* are called *sabhāsadas*. They are expected to bear good will for each other.¹⁰

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The continuity of a *sabhā* and *samiti* was maintained in village *panchayats*. In 1828, Raja Rammohun Roy traced an analogy of “Panchayat” to ancient Hindu law books connecting them to the organization of *sabhā*.¹¹

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Dīrghatamas, the seer of Asyavāmīyasūkta (*Ṛgveda* I.164) is not only a visionary and a great philosopher, he also makes investigations, enters into dialogue with himself.¹²

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The dialogue hymns of *Ṛgveda* have ample elements of debate. In the “Hymn of Yama and Yamī” (X.10), the dialogue between a brother and a sister turn on the propriety of incestuous relations. Yama counters each and every statement of Yamī. In the hymn on Purūravas and Urvaśī (X.95) all the points raised by Purūravas are countered by Urvaśī.

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The concept of *brahmodya* is spelled out in the dialogue between Śauceya and Uddālaka Āruṇi. Śauceya approached the Sage Uddālaka and told him that he wants to know about *brahmodya*. He asks many questions about *brahmodya* to the seer, to which the latter replies. After every answer, he goes on saying “now I understand”.¹³

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*Brahmodyas* (the assemblies for conducting debates and discussions) were held during the Aśvamedha and Daśarātra *yajñas* also. The scholars giving best performance in a *brahmodya* were honoured with the title of *kavi* and *vipra*.¹⁴

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*Brahmodyas* were also comprised of asking riddles and getting them solved. Specimens of such *brahmodyas* are given in *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and other Vedic texts. The following dialogues can be cited as an example:¹⁵

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“Who is born again?”
“It is the moon that is born again.”
“What is the great vessel?”
“The great vessel, undoubtedly, is the world”.
“Who was the beautiful one?”
“Śrī (Lakṣmī) was the beauty beyond any doubt.”
“What is the remedy for cold?”
“The remedy for cold undoubtedly, is fire.”
“Who was the tawny one?”
“Undoubtedly, there are two tawny ones — the day and the night.”

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In another interesting *brahmodya* described in *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* XI.4, Uddālaka Āruṇi, a resident of Kurupāñcāla country is confronted by the brāhmaṇas of north with several complicated questions related to the performance of the ritual of Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice. The *yājamāna* had chosen Uddālaka Āruṇi as a priest for the sacrifice and had placed a *niṣka* (coin) in his honour. Unable to resolve the riddles of the brāhmaṇas, Uddālaka placed the *niṣka* offered to him before one Svedāyana, telling that being more knowledgeable, he deserves the coin. The ceremony of the *yajña* being over, Uddālaka went to Svedāyana to learn the answers of the questions asked to him.

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*Vāda* or *brahmodya* formed a part of sacrifices like the Āśvamedha, but there the questions and answers were defined. It was like a demonstration of a prepared debate or discussion. *Brahmodya* organized during the course of Aśvamedha ceremony has been described in *Yajurveda*. Questions proceeded like this. The Hotā would ask — “What is the ultimate space for speech?” The Brahmā (one of the four priests for the *yajña*-ritual) would reply — “*Brahman* is the ultimate space for speech”. The assembly in a *brahmodya* session became divided in two groups — one asked questions and the other answered them. *Yajurveda* provides specimen of a session of *brahmodya* as under:

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Q : Who is the one that roams alone? Who is the one that is reborn again and again? What is the remedy for ice? What is the great field for sowing?
A: The sun roams alone. The moon is the one that is reborn again and again. Fire is the remedy for ice. Earth is the great field for sowing.
Q: What is the radiance equal to the sun? Which is the pond equal to the sea? What is bigger than the earth and what is that which does not have a limit?
A: *Brahman* is the radiance equal to sun. *Dyauh* (orbit) is the pond equal to sea. Indra is bigger than the earth and cow does not have a limit.
Q: In which substance *Puruṣa* gets dissolved? What entities are subsumed within *Puruṣa*?
A: *Puruṣa* gets dissolved in five, the five are subsumed within *Puruṣa*.¹⁶

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The queries made in *brahmodyas* were not necessarily metaphysical. In *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* of *Yajurveda*, a question regarding the centre and the farthest end of the earth is discussed.¹⁷ The answer however reflects the cosmic view of *yajña* — “the alter is the centre as well as the farthest end of the earth” — says the seer.¹⁸

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*Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa* 17.4 and *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 2.5.8.3 use two other terms for *brahmodya* — *brahmavadya* and *brahmavādya*.¹⁹

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*Brahmavāda*, *brahmavādin* and *brahmavādinī* — these terms have been used in Vedic literature for the debaters and discussants.²⁰ Other key terms and concepts related to *brahmodya* are *pṛcchā* (inquiry) and *vicikitsā* (investigation). In *Ṛgveda* I.164, the seer makes *pṛcchā* to *kavis* (the knowledgeable ones) as to where does the ultimate end of this earth lie, and where does reside the *paramavyoma* (the ultimate space) of speech.

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*Kavi* (poet), *vipra* (scholar) and *ṛṣi* (seer) are the titles given to the learned and gifted with vision. Assemblies were held to identify such poets, seers and scholars. They were called *vidatha*.²¹

Upaniṣadic Debates

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The Upaniṣads refer to various schools of thought and constant dialogues going on between them. Niyativādins, Kālavādins, Svabhāvavādins and Bhūtavādins were promulgating their ideologies. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* describes the Niyati School and Pāṇini refers to it as *diṣṭāmati*.

