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Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c7: 3. Vādaśāstra: The Theories of Debate, Dialogues and Discussions

Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c7

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English

Contents

3. Vādaśāstra: The Theories of Debate, Dialogues and Discussions

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Vādaśāstra

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THE profundity of the debates in the areas of philosophy, *dharma* (ethics and law) and Āyurveda, etc. led to the theoretical discussion on *vāda*, and a conceptual universe of Vādaśāstra was thus created. A theoretical framework on the art of debates had been evolved in the Vedic period. Besides documenting some of the most profound debates in their times, the Vedic texts also present a few technical terms and key concepts related to this discipline. The terms like *yukti*, *tarka*, *smṛti*, *pratyakṣa*, and *aitihya* are used in the Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads.¹

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**Theory of Vāda in Mahābhārata** *Mahābhārata* presents the first authentic exposition on the theory of debate through the discourse of Sulabhā which has been referred in the previous chapter. This discourse can be termed as “a conversation about how to converse well”.² Sulabhā enumerates eighteen blemishes of speech which corrupt the wisdom. Of these, nine belong to the structure and stylistics of the discourse and nine to intent of the interlocutor. They are as under:

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The flaws of expression:
• *Gurvarthasaṁyuktam* (verboseness),
• *Parāṅmukhasukham* (not easy to understand),
• *Anṛtam* (false),
• *Trivargeṇa viruddham* (flouting the human ends — *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*)
• *Asaṁskṛtam* (uncultured/ungrammatical)
• *Nyūnam* (laconic),
• *Kaṣṭam* (full of strained phrases),
• *Vikramābhihataṁ* (full of words reflecting arrogance),
• *Śeṣam* (incomplete), and
• *Niṣkāraṇaṁ* (unreasonable)

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Nine flaws of intent pertain to making a statement out of *kāma* (lust), *krodha* (rage), *bhaya* (fear), *lobha* (greed), *dainya* (self-pity), *anāryatva* (disgrace), *hrī* (bashfulness), *anukrośa* (pity) and *māna* (ego).³

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These are the virtues which the speech imbibes when free from these blemishes:

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• *Anapetārthatā* (wholeness),
• *Abhinnārthatā* (coherence),
• *Nyāyārthatā* (judiciousness),
• *Anyūnādhikya* (conciseness),
• *Ślakṣaṇatā* (grace), and
• *Asandigdhatā* (being free from doubt),

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A sentence not corrupted by the blemishes as above is replenished by eighteen qualities.

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During the course of a discussions in the assembly of intellectuals, the statements made by the interlocutors should reflect the five qualities — *saukṣmya* (minuteness), *sāṁkhya* (enumeration of qualities and blemishes), *krama* (order), *nirṇaya* (conclusion) and *prayojana* (purpose, motif). The arrangement of the contents in a statement justifying the sequence of their occurrence is *krama* (order). *Nirṇaya* (conclusion) relates to the goals of human life. The inclination to control the confluence of sorrows caused by desire and jealousy is *prayojana* (motif).

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A sentence should not become cumbersome with too much load of contents. It should be easy to understand, should be true and should not stand against the three aims of life (*dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*). It should be refined, complete, unhurting, and non-violating any order. It should have proper reasoning and no statement should occur aimlessly.

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A discourse is illuminated when the speaker, listener and statement come together in unison. The communication does not develop if the speaker disregards the listener and simply promotes his self interest. On the other hand, if he gives up his own issues and simply promotes the issues of the other, then also his discourse is subjected to doubts and the statement becomes defective. A true speaker therefore takes into account the view of the listener and also puts up his own propositions in a balanced way.⁴

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Sulabhā’s enumeration of the qualities and blemishes of the speech can be compared to Marcus Tullius Cicero’s delineation of the qualities of conversation.⁵

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Categorizations related to *vāda* find a mention at a number of places in *Mahābhārata*. The terms like *tarka*, *jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā*, *nirṇaya* and *pramāṇa*, *nyāya*, *anumāna*, have been used in this epic in the contexts of argumentation.⁶ The concept of *pañcāvayava-vākya* (five-member syllogism) had been developed long before Gautama wrote his *Nyāyasūtra*, as there is a reference to it in *Mahābhārata*.⁷

Vāda and Nyāyadarśana

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Even though the tradition of intellectual discourses, debates and discussions was assiduously pursued for more than a millennium, it was the Nyāya philosophy that made it a part of an epistemology within the system. *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama (sixth-fifth century BCE) discusses the theory of debate in detail. Out of the sixteen *padārthas* (categories) that are supposed to be essential for the discipline of Nyāya, the following fourteen *padārthas* are directly related to debate — *saṁśaya* (doubt), *prayojana* (purpose/motive), *dṛṣṭānta* (illustration/example), *siddhānta* (theory/tenet), *tarka* (argument), *avayava* (members of a syllogism/parts of sentence presenting the thesis), *nirṇaya* (conclusion), *vāda* (conversation), *jalpa* (debate, wrangling), *vitaṇḍā* (cavil), *hetvābhāsa* (fallacy), *chala* (trick/quibbling), *jāti* (legitimate objection/rejoinder) and *nigrahasthāna* (points of capture/checkmates/clinchers); and the remaining two — *pramāṇa* and *prameya* — are indirectly linked with debate.

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There are four *pramāṇas* — *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (analogue) and *śabda* (scripture).

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The knowledge arising out of sense contact with an object, and which is determinate, unnamable and non-erratic, is *pratyakṣa* (perception). Inference is knowledge preceded by perception and is of three kinds — *pūrvavat* (a priori), *śeṣavat* (a posteriori) and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* (commonly seen). A discourse from an authentic source is *śabda* (scriptural authority). Knowledge of an object through similarity is *upamāna* (analogue).⁸

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Of these, *anumāna* (inference) is crucial for sustaining any conversation or debate. It has three cases in relation to *hetu* (reason/cause) — *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. *Pakṣa* is the thesis case, *sapakṣa* is the observed case in which *hetu* is essentially present, and *vipakṣa* another observed case in which *hetu* is essentially absent. Inference is employed in two ways — for the understanding of one’s own self and for the understanding of the other one (a disciple or an opponent in debate). The former is called *svārthānumāna* and the latter *parārthānumāna*. *Pañcāvayava-vākya* is required for *parārthānumāna*. The five *avayavas*, comprised in five statements, are *pratijñā* (thesis), *hetu* (reason), *dṛṣṭānta* or *udāharaṇa* (illustration), *upanaya* (application) and *nigamana* (conclusion).

