注維摩詰經 3

English (machine translation) 3

Language: English

3.1

Compiled by the monk Sengzhao of the Later Qin

[Kumāra]jīva says: In the Qin language [Subhūti is translated as] Shanye (Good Karma); he is foremost in understanding emptiness. The reason Shanye visited the householder and incurred a defeat was that there was a reason he went, and also a cause for his defeat. Please permit a metaphor to explain it: it is like an expert archer who shoots and never misses a target; though light wings fly swiftly, they cannot soar above his lodging. Just so, Vimalakīrti's eloquence and wisdom are deep and penetrating, his speech never failing to meet the mark, so that among the five hundred arhats none dared peer into his doorway. Shanye believed his own wisdom was capable of penetrating deeply and his eloquence sufficient to respond to the occasion, and therefore went directly without doubt. This was his mindset in going. However, when he enters contemplation his mind accords with the mark of dharmas, but when he emerges from concentration his sentiments shift along with affairs; his incurring defeat and suffering humiliation was truly due to this. Because Shanye considered himself to have penetrated deeply while contradicting equality, the words of this chapter are sharp and the meaning profound. Since the śrāvakas do not fully possess all capacities, each has his partial ability, and because of this partial ability is called foremost; thus the five hundred disciples are all called foremost. Moreover, the four great śrāvakas above further possess an extraordinary virtue: when someone makes offerings to them, they can grant a retribution in the present life; hence they alone are called the four great śrāvakas. The other people lack this virtue, so they are called foremost but are not named 'great.' [Seng]zhao says: Subhūti is in the Qin language Shanjī (Good Auspiciousness); among the disciples he is foremost in understanding emptiness.

3.4

“Go and visit Vimalakīrti to inquire about his illness.” Subhūti said to the Buddha: “World-Honoured One, I am not competent to go there to inquire about his illness. Why is this? I remember once in the past entering his house to beg food from him.

3.5

[Dao]sheng says: Subhūti is foremost among men in attaining the non-contentious samādhi. The non-contentious samādhi means understanding that emptiness leaves no grounds for dispute, which is 'non-contentious.' Vimalakīrti's sharp eloquence was hard to match, and few dared peer into his doorway; yet Subhūti, possessing this concentration, was alone able to visit him, which was an external sign of relying on concentration. Having the external sign of relying on concentration and thereby incurring questioning—how could it not be so?

3.6

“At that time Vimalakīrti took my bowl, filled it with rice,

3.7

[Dao]sheng says: In his external role Vimalakīrti was a householder, which carried the suspicion of stinginess; if he questioned him before giving the food, people might have suspected that. Therefore he first took the bowl and filled it with rice but did not hand it over, fearing that Subhūti, upon getting the bowl, would immediately leave without completing the discourse.

3.8

“and said to me: ‘Noble Subhūti! If you can be equal with regard to food, all dharmas will also be equal.

3.9

[Dao]sheng says: If one comes relying on concentration, one is unequal with regard to concentration. Questioning him directly about food makes it clear that he is also unequal with regard to food. If one is not equal regarding food, how could one be equal regarding concentration? This is having no equality whatsoever. Since there is no equality, how could there be an equal concentration on which to rely?

3.10

“‘If all dharmas are equal, one will also be equal with regard to food.

3.11

[Dao]sheng says: This reiterates the preceding statement. Although the matter of food is coarse, its principle is inherently subtle. One must attain equality regarding all dharmas, and only thereafter can one be equal to it.

3.12

“‘Begging in this manner, only then may you take the food.

3.13

[Seng]zhao says: Subhūti considered that prominent elders, wealthy and self-indulgent, often harbored greed and stinginess without reflecting on impermanence. Although they feel gratified now, later they will certainly suffer poverty. Pitying their delusion, he mostly went to them to beg food. Next he entered the house of the Pure Name, who immediately took his bowl and filled it with rice; before handing it over, he mocked his lack of equality. He means that the myriad dharmas share an identical mark, and taking one as the standard, the rest can be known. If you are equal with regard to food, all dharmas are also equal; if all dharmas are equal, you are also equal with regard to food. Begging in this manner, only then may you take the food. Why discard the poor to follow the rich, giving rise to discriminatory thoughts on your own? [Dao]sheng says: With a mind like this, only then may you rely on it to take my food. The meaning is: if it is not so, do not take it.

3.14

“‘If, Subhūti, you do not sever lust, anger, and delusion, nor are you accompanied by them;

3.15

[Kumāra]jīva says: When one attains their true nature, then being is non-being; when being is non-being, there is nothing severed and nothing possessed; therefore one can neither sever them nor be accompanied by them. [Seng]zhao says: Severing lust, anger, and delusion belongs to the śrāvaka. Being accompanied by lust, anger, and delusion belongs to the pṛthagjana. The mahāsattva contemplates lust, anger, and delusion as being none other than nirvāṇa, and therefore neither severs them nor is accompanied by them. If one can be like this, only then may one take the food. [Dao]sheng says: Subhūti is a person who has severed lust, anger, and delusion; tracing the root of his reliance on concentration, he certainly considers severance as not being accompanied [by them]; hence Vimalakīrti further proceeds to interrogate him. The intention of this interrogation makes it increasingly incisive. If one considers severance as not being accompanied, not only does one not have equal concentration, but one has not severed lust, anger, and delusion either.