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V.S. Aggrawal opines that Prajñāvāda arose in opposition to Niyativāda, offering a rationalistic view of life. Kṛṣṇa was a Prajñāvādin. He adjusts Vidura as one of the prominent advocates of Prajñāvāda school.²²

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*Brahmodya* comprised of questions raised by one wing and answers provided from the other wing. This method is followed in the great debate or *brahmodya* between Yājñavalkya and other scholars in the court of Janaka as described in the Upaniṣad. Yājñavalkya, having been challenged by a multitude of the Brahmavādins or scholars in an assembly, suggests that either they confront him with their questions one by one or he confronts them with his questions one by one.²³ In fact, this was one of the biggest debates held in the assembly of King Janaka around 1000 BCE. It has been termed as *brahmodya* in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. Śaṅkarācārya in his *Bhāṣya* has called the whole of its proceedings as *saṁvāda-prakaraṇa*. Amongst hundreds of intellectuals present, Gārgī, a *brahmavādinī* (lady philosopher) alone could stand as a peer to Yājñavalkya. Besides Yājñavalkya, Janaka and Gārgī, several participants — all opponents of Yajñavalkya — the disputants — have been described. The disputants raise questions, counter questions and their resolutions are given by the respondent — Yājñavalkya. The extensive record of the proceedings of this debate in the Upaniṣad is one of the most valuable and authentic documentations of a philosophical debate. Even if the characters of this narrative do not belong to the history in the modern sense of the term, they are very much parts of a larger history of ideas.

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Aśvala was first to confront Yajñavalkya with his question:

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By what means, the sacrifice is liberated having overcome the clutches of death?

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Yājñavalkya replied:

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By speech which is fire in the shape of *hotā*, the first priest. The speech is fire, and fire is *hotā*, this fire of *hotā* is liberation, and this liberation is absolute liberation.

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Aśvala again asked:

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Yājñavalkya, all this is pervaded by day and night, all this is subjected by day and night. By what means, the sacrifice is liberated having overcome the clutches of the day and night?

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Yājñavalkya replied:

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By the eye, which is Āditya, in the form of the *adhvaryu* priest. Verily, the eye of the sacrifice is *adhvaryu*. This eye is Āditya, this Āditya is *adhvaryu*, and *adhvaryu* is liberation, and this liberation is absolute liberation.

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There is a pattern in the questions posed by all challengers. Aśvala’s further questions pertain to the means of overcoming the clutches of the light and dark halves of the lunar month.

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In reply to Jāratkārava Ārtabhāga, Yājñavalkya described eight fetters and eight auxiliaries. These include all the sense-organs and mind with their subjects as auxiliaries. If all phenomenon is the food of death, then for whom death becomes the food? — Jāratkārava Ārtabhāga questions. Fire is death and it becomes food for water — replied Yājñavalkya. What remains when the man dies? “The name” replies Yājñavalkya.

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The questions in this way became sharper and more penetrating. They pertained to the other world, life after death and destiny. Uṣastā asked Yājñavalkya about *Brahman* and soul.

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Gārgī declared in *brahmodya* held in the assembly at the royal court of King Janaka: “If Yājñavalkya answers my questions correctly, I swear that none amongst you will be able to win him in this *brahmodya*.”²⁴

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The questions posed by Gārgī were cleverly formulated and in the terminology of the Nyāya, they were likely to trap the respondent in *nigrahasthānas* (clinchers), which are being described in the next chapter of this work. Gārgī knew that her question pertained to the Ultimate was indescribable. If Yājñavalkya replied it, he would be committing a mistake by saying that which aught not to be said. (Technically that was a *nigrahasthāna* called *avācyavacana*). If he avoided the question, he would be trapped in the *nigrahasthāna* called *apratibhā*.

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After receiving satisfactory answers of her questions she made this announcement:

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O knowledgeable ones, it will be the best thing for you all to offer obeisance to Yājñavalkya and free yourselves from him. There is none amongst you who could win over him!

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The *ṛṣis* who participated in the debate with Yājñavalkya were intellectuals, seers and thinkers of their own standing. Many of them, though they lost and suffered a defeat because of the quick wit and brilliance of their adversary, had otherwise influenced the milieu by their ideas through *vāda* (debates and discussions). Amongst them Śvetaketu was an eminent ideologist and thinker. The earliest reference to Śvetaketu occurs in *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*.²⁵ He was a descendant of Gautama and grandson of Āruṇa. His father Uddālaka Āruṇi is a well-known seer and thinker in the Upaniṣads and is also referred in *Mahābhārata*. Even great sages like Yājñavalkya, Vājasaneya and Kauṣītaki are said to be his disciples.

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Uddālaka was a resident of Kurupāñcāla and was a student of Ayoda Dhaumya. He had learnt *brahmavidyā* with King Pravahaṇa Jaivāli. *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa* gives the detailed views of Uddālaka and Śvetaketu on the duties of a priest. Śvetaketu was also a man who could stand against the prevailing notions and customs and change the course of history. *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* and *Śāṅkhāyana Brāhmaṇa* (I.33) describe how even as a student he had violated the ban on eating of sweets for *brahmacārins* of the *gurukula*.²⁶

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*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* also describes his dialogues with the King Pravahaṇa Jaivāli and Janaka. Śvetaketu also disagreed with his own father on the performance of rituals. In *Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra* he is referred as an *avara* type of priest.