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The statement of *sādhya* (probandum) is *pratijñā*. The cause or probans for proving the probandum by similarity or dissimilarity is *hetu*. *Udāharaṇa* is *dṛṣṭānta* having similarity with the probandum. Application of the illustration is *upanaya*. Reaffirming the statement of probandum on the basis of justification from *hetu* and *upanaya* is *nigamana*.⁹

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In the well-known instance “there is fire on the mountain, because smoke is arising out of it”, the *pañcāvayava-vākya* will be formulated in the following manner:
• There is fire on the mountain — *pratijñā*.
• Because there is smoke arising from its top — *hetu*.
• Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, just as we see it in the kitchen — *dṛṣṭānta*.
• So is on the mountain — *upanaya*.
• Therefore the fire burning on this mountain — *nigamana*.

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The enunciation of any *anumāna* is not complete without the five *avayavas*, and in the very first aphorism of his *Nyāyasūtra*, Gautama says that the forms of debate are initiated through the five *avayavas* and the system of thought in Nyāya rests on debates.

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Mahāvidyā syllogisms comprising of other members were first formulated by Kulārka Paṇḍita in eleventh century. They were refuted by Vādīndra in his *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* and the system sank into oblivion.¹⁰

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*Vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) is the rule of unfailing relationship between the cause and its effect. A statement specifying the invariable relation between the proban and the probandum is also called *vyāpti*. Wherever there is smoke, fire is there — this is *vyāpti*. There are two *vyāptis* — *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, the positive concomitance and the negative concomitance.

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*Saṁśaya* (doubt) is an irresolute judgement about the precise character of an object arising from recognition of common properties in many objects, or properties uncommon to any from the conflicting testimony or irregularity of perception and non-perception.¹¹

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*Prayojana* is the aim for which the discourse is initiated.¹²

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*Dṛṣṭānta* (illustration) is the statement comprising an example on which both an ordinary person and an expert would have the similarity in understanding.¹³ It is used in the five member syllogism as stated above.

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*Siddhānta* (theory) is a position resting on the authority of a certain treatise, a section of a treatise or implication.¹⁴ It is of four types — *sarvatantra siddhānta* (the theory followed by all systems), *pratitantra siddhānta* (theory in the system followed by the proponent not followed by the opponent), *adhikaraṇa siddhānta* (theory in the system followed in a treatise required for the validation of other sections) and *abhyupagama siddhānta* (the theory to be validated).

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*Tarka* (argument/reasoning) is the confutation carried out on ascertaining the real character of an unknown entity by showing the absurdity of all other characters.¹⁵ Incorrect application of *tarka* leads to *tarkābhāsa* (fallacious reasoning). Udayana has propounded five types of blemishes of *tarka* — *ātmāśraya* (self-dependence), *anyonyāśraya* (mutual dependence), *cakraka* (vicious circle), *anavasthā* (infinite regress) and *aniṣṭaprasaṅga* (*reductio ad absurdum*).

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Arriving at a decision after hearing both the sides — *pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa* — is *nirṇaya*.¹⁶

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*Kathā* (conversation) is a generic term for all kinds of debates, discourses and dialogues. *Vāda* (discussion), *jalpa* (debate) and *vitaṇḍā* (cavil) — these are the three forms of *kathā* according to *Nyāyasūtra*. *Jalpa* (debate) is a defence or attack with the aim of winning over the opponent. *Chala* (quibble), *jāti* (objection) and *nigrahasthānas* (clinchers) are essentially employed in it.¹⁷ Mere attack on the opposite side is *vitaṇḍā* (cavil). The proponent in *vitaṇḍā* makes refutations of other systems without ascertaining his own position.¹⁸ *Jalpa* is thus a tricky debate whereas *vitaṇḍā* is destructive debate involving scholastic exercise with arguments from one side only. The practitioner of *vitaṇḍā* does not argue for establishing his own theory, but demolishes all the other theories, so that his theory alone remains vindicated. Texts written exclusively in the genre of *vitaṇḍā* have been discussed earlier (see Chap. 2). There are two categories of *vitaṇḍā*. The higher category of *vitaṇḍā* serves its *siddhānta-pakṣa* through refutation of all rival systems. The second category is comprised in the misuse of *vitaṇḍā* just for scholastic exercise. Those who practise this basic form of *vitaṇḍā* are called the *durvaitaṇḍikas* by Śrīharṣa.¹⁹

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*Vāda* is a pervasive concept. It is defined by Gautama as the conversation between the master and the disciples or between peers involving discussions of friendly nature. Both the sides of a theory are discussed in *vāda* employing five-member syllogism.²⁰ In his presentation of *Nyāyadarśana*, Haribhadra (sixth century CE) in his *Ṣaḍdarśanasamgraha*²¹ defines *vāda* in the following way: The means for the practice of discourse between the master and the disciple with taking up positions and counterpositions is *vāda* (discussion).²²

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The gamut of *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* is named as *kathā*. The author of *Tārkikarakṣā* defines *kathā* in the following manner: Expansion of sentences by various speakers deliberating upon a particular topic is *kathā*. It has six and according to some, four divisions.²³

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In *Milindapañho*, King Milinda asks Monk Nāgasena — “let there be *kathāsallāpa* (discussion and dialogue) between us”.

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Śaṅkara Miśra in his *Vādivinoda* takes up the following alternate theses with regard to *kathā* and refutes them one by one:
1. Sanātana’s theory of a different kind of *vitaṇḍā*, consisting of *tattvabubhutsuvāda*, i.e. exposition of the own theory alone by the proponent and its vilification only by the respondent.
2. The proposition of the author of *Ratnākara*, holding a fourth category of *kathā* in the form of the exploration of the theory of the proponent only.
3. The theory of *kathā* as a unified single form of debate without any categorizations.