3.16

“‘without destroying the body, you accord with the single mark;

3.17

[Kumāra]jīva says: The body is itself the single mark; it does not depend on being destroyed before one accords with it. [Seng]zhao says: When the myriad things are of the same import and right and wrong are viewed identically, that is the single mark. Thus the body is itself the single mark; why wait until destroying the body and annihilating the form to call it the single mark? The body refers to the body of the five aggregates. [Dao]sheng says: For one who has severed lust, anger, and delusion, the body is destroyed in nirvāṇa. In nirvāṇa there are no longer immeasurable bodily marks, which constitutes the single mark. Not destroying the body seems contrary to the matter, hence he says 'accord with.'

3.18

“‘without extinguishing delusion and attachment, you give rise to clarity and liberation;

3.19

[Seng]zhao says: The śrāvaka has his wisdom obscured by delusion, so he extinguishes delusion to become clear; his mind is bound by attachment, so he unbinds attachment to become liberated. The mahāsattva contemplates the true mark of delusion and attachment as being none other than clarity and liberation; hence he gives rise to clarity and liberation without extinguishing delusion and attachment. [Dao]sheng says: The body originally exists due to delusion and attachment, hence this is stated next. No longer being covered by delusion is clarity. No longer being bound by attachment is liberation.

3.20

“‘by means of the marks of the five heinous sins you attain liberation, yet you are neither liberated nor bound;

3.21

[Seng]zhao says: The true mark of the five heinous sins is itself liberation; how could there be a distinction between bondage and liberation? The five heinous sins are the worst of offenses, and liberation is the supreme path. If one can attain liberation precisely through the marks of the five heinous sins, only then may one take the food of others. [Dao]sheng says: Having spoken of attaining liberation from bondage, and since the five heinous sins are the utmost bondage, he therefore takes them as his words. Thus liberation is non-liberation, and bondage is non-bondage.

3.22

“‘neither seeing the four noble truths nor not seeing the truths;

3.23

[Seng]zhao says: One who truly sees the truths neither sees as if with a mind, nor does not see as if without a mind.

3.24

“‘not attaining the fruits;

3.25

[Dao]sheng says: Attaining liberation from bondage is the efficacy of seeing the truths. Here he inverts it again: not non-seeing of the truths is attaining the fruits, and so he immediately overturns it.

3.26

“‘neither a pṛthagjana nor free from the dharmas of a pṛthagjana;

3.27

[Seng]zhao says: 'Fruits' refers to the fruits of the various paths. Because he does not see the four truths, he does not attain the fruits; because he does not fail to see the truths, he is not a pṛthagjana. Although he is not a pṛthagjana, he is not free from the dharmas of a pṛthagjana: this is the path of equality. [Dao]sheng says: Seeing the truths resides in the person, so he discusses it further.

3.28

“‘neither a sage nor not a sage;

3.29

[Seng]zhao says: Not being free from the dharmas of a pṛthagjana, he is not a sage; his path transcending the three realms, he is not not a sage.

3.30

“‘although accomplishing all dharmas, you are free from the marks of all dharmas—

3.31

[Seng]zhao says: Not discarding bad dharmas to follow good ones, what is there among all dharmas that is not accomplished? Although all dharmas are accomplished, one is free from their marks; because one is free from their marks, both beauty and ugliness are thus accomplished. [Dao]sheng says: A person must accomplish dharmas, hence he further pushes the point to its utmost limit.

3.32

“‘only then may you take the food.

3.33

[Seng]zhao says: If one can be fully endowed as stated above, only then may one take the food.

3.34

“‘If, Subhūti, you do not see the Buddha and do not hear the Dharma;

3.35

[Seng]zhao says: This is still instructing him in equality. One who can level right and wrong and unify good and bad—even if he were, above, the equal of the Tathāgata, he would not deem him exalted; even if he were, below, the equal of the six masters, he would not deem them base. Why is this? Heaven and earth are [as] one finger; the myriad things are [as] a single vision. Though the heterodox and the orthodox differ, their nature is non-dual; how could it be that the Tathāgata alone is exalted while the six masters alone are base? If one can, like those six masters, not see the Buddha and not hear the Dharma, go forth [into homelessness] through them, and follow them in that into which they fall without regarding this as different, only then may one take food. This is an exposition that fathoms principle, exhausts nature, and reaches the limit of having no fixed perspective. When good and evil are argued inversely without transgressing their constant [principle], and heterodoxy and orthodoxy are harmonized in debate without losing their truth, may this not be called the way of equal, correct transformation without duality? [Dao]sheng says: This stage causes the words to be paradoxical while the principle remains concordant. If one truly embodies emptiness and is inwardly luminous, one will not be deluded in mind by paradoxical words. Subhūti had seen the Buddha and heard the Dharma, yet [the sūtra] says, 'not seeing the Buddha and not hearing the Dharma'—the words are diametrically reversed. If one takes there being no buddha to be seen as 'not seeing the Buddha', and there being no dharma to be heard as 'not hearing the Dharma', then it conforms to principle.