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Sujātā, his sister, was married to Kahoṭaka, father of Aṣṭāvakra. Aṣṭāvakra was initiated and educated in the hermitage of Uddālaka. He was a dwarf and suffered from physical deformity, but an intellectual giant, he defeated the detractor of his father in a debate.

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Śvetaketu must have been somewhat of an irritating, proud and envious nature in his childhood. He did not join his father, when the latter was going to learn *brahmavidyā* (spiritual knowledge).²⁷ He was also proud of his knowledge of rituals and expressed his dissatisfaction when the kings of Kāśī, Kosala and Videha nominated Jātukarṇya as their priest. The course of the life of Uddālaka by this time had undergone a change, and he advised his son to devote himself to the pursuit of knowledge and spirituality.

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That Śvetaketu with his Vedic lineage and Upaniṣadic background continued to be remembered as a thinker during the later centuries is evident from two episodes in *Mahābhārata*. He was the first person to have protested against the violence on women. The episode narrated in *Mahābhārata* is as follows.²⁸ It so happened that Śvetaketu saw his mother being dragged out of the house by a brāhmaṇa, who was intoxicated. He was declaring that he needs a woman for satiation of his sexual urge and he is therefore taking away this woman with him. “Why don’t you stop this man?” — Śvetaketu asked his father. His father said — “Under what law can I stop him? The law in our society gives a man right to take any woman for the satiation of his sexual urge.” Śvetaketu said — “I raise my voice of I dissent against such law. Henceforth no man will forcefully take any woman.”

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Yaśodhara, a well-known commentator on Vātsyāyana’s *Kāmasūtra*, also cites this episode. Śvetaketu is said to have composed a text on Kāmaśāstra also and Vātsyāyana in his *Kāmasūtra* refers to him as one of the authorities on Kāmaśāstra.

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Another narrative in *Mahābhārata* describes Śvetaketu’s marriage with Suvarcalā. Suvarcalā herself chose to marry Śvetaketu because he could prove himself a suitable match by satisfying her queries.²⁹ Besides fulfilling their responsibilities as householder, the couple frequently had discussions on the perennial questions related to the reality, language and speech. *Mahābhārata* tells that they were spending their life on two levels, at one level they were living a normal life as the husband and the wife, and discharging their duties as householders. But they also soared above in the world of intellectual debates. Suvarcalā, when she felt that they were too much engrossed in the worldly affairs, enticed her husband to join her for a discussion. On one such occasion, she raised the questions of language and reality.

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Śvetaketu agrees that the language fails to comprehend reality, but it can become a medium leading to the path of knowing reality. The words actually do not consist of the meaning, the meaning slips and slides on the word, like a drop of water on the petals of a lotus flower.³⁰ The relationship between the word and its meaning is not *ātyantika* (invariably permanent).

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Suvarcalā very pertinently objects here and suggests that the relationship has to be accepted as eternal, otherwise the words of the scriptures would also become fragile (like of drop of water on the petals of a lotus flower). Śvetaketu resolves the dilemma by the illustration of space holding the world, and also by introducing the concept of *upacāra* (figurative use). The whole discussion, in the words of Śuvarcalā, was to drag Śvetaketu out of the rut of routine activities, as she felt that his knowledge is in the danger of vanishing.³¹

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Bhīṣma narrates the story of Sulabhā in *Mahābhārata*.³² It is a woman’s fight against man’s pretensions and arrogance. Janaka displays overconfidence in his spiritual attainments and appears to be blind to reason. There is a heated argument from Janaka, who pretends to be a liberated soul, but starts talking in a vulgar and licentious tone. He attributes ulterior motifs to Sulabhā’s visit. This is followed by very patient and insightful rejoinder from Sulabhā. She clearly tears away the mask worn by the king. But *Mahābhārata* does not tell us who won this debate. Arindam Chakrabarti points out:

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The indecisiveness of *Mahābhārata* as to who is the winner, Janaka or Sulabhā, narratively draws us nearer to the cognitive — discursive caution of never claiming dogmatically to have “got it right”.³³

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*Mahābhārata* also indicates that this debate is happening in *dharmayuga* (time of morality) inside Janaka, because Bhīṣma, who describes this debate, also says that the debate happened in a single locus.³⁴

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In the very preceding chapter (319ᵗʰ), *Mahābhārata* depicts Janaka as a liberated soul. Here he is portrayed in all garrulousness with his pompous behaviour and manner quite unbecoming of a “saint-king”. Perhaps *Mahābhārata* suggests that there are layers of liberation. Janaka himself says — how am I any less liberated than you are?

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The questions posed by Yakṣa in *Mahābhārata* and by Karkaṭī (a titan) in *Yogavāsiṣṭha* indicate how the techniques of *vāda* were adopted for meta-discourses.

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The Upaniṣads also evolved some simple but very systematic techniques for carrying out *vāda*. They are:

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1. *Praśna*: questioning to initiate a dialogue,
2. *Anupraśna*: counter-questions arising out of the discussions on the preliminary query,
3. *Anatipraśnanivāraṇa*: avoiding too much questioning which leads to the sidetracking of the issue itself,
4. *Vyākhyā*: detailed explanation of the theory,
5. *Anuvyākhyā*: further explanations,
6. *Dṛṣṭānta*: illustration,
7. *Ākhyāyikā*: narrating a story as an exposition of the theory, and
8. *Ūrdhvapravacana*: deciphering the extant of learning that has already been acquired by a disciple, so that discussion be carried on after it.

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These techniques became the precursors of the concept of *pañcāvayava-vākya* (sentence with five divisions).