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Śaṅkara Miśra also discusses the concept and verities of *vipratipatti* (disagreement) in *kathā*.²⁴

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There are seven regulations of *kathā* as defined in *Tārkikarakṣā*. They are:
• *Nirūpyanirūpakaniyama* — regulations for using signifiers and signs.

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• *Kathāviśeṣavyavasthā* — arrangements for special types of debates.
• *Vādiprativādiniyama* — rules for the opponent (*vādī*) and respondent (*prativādī*).
• *Sadasi anuvidheyasaṃvaraṇa* — codes of conduct for the juries defining scopes for their interference and maintaining restraint by both the head of assembly (*sabhā*) and the juries.
• *Nigrahasthānasāmastya* — deciding the clinchers.
• *Asāmastyodbhāvanapratijñāna* — ascertaining the extent to which the clinchers have been completely/incompletely pointed out.
• *Kathāparyavasānasaṁvittiḥ* — regulating the debate for winding up.

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On the other hand, some of the theorists have accepted four divisions. They are — two types of *vādiprativādiniyama* (rules for the opponent and respondent) and two types of *sadasi anuvidheyasaṃvaraṇa* (codes of conduct for the juries).

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*Kathaka* is a person participating in a *kathā*.

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Rajeshwar Shastri says that when a *kathā* is being conducted in the form of a debate, both the participants should be of equal stature in erudition, otherwise the very purpose of *kathā* — dissemination of knowledge in a particular field — will be lost, and due to inequality of the debators, the juries may take a decision without the debate.

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The orthodox tradition of Nyāya philosophy regards *vāda* as something sacred. As a *vāda* was supposed invariably to culminate in an understanding of *tattva* (reality), only the teacher and his disciple as well as those engaged in the pursuit of knowledge are entitled to participate in a *vāda*. Organizing an assembly for a *vāda* was supposed to yield merit equal to performance of a *yajña*. The understanding of *tattva* (reality) is said to be of three types — (i) that which imparts the knowledge of the unknown, (ii) that which substantiates the knowledge of the known, and (iii) that which eradicates the doubts.²⁵

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Gautama has defined five *hetvābhāsas* (fallacies) — *savyabhicāra*, *viruddha* (contrary), *prakaraṇasama*, *sādhyasama* and *atītakāla*. The first occurs when the probans leads to other probandums also. The probans leading to the opposite probandum is *viruddha*. Making probans identical with the probandum is *prakaraṇasama*. Unproved probans is *sādhyasama*.

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Mistimed statement on the probans is *atītakāla* or *kālātīta*.²⁶ Other authors in the field of Nyāya have redefined these *hetvābhāsas* as *asiddha* (unproven), *viruddha* (contrary), *anaikāntika* (inconclusive), *satpratipakṣa* (counter-balanced) and *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* or *bādhita* (contradicted).

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Assumption of alternate meaning in the proposition of an opponent is *chala* (cheating). It is of three types — *vāk-chala*, *sāmānya-chala* and *upacāra-chala*. On the basis of the ambiguous use by a speaker, the opponent misconstrues his statement — this is *vāk-chala*. Imagining an impossible situation from a statement describing a possibility is *sāmānya-chala*. *Upacāra-chala* consists of deriving the metaphorical meaning.

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An attack or denial of a proposition on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity is *jāti*,²⁷ so named because it is generated or born instantly. As per *bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, *jāti* involves objections on *hetu* (cause). When *hetu* is intended to prove a proposition through the similarity of the example cited, *jāti* proceeds to counter it by producing an example based on dissimilarity and vice versa. Udyotakara however disagrees with the definitions of Gautama and Vātsyāyana with regard to restricting *jāti* to opposing a hypothesis on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity of the example alone. It is like positioning a *wazīr* against a *wazīr* in the game of chess. *Jāti* thus forms a counter-argument exhibiting the futility of the arguments already presented, right argument against the right one and a futile argument against the equally futile one, showing flaws in opponent's argument. Gautama has described twenty-four *jātis* based on:
• Homogeneity (*sādṛśyasama*)
• Heterogeneity (*vaidharmyasama*)
• Addition (*utkarṣasama*)
• Deficiency (*apakarṣasama*)
• Uncertainty (*varṇyasama*)
• Certainty (*avarṇyasama*)
• Alternative (*vikalpasama*)
• Probandum (*sādhyasama*)
• Co-presence (*prāptisama*)
• Mutual absence (*aprāptisama*)
• Infinite regress (*prasaṅgasama*)
• Counter-instance (*pratidṛṣṭāntasama*)

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• Non-production (*anutpattisama*)
• Doubt (*saṃśayasama*)
• Issue under reference (*prakaraṇasama*)
• Cause (*hetusama*)
• Implication (*arthāpattisama*)
• Non-difference (*aviśeṣasama*)
• Proof (*upapattisama*)
• Apprehension (*upalabdhisama*)
• Non-apprehension (*anupalabdhisama*)
• Evanescence (*anityasama*)
• Eternity (*nityasama*)
• Effect (*kāryasama*).²⁸

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The knowledge of *jātis* makes a debater to expose the futility of the arguments made by his opponent.