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That the lady seers (*brahmavādinīs*) used to participate in the debates is exemplified by the narratives related to Gārgī, Maitreyī, Suvarcalā and Sulabhā.

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The Cārvākas or Lokāyatikas known for their debating skills, dominated the discussions in *āśramas* (hermitages) or in royal courts. The tale of Śakuntalā in *Mahābhārata* describes that the hermitage of Kaṇva was resounding with the voices of the chief Lokāyatikas engaged in propounding their theses, raising objections and establishing the theory.³⁵

Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Rāmāyaṇa

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*Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmīki was written in the age of dialectic of ideologues. The ethical concepts as well as the tenets of major philosophical systems were in the process of their evolution. This is reflected in the scepticisms, discussions, dialogues and debates in which we find the characters of *Rāmāyaṇa* involved. There are sceptics and believers taking positions and counter-positions. Lokāyata and Ānvīkṣikī — these two schools of philosophy — posited challenges and raised questions on the existing practices and norms. The *yajña* ceremony was comprised of a number of performances, including *vādas*. The Putreṣṭiyajña performed by Sage Ṛṣyaśṛṅga for Daśaratha, the *vipras*, adept in oratory and having patience for arguments gathered to hold *hetuvādas*. It is said that all the members of the assembly performing the rites of the *yajña* were adept in debates.³⁶

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The following debates, dialogues and discussions in *Rāmāyaṇa*, reflecting divergence of ideas, may be mentioned:

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1. Discussion and debate between Rāma, Bharata, Jābāli and Vasiṣṭha on nullification of Rāma’s banishment.

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2. Dialogue between Sītā and Rāma in Daṇḍakāraṇya on the vulnerability of violence and practice of non-violence.

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3. Dialogue between Rāma and Sītā before Sītā’s *agniparīkṣā* (the fire test).

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4. Hanumān’s debate with his own self during his search for Sītā in Laṅkā.

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The first discussion directly pertains to a family matter, it is marked with heated arguments and passionate appeals but it eventually culminates in the discussions on *dharma* (morality) and ethics. It begins with Rāma’s questions to Bharata about the welfare of the family and the kingdom of Ayodhyā and through his queries he brings out discordance of ideologies and outlooks. The whole discussion here invokes policies and thought processes.

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Rāma asks:

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O dear one, will you confirm that you do not serve the brāhmaṇas who are Lok

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1. The eternal *dharma* is greater than *rājadharma*, and he (Bharata) should follow this eternal *dharma* by giving up the royal seat in Rāma's favour.
2. King Daśaratha was not in his senses when he was beguiled by Kaikeyī.
3. Even if Rāma wishes to observe the rigour of *dharma*, he can do it better by being a king, thereby nourishing the four *āśramas* and by repaying the three debts as laid down in the scriptures.

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In his rejoinder to Bharata's arguments, Rāma says that truth is the greatest *dharma*, our father stood for truth and we have also to follow him.

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The passage following after this discussion is an interpolation and has been added to the original *Rāmāyaṇa* as an evidence of the conflict and debates between the followers of Vedic *dharma* on one hand and the followers of Cārvāka and Buddhist systems on the other. Jābāli, a seer and one of the counsellors in the royal court of Ayodhyā, joins this series of arguments and counter-arguments. He says:

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Enough O Rāghava! Do not let thy wisdom be rendered void like a common man, thou who art distinguished for thy intelligence and virtue! Who is man's parent? From whom can be obtain anything? Man is born alone and dies alone. He who clings to another, saying — "this is my father, this is my mother" — should be regarded as one who has lost his wits. O Rāma! There is none who belongs to another!

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As one who passes through a strange village, spends the night there, and the next day, leaves that place, and continues his journey, so are father, mother, home and possessions of a man; they are but a resting place, O Kākutstha, and wise do not become attached to them. Thou can't therefore abandon thy father's kingdom, O chief of men, in order to dwell in a lonely forest that is gloomy and full of thorny thickets! Come and be crowned in the prosperous city of Ayodhyā, thy locks unbound; the capital awaits thee! Come and taste the royal luxuries worthy of thee, O son of a king! Divert thyself in Ayodhyā as Śakra (Indra) in Triviṣṭapa (heaven)! Daśaratha is nought to thee now, nor thou to Daśaratha! The diseased king was one person and thou another, therefore do whatever is proper for thee to do! The seed is the only father of all beings. It is the seed and the blood from blending of which at the right time in mother's womb that man is born in this world! The king has gone where he had to go, it is the fate of all beings, do not grieve uselessly! I pity those who give themselves up especially to that which is meritorious, disregarding their own interest; I do not pity others; they suffer misery here; and in the end find extinction! Pious men say: "The eighth day should be given up to the sacrifices for the spirits of our ancestors"; the food that is offered is wasted, can the dead eat? If that which is eaten here, could enter the body of another, then let a sacrifice be offered for those who are setting out on a distant journey and they will not need provisions! The *granthas* (texts) were all made by learned men for the sake of including others to give; their doctrine is "distribute gifts, perform sacrifices, consecrate yourselves up to asceticism and renunciation!"

c6.s2.15

O Exceedingly sagacious Prince! There is no world but this; let this thought be absorbed by thee. Concern thyself with what is evident and turn the back on what is beyond our knowledge! Accept the judgement of the good and regarding that which is approved by all, accept the crown

c6.s2.16

and allow thyself to be swayed by Bharata!42

c6.s2.17

Jābāli also speaks in a tone of condemnation for the authors of the Dharmaśāstras, like Medhātithi.

c6.s2.18

Replying to him, Rāma argues for the righteous path leading to heaven. He then goes to the extent of saying:

c6.s2.19

I blame my father for having employed a man of perverse understanding like you (as minister 43) — swerving from the path of *dharma*, who has turned to frightfully atheistic with this kind of his intellect. As a thief is, so is Buddha, let it be known to you that *tathāgata* is an atheist. A man of righteous understanding should not talk in his terms.44

c6.s2.20

Rāma’s rejoinder to Jābāli is believed to be an interpolation by modern scholars. At least the remarks on Buddha do not form a genuine part of the epic. Amartya Sen rightly suggests:

c6.s2.21

The problem with invoking the *Rāmāyaṇa* to propagate a reductionist account of Hindu religiosity lies in the way the epic is deployed for this purpose — as a document of supernatural veracity, rather than a “marvellous parable” (as Rabindranath Tagore) describes it and a widely enjoyed part of India’s cultural heritage.45

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Rāma emphasizes over the values of life, sacrifice, renunciation, truth and duty. His prolonged discourse here is a strong refutation of all the arguments advanced by Jābāli. Rāma points out that the apparently honest intention of Jābāli is in fact nefarious. He puts forward the view of the Dharmaśāstra that gives utmost importance to duty. A man is known for his actions. It is his actions which reveal his baseness or nobility. If Jābāli’s advice is accepted, people will start acting whimsically, the ignoble would resemble the noble, it will lead to confusion of castes. Just and unjust, evil and good are discerned only on the basis of scriptures. He (Rāma) will be setting a bad example before the world by following Jābāli’s advice. *Dharma* is the soul of governance and the subjects are also guided by *dharma*. Man is not alone, his *dharma* always goes with him. Jābāli’s counsel, couched in excellent words, is unworthy for Rāma’s noble descent. By forsaking the vow he will incur a sin. Everybody reaps the fruits of his acts.

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Seeing Rāma’s stern consternation, Jābāli cleverly changes his position “I do not speak the language of unbelievers” he says, “nor am I an atheist. This is not true that there is nothing beyond this world. (I became an atheist and) considering the occasion again turned to be a believer. On other occasion I may become an atheist again. This was an occasion for me to adopt the speech of an atheist just for persuading you to return back and to please you.”⁴⁶

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Vasiṣṭha joins this discussions and he recites the genealogy of Rāma’s line beginning from Brahmā and Vivasvān to Aja and Daśaratha. The purport of citing the names of all great kings of the dynasty is to emphasize over the need of maintaining the tradition of the house of Raghu, to protect the *kula-dharma*, which is *sanātana* (eternal). The requirement of *kula-dharma* (practice in the family line) in this context is that the eldest son receives the royal anointing and also the order of the *guru*. In this case he himself is one of the *gurus* and Rāma’s mother, Kausalyā is also his *guru*.

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Rāma remains unshaken even over this well-formulated reasoned appeal. His reply to Vasiṣṭha’s arguments proceeds from the same position — and the argument of obeying to one’s *guru* also does not stand here because to respect the pledge given by his father Daśaratha as per his commitment to Kaikeyī, he has to continue his sojourn in the forest.

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Seeing all his arguments and appeals falling apart, Bharata decides to lie down before Rāma and fast till his death if the later does not concede to his demand. Rāma tells him that this is not the *vidhi* (way of life) for a man belonging to the military class, only a brāhmaṇa is allowed to obstruct persons in this way.

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Bharata makes a fervent appeal to the people of Ayodhyā who have accompanied him to dissuade Rāma from his decision to continue his stay in the forest. The people express their helplessness in doing so, they unanimously speak for Rāma, appreciating his adherence to truth and duty. Bharata then decides to return to Ayodhyā as per the advice given by the counsel of *paura-jānapadas* (citizens and dwellers of the provinces) and the sages present there.

c6.s2.28

The debate in Citrakūṭa regarding the dichotomy between obedience to father and *rājadharma* (duty of a king) is the culmination of the initial expression of Lakṣmaṇa’s outrage on Rāma’s banishment and his advice to his elder brother to refuse the orders of banishment.

c6.s2.29

Another episode in *Rāmāyaṇa* reflects the debate on the value of non-violence. How can a person shun violence completely? This is the question Sītā raises to her husband. A person can attain *dharma* by eschewing three evils born out of *kāma* (desire) — false utterance, illicit relationship and vengeance. Sītā says that there is no possibility of the first two in Rāma but the third evil, bearing hostility for others without cause may make a room in him. “Out of love and respect for you, I just want to remind you”, she further pleads, “and do not venture to instruct you, that please give up the idea of killing the demons of this forest by bearing this bow. Bearing arms and retirement to the forest do not go together. Practising war and renunciation are in opposition to each other, therefore please follow the *dharma* of *vanavāsa* (forest dwelling). The very association of a weapon would vitiate one’s mind making a room for murderous thoughts.”⁴⁷

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In support of her thesis, Sītā also gives an illustration by the way of narrating the predicament of a sage, who fell from his glory just by keeping a weapon even as a trust and just holding it in his hands to avoid its loss, he developed war-like inclinations.