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When a refutation of the hypothesis of *vādī* is equally defective, then this yields *ṣatpakṣī* (six options). Of the six ways employed in this *ṣatpakṣī*, *vādī* and *prativādī* both get three chances each to prove the infallibility of their position. *Vādī* makes a statement, the opponent gives futile rejoinder and the proponent is unable to point out the flaw in this rejoinder. According to Udayana, the debate can be put to an end by the jury here itself, so that there are only three ways. But the respondent is allowed again to point out that the proponent has not been able to point out his flaw, failing which the proponent again will get one more chance, and then the opponent will be asked to give his view. This makes six presentations all in all. Of these, the first, third and fifth belong to *vādī*, and the second, fourth and sixth belong to *prativādī*.²⁹

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The concept of *nigrahasthāna* (clincher) is very crucial in the theory and practice of debate. It occurs when one of the debaters gets himself trapped due to his own deficiency.³⁰ Śrīharṣa in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* has used the term *pratidvandīgraha* for the situation when a *vādī* overlooking the defect in his own thesis, starts displaying the same defect in the discourse of his opponent.³¹

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In *Gautamīya Nyāya* the following twenty-two *nigrahasthānas* are accepted:

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(a) *nigrahasthānas* based on defect in the statement or probans (5):
• *pratijñāhāni* (loss of thesis)
• *pratijñāntara* (change of thesis)
• *pratijñāvirodha* (contradicting one's own thesis)
• *pratijñāsaṁnyāsa* (abandonment of thesis)
• *hetvantara* (shifting the reason)

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(b) *nigrahasthānas* based on defective syntax and semantics (4):
• *arthāntara* (digression)
• *nirarthaka* (gibberish)
• *avijñātārtha* (incomprehensible speech)
• *apārthaka* (nonsensical)

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(c) *nigrahasthānas* based on wrong formulation of thesis (3):
• *aprāptakāla* (reversal of order of five-member syllogism)
• *nyūna* (omission of one or more steps)
• *adhika* (addition of steps not required)

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(d) *nigrahasthāna* based on repetition (1):
• *punarukta* (repetition)

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(e) *nigrahasthānas* arising out of inconsistency (4):
• *anuvāda* (reiterating )
• *arthapunarukta* (repetition of contents)
• *ananubhāṣaṇa* (silence)
• *ajñāta* (lack of intelligence)

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(f) *nigrahasthānas* with acceptance of one's own defective proposition (3):
• *apratibhā* (incapability to respond)
• *vikṣepa* (dispension, making excuses)
• *matānujñā* (allowance to the view of the opponent by saying that this defect lies in your statement also)

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(g) *nigrahasthānas* based on inner contradiction (2):
• *paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa* (neglecting the one's own defeat or objections raised on it)
• *niranuyojyānuyoga* (inadvertent proclamation of the defeat of the opponent by the disputant himself).

Caraka on the Theory of Vāda

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The discussions on the theory of *vāda* and cultivation of the methodology related to it was not confined to Nyāya system of philosophy alone, nor was it the prerogative of philosophers only. Theory and practice of *vāda* were taken up by authors in the field of other disciplines like Āyurveda, Arthaśāstra and Dharmaśāstra also. Each text defines it own parameters of the theoretical discussion.

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The extensive treatment of the concept of *vāda* and its techniques by Caraka in his *Caraka Saṁhitā* has led a modern scholar of philosophy like S.N. Dasgupta to suggest that in Indian philosophy “dialectic emerged from discussions of Āyurveda physicians”. E.A. Solomon rightly disagrees with this view. To quote her:

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We may not so far as to give all the credit to the Āyurveda-physicians, but we can certainly say that we have evidence that the school of Yājñika-Mīmāṁsakas and the medical school through their discussions and disputes contributed considerably to the field of logic and dialectic.³²

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According to Caraka, the whole discourse in his text is delivered through four sections/segments: *tantra* (text), *sthāna* (section), *adhyāya* (chapters) and *praśna* (queries and their answers) by the *pravaktṛs* (spokesmen/proponents) of this *śāstra*. The themes are to be explained in brief and in detail through the five stages of *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*, so that the discussion is made comprehensible for all the three types of disciples — brilliant, average and dull.³³ Caraka has also given the model of questions and answers that can proceed between a *guru* and his *śiṣya* of this *śāstra*.³⁴ He has used the term *sambhāṣā* (conversation) instead of *kathā* (discussion). Themes for discussions or questions between two *vaidyas* have also been defined by Caraka. They comprise of a group of eight categories — *tantra* (treatise or the text), *tantrārtha* (contents of the text), *sthāna* (sections in the text), *sthānārtha* (contents of the sections), *adhyāya* (chapters), *adhyāyārtha* (contents of the chapters), *praśna* (topics) and *praśnārtha* (contents of the topics).³⁵

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Through the theory of *vāda*, Caraka has reformulated the epistemology for Āyurveda. He has also developed a theory of *vāda* as applicable to his discipline and calls it *bhiṣagvāda* (debates between the physicians).³⁶ He also gives a clear directive to his fellow physicians — all the discussions or dialogues that they carry with their colleagues should pertain to Āyurveda only and not to other disciplines.³⁷ Here, *pratyakṣa* (perception) is not cited as the first valid means of knowledge, it is *āptopadeśa* which is the first *pramāṇa*.³⁸ The concept of *āpta* also differs. *Āptas* to Caraka are the knowledgeable ones who have perfect memory of the *śāstra* and can give a discourse on it in an unambiguous way without any partiality and prejudice.³⁹

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Debates between the practitioners of Āyurveda were assiduously cultivated and were regarded as essential for a healthy growth of the discipline itself. Caraka regards the employment of debating techniques to defeat the designs of the pseudo-*vaidyas*. He equates such *vaidyas* to wolves terrorizing poor folks who are like weak animals. The knowledgeable *vaidya* should assert himself as an *āpta* (authority on the subject) so that he appears as a wolf for dispelling the appearances of the ignorant one. A *vaidya* knowing nothing but boasting of his expertise should be confronted with eight questions pertaining to the fundamentals of the discipline. In the course of the debate his adversary who is feigning to be a great *vaidya* then is exposed like a *babhru* or *nakula* (mongoose) covered by his woollen hair. The knowledgeable *vaidya* should carry on a hostile debate to such a fake practitioner. A *vaidya* should face the challenge in the debate and should not tolerate pedantry and misconstrued notions. A debate is necessary for revelation of true knowledge in the field of Āyurveda. A true *vaidya* would carry *sadvāda* (fair debate) and would put an end to *Asadvāda* (unfair debate). Through the real debate, the *āpta* (authentic expert) is recognized. *Ānāptas* (non-authorities) start boasting of their knowledge and become rude out of hypocrisy. They are actually *dūṣakas* (revilers) of the *śāstra*. One should avoid them and approach the real *vaidyas* to arrive at true knowledge of the *śāstra*.⁴⁰

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After describing the pedagogy and methods of teaching Āyurveda in chap. IV (VIII in some other editions) of Vimānasthāna in his text, Caraka discusses the theory of debate in detail. The debate between physicians encourages the pursuit of knowledge and its advancement provides expertise, improves the art of oratory, illuminates fame, provides opportunity to remove doubts with reference to what was listened earlier by listening to it again with the removal of the doubts; it inculcates decisiveness and introduces new ideas hitherto unknown. Sometimes the teacher reveals the secrets of his discipline before a disciple with whom he may be pleased, but he also reveals these secrets in the course of a discussion with an opponent out of the desire of winning the debate. Therefore the experts recommend that a physician should enter into debates only with those physicians who are adept in their field.

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The debate is of two types from the point of view of purpose — *sandhāya saṁbhāṣā* (friendly debate) and *vigrāhya saṁbhāṣā* (hostile debate). The former is conducted with a spirit of coordination. The latter is aggressive and involves disputes. Caraka has also used the term *anuloma saṁbhāṣā* for the friendly debate.⁴¹

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The friendly debate is held with a learned and knowledgeable *vaidya* who is able to express himself well and is prompt in responding; is not irritable and jealous; is ready to be convinced and able to convince others; can take pains in carrying out the discussion and is endearing in speech. In the course of a discussion being carried out with such a *vaidya*, one should talk to him without reservations, should ask him questions without hesitation and upon his raising any query, should tell him in an elaborate manner. He should not be detracted by the fear of defeat in the debate, should not rejoice at winning a debate, should not boast before others, should not be obsessed with his own stand, should not explain things which are unknown, should be perfectly convincing with humility and maintain restraint. This is the way *anuloma sambhāṣās* (friendly discussions are conducted).

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On the other hand, one should enter into a hostile debate with a fake physician, considering himself superior to his adversary. Before proceeding to make rejoinders, he should examine the difference between his speech and the speech of the opponent, difference between himself and the other one, and also the qualities of the juries. Proper examination gives an understanding when one should initiate the discussion and when he should wind it up. Hence the experts recommend proper examination. When making such an examination, one should also examine the merits and demerits of the speaker in a proper way, viz. — his knowledge, understanding, retention, brilliance and eloquence — these are the merits. The demerits are — irritability, lack of skill, cowardice, lack of retention and unawareness. One should compare the advantages and disadvantages in respect of these merits and demerits.⁴²

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In accordance with these merits or demerits, the opponent may be of three types — superior, inferior or equal.⁴³

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The assembly of experts or juries is of two types — learned or ignorant. From other point of view, it is of three types — friendly, neutral and prejudiced. Before a prejudiced assembly, even if it is a congregation of learned and knowledgeable ones, one should not carry discussion. But if the assembly consists of friendly or neutral persons, one should carry on discussion with his opponent whether he is ignorant or knowledgeable one. In discussions with such an opponent, a *vaidya* is advised to use long incomprehensible sentences loaded with aphorisms, to ridicule the opponent again and again with movements of hands before the gathering and not allow him to speak and while using difficult words and seeing the opponent at the loss of words, he should say why are you not speaking now? Or should tell him, in an assertive way, that your propositions do not stand. He should tease him by saying:

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You should learn for one more year, it seems that you have not learned under an able *guru*. The opponent even when defeated for once only, should be taken as defeated and should not be entertained again. Some say that this very method can be applied for discussions with a superior one, but Caraka recommends that confrontation with a superior *vaidya* is not desirable.⁴⁴

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A hostile debate with a person who is inferior in knowledge or with the one who may be a peer can be conducted before a friendly assembly. If the assembly consists of neutral persons, who are attentive, prompt in listening, and equipped with knowledge, comprehension and retention; are able to respond through speech and give a rejoinder; one should carefully weigh the merits as well as the strong and weak points of the opponent. If he finds the opponent superior, he should avoid debate without apparently exhibiting the discontinuance. But where he finds the opponent inferior, he should overpower him there (on the weak points). And these are the means to subdue the inferior opponents quickly — he should overpower the opponent having no knowledge of the text by long citations from the text; the opponent weak in comprehension by producing long and difficult sentences; the opponent weak in retention of the sentences by cluster of sentences making complicated structure; the unintelligent opponent by speaking a sentence with more than one meanings; the opponent lacking in power of speech by intercepting when he has uttered half of the sentence; the unskilled opponent by putting him in an embarrassing situation; the irritant opponent by teasing; if the opponent is a coward then by terrorizing him; if he is not attentive, then by controlling him. Thus by these means one should subdue an inferior opponent quickly.⁴⁵

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In a hostile debate, one should always stick to logic. A position once adopted should not be relinquished. One should keep the fact in mind that the hostile debate sometimes creates enmity in some persons. If a person really gets angry in the hostile debate, he can cross limits in action and speech. The experts do not recommend real quarrel in the assembly of noble persons.⁴⁶

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Prior to the start of the debate, one can do some planning. If the assembly of judges is friendly, he should get such a topic selected in which he is well-versed, or that which may be difficult for his opponent. Or the opponent can be assigned the uneasy side of the theme of the debate. After making these arrangements, he should say these are learned experts, it is improper for us to say anything in their presence, the assembly of learned juries itself will decide the norms and guidelines as they deem fit and desire to decide. Having said this he should sit quiet.