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Rāma counters Sītā’s argument by reiterating his commitment to *dharma*. “The person of warrior class puts on the bow so that there is no cry from the helpless”, he says.⁴⁸

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Elsewhere Sītā outmatches Rāma by her skill of debate in one of the most difficult and sensitive situations. After winning the war with Rāvaṇa, she is brought before Rāma at his orders in the presence of the multitude of monkeys and demons. Rāma feels the pressure of the congregation and utters most harsh words to Sītā:

c6.s2.33

O illustrious Princess, I have won thee and mine enemy has been defeated on the battlefield; I have accomplished all that fortitude I could do; my wrath is appeased; the insult and the one who offered it have both been obliterated by me. Today my prowess has been manifested; today my exertions have been crowned with success, today I have fulfilled my vow and am free. As ordained by destiny, the stain of thy separation and thine abduction by that fickle-minded titan has been expunged by me, a mortal. Of what use is great strength to the vacillating, who do not with resolve avenge the insult offered to them?

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Sītā started weeping hearing these words and looking at her Rāma was torn within himself. Then he was in a rage and said:

c6.s2.35

What a man should do in order to wipe out insult, I have done by slaying Rāvaṇa for I guard my honour zealously. Thou were re-won as the southern region, inaccessible to man, was re-gained by the pure souled Agastya through his austerities. Be happy and let it be known that this arduous campaign, so gloriously terminated through the support of my friends, was not undertaken wholly for thy sake. I was careful to wipe out the affront paid me completely and to avenge the insult inflicted on mine illustrious house.

A suspicion has arisen, however, with regard to thy conduct, and thy presence is as painful to me as a lamp to one whose eye is diseased. Henceforth go where it best pleaseth thee, I give thee

c6.s2.36

leave, O daughter of Janaka! O lovely one, the ten regions are at thy disposal, I can have nothing more to do with thee! What a man of honour would give reign to his passion so far as to permit himself to take back a woman who has dwelt in the house of another? Thou hast been taken into Rāvaṇa’s lap and he has cast lustful glances on thee; how can I reclaim thee, I who boast of belonging to an illustrious house? The end which I sought in re-conquering has been gained; I no longer have any attachment for thee; go where thou desirest! This is the outcome of my reflections, O lovely one! Turn to Lakṣmaṇa or Bharata, Śatrughna, Sugrīva or the titan Vibhīṣaṇa, take thy choice O Sītā, as pleases thee best. Assuredly Rāvaṇa, beholding thy ravishing and celestial beauty, will not have respected thy person during the time that thou didst dwell in his abode.⁴⁹

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Confounded by this unexpected unkindness and Rāma’s sudden outburst, Sītā summons all her strength to give a passionate, yet befitting rejoinder to the charges inflicted on her. It is a lonely woman’s defence in a cruel society of men. Even though on the verge of an emotional breakdown, and being unduly stigmatized, Sītā pleads her case and a summary of her arguments in her own words can be given in the following way:

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1. All women cannot be maligned if some of them become sluts.

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2. I was helpless and without any defence when Rāvaṇa forcibly carried me away and touched my body.

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3. We both (i.e. Rāma and herself) have grown together and lived together for long, and even then you have failed to understand me, which is like a death to me.

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4. What was the purpose of sending Hanumān to me with all the message of reassurance? Had you communicated these feelings for me that time itself, I could have ended this life of mine, and it would have saved you from all the troubles of waging a momentous war and causing such an enormous destruction.

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5. Overcome with your anger, it is you who are acting like a degraded person showing the characteristics of a lowly woman in yourself.⁵⁰

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A man debates with himself, the debates and ideological conflicts going on in the society are reflected in his psyche. He creates an opponent and a respondent within himself and his/her mind becomes a locale of debate. Hanumān’s contemplations during his search for Sītā in Laṅkā bring out questions and dichotomies that the society of his time undergoing through, so that he appears to be debating with himself.

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Not finding Sītā anywhere in Laṅkā after continuous search, Hanumān grew pensive and in a mood of melancholy started debating with himself:

c6.s2.45

I, not having found Sītā, shall become a hermit, subsisting on fruits and roots. (Otherwise) preparing the funeral pyre on the shores of the sea, in a place abounding in roots, fruits and water, I shall enter the flames or allow myself to die of hunger; or else I will sit with a vow and let the wild beats or crows eat this body of mine. I think this also is the way of giving up this life envisaged by the seers. Or else I will drown myself in the sea if I do not see the daughter of Janaka.⁵¹

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The long soliloquy of Hanumān is marked with *ūha* (confutation), *tarka* (argument) and considerations of various possibilities, and he builds up the *pūrva-pakṣa* (prima facie view) and the *siddhānta-pakṣa* (final view). He concludes by considering the other aspect:

c6.s2.47

Yet, there are incalculable evils in thus destroying oneself. If I continue to live, I may attain success. Therefore I will uphold my life, if I live the re-union (of Rāma and Sītā) may materialize.⁵²

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At other place Hanumān argues with himself by saying:

c6.s2.49

Perseverance is the root of success, perseverance is the root of prosperity, and perseverance brings supreme facility.⁵³

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Hanumān’s reveries bring out the clash between two ideologies: *pravṛtti* (empiricism) and *nivṛtti* (renunciation).

Debates in Mahābhārata

c6.s3.1

The tendency to use tricks in scholarly debate must have been in practice during the age of *Mahābhārata*. Śakuni when remonstrated by Yudhiṣṭhira on the use of trick in the game of dice, says: “a scholar surpasses a nonscholar only through his *nikṛti* (trick), but it is not regarded as trick”.⁵⁴

c6.s3.2

Techniques of *vāda* had systematically been developed when this great epic was being compiled. Vyāsa, delivering a discourse on governance before Yudhiṣṭhira and other Pāṇḍavas, recommends that the king should employ ministers who are well-versed in Tarkaśāstra (logic). He also emphasizes over the need for inculcating the Tarkaśātra in life.⁵⁵ Ānvīkṣikī is actually mentioned here in the enumeration of the four branches of learning.⁵⁶ There is a reference to *pañcāvayava-vākya* (five-member syllogism), which is essential for carrying out a debate as per the methodology laid down in *Nyāyadarśana*.⁵⁷ *Mahābhārata* also refers to four *pramāṇas*⁵⁸ and scholars especially adept in the virtues and flaws of *pañcāvayava-vākya*.⁵⁹

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*Mahābhārata* reflects dilemmas on perennial questions of destiny, life and death to set the ground for debates on crucial issues of human life.

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Immediately after the great war, Yudhiṣṭhira suffers from a moral dilemma. He is appalled at the devastation the war has caused and bitten with remorse and a persisting sense of guilt; he even declines to accept the throne and expresses his desire to retire to the forest and lead the life of an ascetic.⁶⁰ This puts him in bitter debate with Draupadī and Bhīma, who go to the extent of calling Yudhiṣṭhira a mentally deranged person; Draupadī even suggesting that her husband has gone insane and needs to be treated or be sent behind the bars along with the heretics (*nāstikas* or *Ājīvakas*).⁶¹

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Ultimately Vyāsa joins this discussion and resolves the dilemma.⁶²

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Again, Kausalyā, wife of Janaka, the celebrated patron of philosophy seminars, raises a debate when her husband is ready to leave the royal palace for forest and become a mendicant. She calls the monks as parasites sucking the householders because of their vow of poverty and living on alms.

c6.s3.7

Thus one of the recurring themes for debate in *Mahābhārata* is the conflict between *karma* (action) and *jñāna* (knowledge). The concept of *bhakti* (devotion) as an alternate vision for life came to be introduced later. The first thirty-five cantos of the Śāntiparva in *Mahābhārata* are devoted to this debate. The theme is again taken up in the dialogue between Suvarcalā and Śvetaketu referred earlier. Vyāsa comes back to the same question of choice between action and knowledge in the cantos 267-70 and also 326, opening the gateway of diverse conflicting views.

c6.s3.8

Another conflicting issue is the choice between violence and non-violence. How can a king observe his duties and rule over the kingdom without hurting any of the subjects — this is the question Yudhiṣṭhira asks Bhīṣma in the beginning of the canto 267. Bhīṣma narrates the story of the dialogue between Dyumatsena and Satyavān. Even condemnation and censure could sometimes suffice as punishments for severe offences if the offender does not inflict further harm on the society.⁶³ In the next canto Kapila discusses the question of violence in the rituals. And then he reverts back to the tussle between *pravṛtti* (empiricism) and *nivṛtti* (renunciation).

c6.s3.9

The royal courts functioned like academies for cultivating debates on issues related to literature, philosophy and arts. In *Mahābhārata*, the court of King Janaka is described in a number of episodes as a flourishing centre for vigorous intellectual discussions and debates. Chapter 266^th of Śāntiparva describes the visit of Pañcaśikha, one of the proponents of Sāṁkhya system, to this court to discuss his philosophy.

c6.s3.10

Besides the royal courts, a hermitage also became a potential venue for holding live debates. The 222^nd chapter of Śāntiparva describes the debates conducted in the assembly of 6,000 sages in the Himalayan region. The debates proceeded on the following questions — 1. what is the nature of this Universe and how was it created?, and 2. what is the nature of *karma*?

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Diverse views were propounded in this assembly with regard to this Universe, some said it is eternal, some said it is created by a God, the other would say there is no God, still others would even deny the very existence of this universe.

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The brāhmaṇas (the knowledgeable ones) in this debate were armed with hundred kinds of reasoning and they had initiated several types of Śāstras (knowledge systems). In that grand debate, (the assembly came to be divided in two different groups of *vādins* (the proponents) and *prativādins* (the opponents). But they could not reach any solution to these fundamental problems. The sages were agitated to such an extent that out of fury they tore away cloths and destroyed the pots and sticks.⁶⁴ Then they calmed down and approached Sage Vasiṣṭha to resolve their questions with regard to the eternal truth. When Vasiṣṭha expressed his inability to do so, they all went to Nārada. Ultimately a divine voice told them to go to Sanatkumāra. They were finally preached by Sanatkumāra, much on the lines of the Upaniṣadic discourses, incorporating even sentences in prose instead of the usual verse form in which most of the epic is structured.

c6.s3.13

The word *saṁvāda* is used in *Mahābhārata* in the sense of a highly-profound discussion between two intellectuals that was carried out in past and lives in the collective memory of a race, constituting an *itihāsa*. Many such *saṁvāda*s are cited in *Mahābhārata*. The *saṁvāda* between Kṛṣṇa and Nārada on various questions of diplomacy of polity is cited as something that happened in yore.⁶⁵

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It is during the age of *Mahābhārata* that the term *nyāya* came to be used for the proper methodology for discussions and debates involving the style and form that vouch for accuracy of the whole process of a debate or discussion.

c6.s3.15

The dice game between Duryodhana and Yudhiṣṭhira resulted in one of the most tense and exciting debates in human history. It is an example of impromptu debate as described earlier. This type of debate gets started under compulsion all of a sudden.