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The norms for winning or losing a debate can be like this — the debaters will use such and such terms, they will not use such and such terms, and either of them speaking in such and such way will be declared defeated and so on.⁴⁷

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After this Caraka produces a long list of technical terms with which the participants in a debate should be well-acquainted.⁴⁸ Out of the forty categories cited by him, the following are in addition to the ones defined by Gautama: *drava*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, *samavāya*, *sthāpanā*, *pratiṣṭhāpanā*, *uttara*, *aitihya*, *aupamya*, *jijñāsā*, *vyavasāya*, *arthaprāpti*, *sambhava*, *anuyojya*, *ananuyojya*, *anuyoga*, *pratyanuyoga*, *vākyadoṣa* and *vākyapraśaṁsā*. *Siddhānta* is included in sixteen *padārthas* (universal categories) of *Nyāyadarśana*. Some of his terms like *atītakāla*, *upalambha*, *parihāra*, *pratijñāhāni*, *abhyanujñā*, *hetvantara* and *arthāntara* cited here by Caraka are included in the *nigrahasthānas* and whereas some others may fall under the *hetvābhāsas* (fallacies). He has used the term *ahetu* for fallacious reason and has defined here three types of *ahetus*: *prakaraṇasama*, *saṁśayasama* and *varṇyasama*.

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Six out of this whole gamut — *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* — relate to universal categories of Vaiśeṣika philosophy and Caraka has described them at the very outset of his text (in Sūtrasthāna) in the context of the cosmogony.⁴⁹

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He follows Vaiśeṣika closely here, but differs with Gautama to a considerable extent. It is Caraka who actually understands the term *vāda* in the sense of a formal or proper debate, where one party differs with the other and each adopts a position as per their system of thought or discipline. Instead of grouping *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* as types of *kathā* (discussion) Caraka defines these two as types of *vāda*.⁵⁰

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Caraka has added two more categories — *sthāpanā* and *pratiṣṭhāpanā* — after *pratijñā* (proposition). The statement of probandum is *pratijñā*. *Sthāpanā* involves the other four categories of the five-member syllogism for substantiating the *pratijñā*. *Pratiṣṭhāpanā* is the counter-proposition reversing the proposition of the opponent. Caraka has reformulated the concept of *hetu* (probans). That which leads to the attainment of the probandum is *hetu*, and it is a resultant of four *pramāṇas* — *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *aitihya* and *upamāna*.⁵¹ There is slight difference in his concept of *dṛṣṭānta*, *upanaya* and *nigamana* also. A *dṛṣṭānta* should be intelligible to fools and scholars alike, and *upanaya* as well as *nigamana* are to be seen in the context of *sthāpanā* and *pratiṣṭhāpanā*.⁵² *Uttara* is a rejoinder. If the proponent explains *hetu* on the basis of similarities, the opponent would explain the same on the basis of dissimilarities. For example, if a patient is suffering from *śītavyādhi* (flu), the proponent would say that the causes of this disease are contact with chill air in winter. The opponent would reply — the same causes, i.e. the contact with chill air, etc. would function as favourable when one is suffering from heat.⁵³ In Gautama’s system, this category is incorporated in the treatment on *jāti*.

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Caraka’s concepts of *siddhānta*, *aupamya*, *saṁśaya* and *prayojana* are very much in affinity with their counterparts in Nyāya,⁵⁴ while his *savyabhicāra* is treated as a *hetvābhāsa* in Nyāya. His treatment of *śabda*, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* also follows the Nyāya system.⁵⁵ He defines *aitihya* as *āptopadeśa* (advice from ancient reliable source).⁵⁶ This is treated as a category separate from *śabda-pramāṇa*, because *śabda-* *pramāṇa* to Caraka lies in the statements of reliable physicians. *Jijñāsā* is a typical category in Caraka’s discourse. It is like diagnosis. The advice given after examining a patient is *jijñāsā*.⁵⁷ *Vyavasāya* is decision.⁵⁸ *Arthaprāpti* (implication) is like the *arthāpatti* in Māmāṁsā, *sambhava* (origination), *anuyojya* (questionable statement), *ananuyojya* (unquestionable statement), *anuyoga* (question) and *pratyanuyoga* (counter-question) are other categories, according to Caraka, to be utilized in debate.⁵⁹

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He has discussed five *vākya-doṣas* (blemishes of a sentence) — *nyūna* (laconic), *adhika* (having excess of words, etc.), *anarthaka* (senseless), *apārthaka* (misleading) and *viruddha* (contradictory). The reversal of these yields five *vākyaprasaṁśās* — *anyūna*, *anadhika*, *arthavat*, *anapārthaka* and *avirudddha*. Caraka perhaps is indebted to Sulabhā’s categorizations of good and bad conversations as discussed in *Mahābhārata*.

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*Chala* has been defined by Caraka as mere verbosity full of deceit and pseudo-meanings. Examples are given from Āyurvedic debates. He defines two types of *chala* only – *vāk-chala* and *sāmānya-chala*, and omits *upacāra-chala*.⁶⁰ The categories like *atītakāla* are repeated here and they are taken up as *nigrahasthānas* also. Caraka has used the term *ahetu* for *hetvābhāsa*. *Ahetu* is of three types — *prakaraṇasama*, *saṁśayasama* and *varṇyasama*. *Upālambha* is remonstration. *Parihāra* is retribution of the defect. *Pratijñāhāni* and *abhyanujñā* are also defined as *nigrahasthas* in *Nyāyasūtra*. *Hetvantara* is referred to a defective cause instead of the cause in the context. *Arthāntara* is digression.

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Caraka defines *nigrahasthāna* as the occasion of defeat. He cites the following *nigrahasthānas* — *triḥ abhihitasya aparijñānam* (inability to understand even when a proposition is repeated thrice), *ananuyojyānuyogaḥ* (asking a question not to be asked), *anuyojyasya ananuyogaḥ* (not asking a question that ought to have been asked), *pratijñāhaniḥ* (loss of statement), *abhyanujñā*, *kālātītavacana*, *ahetu*, *nyūna*, *adhika*, *vyartha*, *punarukta*, *viruddha*, *hetvantara* and *arthāntara*.⁶¹

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In the terminology of Dharmakīrti, *sandhāya saṁbhāṣā* (friendly debate) and *vigrāhya saṁbhāṣā* (hostile debate) are known as *tattvabubhutsuvāda* (debate with the desire to seek the truth) and *vijigīṣuvāda* (debate with the desire for winning).