c6.s3.16

Yudhiṣṭhira lost Draupadī on his final bet in the game of dice. Duryodhana sent the messenger (*pratikāmin*) to bring Draupadī. Draupadī asked *pratikāmin* to go and ask the gambler (Yudhiṣṭhira) whether he had lost himself first or her.⁶⁶ Then Duryodhana sends his younger brother to bring Draupadī by force. Being forcibly taken to the assembly with her hair dishevelled and half her attire loosened, Draupadī told her tormentor Duḥśāsana:

c6.s3.17

My Lord Yudhiṣṭhira is bound by obligations of *dharma*, *dharma* however, is subtle. Only those who are possessed of clarity of vision are able to ascertain *dharma*.

c6.s3.18

Dragged forcibly by Duḥśāsana in the assembly, an utterly helpless Draupadī dares to confront the elders in the congregation with a question. The question raised by her pertains to *dharma*. She started a debate as a complainant and pleaded her case. Subjected to humiliation in public, she questioned the elders in the assembly and the question was: whether her husband was authorized to bet on her in the game of dice when after putting himself on stake, he had lost and become a slave himself.

c6.s3.19

Bhīṣma is perplexed and looks askance. At his wit’s end, he hesitates in answering the question of Draupadī, and then somehow manages to say that the *dharma* is very subtle and he is unable to decide on either side, because arguments can be advanced from both sides. It is true that having become a slave, Yudhiṣṭhira had no right to put her on bet, but then it is also true that he continues to be her husband even as a slave, and as a husband he had right to bet on her.⁶⁷ Only Vidura and Vikarṇa (the youngest brother of the Kauravas) stand in Draupadī’s defence.

c6.s3.20

One point which Bhīṣma had raised in his reply was that Yudhiṣṭhira chose to play the game of dice on his own, and he staked Draupadī voluntarily. Draupadī refuted this claim. She said:

c6.s3.21

The king (Yudhiṣṭhira) was summoned to this assembly, and though possessing no skill of dice, he was forced to play with skilled, wicked, deceitful and desperate gamblers. How can you say then that he staked me voluntarily? The chief of Pāṇḍavas was deprived of his senses by wretches of deceitful conduct and unholy instincts having joined their hands together and

c6.s3.22

defeated him. He could not understand their tricks and he was not his own when he did so (staked me). Here in this assembly there are Kurus who are the lords of their sons and their daughters-in-law. Let all of them consider my statement and duly decide the issue I have raised.

c6.s3.23

She asked the elders to think of *dharma*, and found that they have been taken aback. Then she condemned them in most unequivocal terms:

c6.s3.24

The virtue of the people of Bharata race is gone! The practices of the kṣatriyas have disappeared! Otherwise the Kurus present here would never have silently watched such an act being performed which violates these very practices! Both Droṇa and Bhīṣma have lost their energy, and so has the noble Vidura and also this King (Dhṛtarāṣṭra). Else why are they sitting silently over this crime?⁶⁸

c6.s3.25

The whole unsavoury episode included a fierce debate between two sides. The court of Duryodhana was immediately converted into a scene of debate and a court for justice, where not only the fate of a woman was to be decided; the destiny of the two races (Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas) was also to be rewritten. This is one of the greatest debates in the history of civilization. It raises serious questions with regard to man’s attitude towards women, property rights, values and social norms. Draupadī not only pleads her own case, she is able to generate a public opinion in her favour. After going through the whole agony and ordeal, she wins her case and also successfully gets herself and her five husbands freed from the bond of slavery.

c6.s3.26

It is only through her debating skill and moral courage to put up a question that Draupadī poses a challenge before an entirely nonchalant and chauvinistic gathering and is able to create a conscience to win the verdict in her favour. The *Mahābhārata* presents this whole episode to be viewed as a scene of debate. Draupadī is therefore made to make a remark about the responsibilities of the members of the assembly. She says:

c6.s3.27

An assembly not attended by the elders is not a proper assembly for the debate and men who do not speak *dharma* are not elders. The *dharma* without truth is not *dharma*, and the truth imbued with deception is not truth.⁶⁹

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Vikarṇa and Vidura also use similar terms to invoke the conscience of the members of the assembly. Vikarṇa gave reasons why Draupadī could not be considered to have been won and why the issue raised by her needs to be considered.⁷⁰ He finally made a fervent appeal to decide the case in Draupadī’s favour. There was uproar in the assembly. Vikarṇa’s fervent appeal was applauded. Karṇa rose to silence Vikarṇa, telling him that he is too immature and young to take a decision in this case while the elders have not spoken a word. He emphatically said that Draupadī, being a possession of Yudhiṣṭhira which has been lost in stake is properly won and acquired rightfully.

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Amidst the clamour, people in the assembly started censuring Dhṛtarāṣṭra, who as a king ought to have stopped the heinous act of dishonour to a lady. Vidura then said:

c6.s3.30

Draupadī has put up a question and is weeping helplessly. Virtue and *dharma* are being persecuted by such conduct (of Kauravas). When an afflicted person asks an assembly of noble persons about his rights, as sanctioned by *dharma*, members of the assembly should, without being affected by interest and anger, answer his question.

c6.s3.31

With these words he supported the statement of Vikarṇa.⁷¹ Both Vikarṇa and Vidura expressed their opinion in unequivocal terms that Draupadī cannot be forced to become a slave because putting her on stake by Yudhiṣṭhira was illegal.⁷² Vidura was silenced by Duryodhana, calling him a śūdra. But listening to Vikarṇa’s fervent appeal, the members of the assembly raised their voices to support him.⁷³ Again there were arguments and counter-arguments. The debate can be summarized as under.

First 143 of 592 passages. Read on

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