Asaṅga on the Types of Vāda

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Next to Gautama and Caraka, Asaṅga (around fourth century CE) discussed the concepts and categories of debate in a most elaborate way in his *Yogācārabhūmi* and *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. He used the term *hetuvidyā* for logic and defined it as "perception at hand by reason of careful consideration".⁶²

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Asaṅga defined six kinds of *vāda* — (i) *vāda* (utterance in general), (ii) *pravāda* (worldly declarations), (iii) *vivāda* (quarrels), (iv) *apavāda* (rebukes), (v) *anuvāda* (consistency of remarks), and (vi) *avavāda* (precepts, guidelines).⁶³

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On the basis of *pratijñā* (thesis) *vāda* is of two kinds — *svabhāva* (*vāda* of intrinsic nature) and *viśeṣa* (*vāda* of particular nature). On the basis of *hetu* it is of eight kinds — (i) *pratijñā* (upholding the thesis), (ii) *hetu* (giving the reason), (iii) *udāharaṇa* (example), (iv) *sārūpya* (similarity of example), (v) *vairūpya* (dissimilarity of example), (vi) *pratyakṣa* (right perception), (vii) *anumāna* (inference), and (viii) *āptāgama* (concluding with reference to the authorities).

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All in all, this makes ten kinds of *vāda*. Asaṅga has expanded *pañcāvayava-vākya* (five-member syllogism) as defined in *Nyāyasūtra* to make these ten types. But he has further elaborated upon the varieties based on similarity and dissimilarity of the examples. There are five varieties based on *sādṛśya* (similarity) — *liṅgasādṛśya*, *svabhāvasādṛśya*, *karmasādṛśya*, *dharmasādṛśya* and *hetuphalasādṛśya*. Asaṅga has extensively dealt with the varieties of *pratyakṣa* (perception) which do not generally come in practical use. His treatment of *vādālaṁkāra* (adequacies of debate) is noteworthy. He describes five types of *vādālaṁkāras*: *svaparasamayajñāna* (the debaters have knowledge of their own and other's systems), (ii) *vākkaraṇasampannatā* (they are equipped with the accomplishment in oratory), (iii) *vaiśāradya* (they are skilful), (iv) *sthairya* (they are firm), and (v) *dākṣiṇya* (they are generous). Under *vākkaraṇasampannatā*, Asaṅga enumerates five *guṇas* (qualities) and nine *ākārās* (gestures). The five *guṇas* are *agramyatā* (being non-rustic), *laghutā* (being at ease), *tejasvitā* (brilliance), *sambaddhatā* (coherence) and *svārthatā* (meaningfulness). The nine gestures are *anākula* (remaining undisturbed), *asaṁrabdha* (not exhibiting violence), *gamaka* (communicability), *mita* (being precise), *arthayukta* (being cogent), *kālana* (maintaining time), *sthira* (sticking to the point), *dīpta* (illumination of speech, clarity) and *prabaddha* (continuity). The concept of surrender by one of the debaters (*kathātyaya*) is very significant in Asaṅga, in the Nyāya traditions it has not been taken into account independently. Asaṅga takes a detailed note of it in his treatment of *vādinigraha* (capturing a disputant). If none of the debaters is unable to continue the discussion then it is *kathāsāda*. If there are defects in the debate, they are treated as *vāg-doṣas*. Asaṅga elaborates upon thirteen kinds of surrenders through declaration (*vāg-vijñapti*) — by the way of saying that mine was not good, yours was good, mine was not well-considered, yours was well considered, mine was not cogent, yours was, etc. The blemishes are *ākulavacana* (confused language), *samrambha* (violence), *agamakatva* (incomprehensibility), *amita* (digressions), *akālana* (mistimed), *asthira* (inconsistent), *adīpta* (obscure) and *aprabaddha-vacana* (staggering). A disputant should proceed for debate only after careful consideration of merits and demerits of the assembly and of skills. Knowledge, confidence and ingenuity are the three desired attributes for any debater.⁶⁴

Debate on the Debate: Buddhist Critique of the Naiyāyika

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The concept of triple probans prevailed since the time of Gautama. Afterwards, the orthodox Naiyāyikas adopted the idea of sixfold probans adding additional three categories. This model of the probans was rejected by the Buddhists. Dharmakīrti has given considerable space to the refutation of the concept of six types of probans. As a result of his criticism, the later Naiyāyikas readjusted the concept of sixfold probans and accepted five categories of *hetu*.⁶⁵

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The orthodox Naiyāyikas gave the concept of *pañcāvayava-vākya* — the sentence stating the five steps of inference, as elaborated earlier. Both Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti rejected the concept of *pañcāvayava-vākya*. They emphatically stated that without using the five-member syllogism a *vādī* can prove *sādhya* and all the argument should invariably lead to it and not to any other attribute. For drawing an inference, *pakṣa* and *dṛṣṭānta* these two premises only are sufficient and they make *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance). *Pratijñā* (statement of proposition) and *nigamana* (conclusion) are redundant.⁶⁶ Having rejected the structure of *pañcāvayava-* *vākya*, he also demolishes the sequential order of the five categories there, proposing to abolish the restriction that the probans should be stated first and the instance in the last. He finds any such sequence absurd, because argument can be employed both ways and the aim of causing authentic cognition should be realized, rather than maintenance of an order in the statement of categories.⁶⁷ He also holds the use of two *vyāptis* (*anvaya* and *vyatireka* — the positive concomitance and the negative concomitance) as redundant, because one of them naturally implies the other.⁶⁸

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The idea that the invariable concomitance can be understood without reliance on examples was elaborated first by the Jainas. It was taken over by Buddhists and became known as Antarvyāptivāda (theory of intrinsic implication of invariable concomitance). Dharmakīrti argues in support of Antarvyāptivāda. He redevelops it through his idea of *sāmarthya*, i.e. the invariable concomitance in itself is capable of leading to the conclusion and out of two types of *vyāptis* one is capable of leading to the other.

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The concept of *āpta* (reliable person) has been a contentious issue between the orthodox Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists. Even the system of grammar so scientifically and meticulously cultivated under Pāṇinian tradition relied on *āptas* or *śiṣṭas*. Patañjali states that the usage of *śiṣṭa* (learned) should be accepted as the standard norm. He identifies *śiṣṭas* as “those brāhmaṇas who live in Āryāvarta (the home of *āryas*), whose daily intake of food is the grain only in one little earthen pot, who are not greedy, do not seize upon a cause and are well versed in all the Śāstras (knowledge systems)”.

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Buddhist logicians like Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti do not agree with the theory of *parārthānumāna* as postulated by Gautama and his followers. *Parārthānumāna* was also named as *sādhana* by Diṅnāga. *Pakṣa* (thesis), *hetu* (cause or signifying analogy) and *dṛṣṭānta* (instance) — these are the three constituents of *parārthānumāna* according to Diṅnāga. The unsound nature of these three makes three fallacies, called *sādhanābhāsas* by Diṅnāga — *pakṣābhāsa*, *hetvābhāsa* and *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*.

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Diṅnāga believed that *parārthānumāna* will not be possible if any one of the three elements, i.e. *pakṣa*, *hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta*, is defective. In the same way he also holds that all of three elements — *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* — also form the essential requisites for the inference. Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāyabindu* agrees with Diṅnāga and criticizes the orthodox Naiyāyikas.⁶⁹

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The Buddhist logicians differ from orthodox Naiyāyikas as *vāda* to them is not a means for winning the arguments, it is meant to help the opponent in seeing the truth. The conceptual framework for the theory of debate was further substantiated in the discussions on *anumāna* (inference).

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Again there is a basic difference between Gautamīya Nyāya and Buddhist philosophers with regard to the concept of *nigrahasthāna*. In the former *nigrahasthāna* is defined as a *parājayavastu* (a point of defeat), whereas Dharmakīrti views *nigrahasthāna* as a *parājayādhikaraṇa* (forfeiture of the right to continue debate).

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Dharmakīrti has divided *nigrahasthānas* into two categories — *asādhanāṅga-vacana* (non-statement of a constituent proof) and *adoṣodbhāvana* (failure to point out the fault of the opponent). The former belongs to *vādī* (disputant) and the latter to *prativādī* (opponent or defendant). In the former, the digression by the opponent leads to disruption in the debate. Dharmakīrti advises the juries that if the opponent starts employing this malpractice, the debate should be adjourned. *Asādhanāṅga-vacana* would become an occasion of defeat of the disputant only when the opponent points it out, otherwise none of them can be held victorious or defeated just on the basis of the use of *asādhanāṅga-vacana* by the disputant. Dharmakīrti prescribes a gap between the occurrence of *nigrahasthāna* and actual declaration of defeat and in this way has avoided a paradoxical situation which occurs in the framework of Gautamīya Nyāya, viz. if the disputant commits the fault of using a *hetvābhāsa* and the opponent at the same time is guilty of *paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa* — by the way of not pointing out this fault of the disputant, then both of them are to be declared defeated! But this kind of peculiar situation has an occurrence in Dharmakīrti’s concept of *adoṣodbhāvana* as well. The inability to point out the defect in presenting *sādhana* (proof) of the disputant is naturally an occasion of defeat of the opponent. This is the first *nigrahasthāna* for the opponent called *adoṣodbhāvana*. But what happens if the disputant points out or fails to point out his opponent’s inability to point out his (disputant’s) defect? Dharmakīrti says that in either case neither the disputant nor the opponent loses a point, and the debate should be taken up again.

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Dharmakīrti rejects *chala* (cheating) and *jātis* as parts of *vāda*, as well as the whole framework of *nigrahasthāna* proposed by Gautama.

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Like the parliaments, judicial courts have also functioned as platforms for very lively debates on social, moral and ethical issues. These courts also initiated new techniques and methodologies for discussions and debates. Smṛti texts furnish in depth analysis of these techniques. *Bṛhaspatismṛti* (1.17) lays down four steps of the judicial process involving debate — *pūrva-pakṣa* (petitioners view), (ii) *uttara* (reply by the respondent), (iii) *kriyāpāda* (specifying the action to be taken), and (iv) *nirṇaya* (judgment). Reply under no. (ii) is divided by *Śukrasmṛti* into four categories — *satya* (factual), *mithyā* (false), *pratyavaskandana* and *pūrvavyavahāravidhi*. The first is also named as *pratipatti*. It is the acceptance of the points raised by the petitioner. The second is negation of the points raised by the petitioner. *Pratyavaskandana* is partial acceptance with a view to denounce the case as presented by the petitioner. This is done by adding rejoinders. The fourth involves citations of previous arguments and victory acquired by the respondent in the same or similar cases.

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Kauṭilya specifies the arrangements to be made for proper recording of *vāda* or *vyavahāra* (case) brought up in *dharma-sthāna* (court of law). The questions and objections of *vādī* and *prativādī* should be written in proper order.⁷⁰

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Kātyāyana (16-40), Bṛhaspati (2.8-9) and Śukra also describe certain defects in the language. Śukra defines these defects as under:
• *anyārthaṁ* (carrying a different meaning)
• *arthahīnaṁ* (without meaning)
• *pramāṇāgamavarjitaṁ* (without proper evidence)
• *hīnāṁ* (laconic)
• *adhikaṁ* (excessive)
• *bhraṣṭaṁ* (corrupt).

Codes for Conducting the Debate

c7.s5.1

*Prāśnika* and *sadasya* these two terms have been used for a jury. Diṅnāga says that *prāśnika* (jury) is not supposed to know the conclusions being derived by the disputants when a debate is started.⁷¹ Commenting on him, Haribhadra explains — it is not that *prāśnikas* are ignorant, but they do not know the way to support either of the debaters.⁷² In his commentary on *Nyāyapraveśakasūtram*, Haribhadra defines *prāśnikas* as “unbiased like a balance which can equally weigh both the debaters, having knowledge of their systems and the systems of others, born in a good family, tolerant, and devoted to debates”.⁷³

c7.s5.2

Minimum three juries should be nominated with the consent of both *vādī* and *prativādī*. They should always be in odd numbers.⁷⁴ The advantage of having juries in odd numbers lies in felicitating a decision by majority, as odd numbers will eliminate any possibility of a tie.

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