3.36

"[If] those six heterodox masters—Pūraṇa Kāśyapa,

3.37

[Kumāra]jīva says: Kāśyapa was his maternal clan name; Pūraṇa was his personal name. This man gave rise to the false view that all dharmas have nothing that exists, being like empty space, neither arising nor ceasing. [Seng]zhao says: His clan name was Kāśyapa; his personal name was Pūraṇa. This man gave rise to the false view that all dharmas are annihilated and intrinsically empty, and that there is no way of loyalty and filial piety between ruler and minister or father and son.

3.38

"Makkhali Gosāla,

3.39

[Kumāra]jīva says: Makkhali was his personal name; Gosāla was his mother. This man gave rise to the view asserting that the defilement of transgressions of sentient beings has neither cause nor condition. [Seng]zhao says: Makkhali was his personal name; Gosāla was his mother's name. This man gave rise to the view that the suffering and pleasure of sentient beings are not obtained on account of their actions, but are simply natural.

3.40

"Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta,

3.41

[Kumāra]jīva says: Sañjaya was his personal name; Belaṭṭhi was his mother's name. This man gave rise to the view that one must inevitably pass through saṃsāra for a long duration, traversing kalpas, after which the limit of suffering will naturally come to an end. [Seng]zhao says: Sañjaya was his personal name; Belaṭṭhi was his mother's name. This man asserted that the path does not require seeking: passing through the kalpas of saṃsāra, when suffering is exhausted one will naturally attain it. It is like rolling a ball of thread down a high mountain: when the thread is exhausted, it stops on its own—why resort to seeking?

3.42

"Ajita Kesakambala,

3.43

[Kumāra]jīva says: Ajita Kesakambala was his personal name; kambala means coarse clothing. This man gave rise to the view of conceiving as causes what are not causes: wearing coarse hide garments, plucking out his hair, smoking his nose, and the like, taking various ascetic practices to be the path. [Seng]zhao says: Ajita was his personal name; kesakambala is the name of coarse, tattered clothing. This man wore tattered clothes, plucked out his own hair, and scorched his body with the five fires, taking ascetic practices to be the path. He asserted that if one suffers all at once in this present body, in the next body one will enjoy constant pleasure.

3.44

"Pakudha Kaccāyana,

3.45

[Kumāra]jīva says: This is the name of a heterodox master. This man gave rise to views in response to things: if someone asked, 'Does it exist?', he answered, 'It exists.' If someone asked, 'Does it not exist?', he answered, 'It does not exist.' [Seng]zhao says: His clan name was Kaccāyana; his personal name was Pakudha. This man asserted that all dharmas both have characteristics and lack characteristics.

3.46

"and Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta—

3.47

[Kumāra]jīva says: Nigaṇṭha was his personal name; Nātaputta was his mother's name. This man gave rise to the view that transgression and merit, suffering and pleasure, all stem from previous lifetimes and must inevitably be repaid; although one may practice the path now, one cannot cut them off halfway. These six masters all gave rise to false views, went naked, practiced austerities, and proclaimed themselves omniscient; they were largely the same, differing only in minor points. In all, there are three types of the six masters, making eighteen schools: the first proclaims omniscience, the second attains the five supernatural powers, and the third recites the four Vedas. The six masters expounded above belong to the first class. [Seng]zhao says: Nigaṇṭha is the general designation for their homeless renunciants, just as in the Buddha's teaching the renunciant is called a śramaṇa. Nātaputta was his mother's name. This man asserted that transgression and merit, suffering and pleasure, originally have fixed causes and must inevitably be experienced, and are not something that practicing the path can sever. Before the Buddha appeared in the world, the six masters all reigned as kings of doctrine in India.

3.48

"are your teachers, and you go forth [into homelessness] through them;

3.49

[Dao]sheng says: Since he does not see the Buddha and does not hear the Dharma, he receives the path from teachers of false views and, relying on them, becomes a heterodox renunciant. Conforming to the principle present in the six masters is the means of awakening; taking them as teachers, one furthermore follows them to accomplish the path of homelessness.

3.50

"and that into which those teachers fall, you also fall into along with them—only then may you take food.

3.51

[Seng]zhao says: In life one follows false views; in death one falls into the evil destinies. [Dao]sheng says: Having taken them as teachers, when they fall into the three evil destinies, one cannot but follow them in their fall. If one goes forth by conforming to the principle of taking the six masters as teachers, then though there are three evil destinies, there is no violation in falling into them. Another edition reads: 'Not seeing the Buddha, down to following the six masters in that into which they fall.' [Kumāra]jīva says: Because he saw distinctions, [Vimalakīrti] instructs him to cultivate equal vision. If one can see no superiority of the Buddha over the six masters, go forth through them, and be one with them without destroying differentiated characteristics, only then may one take food.

3.52

"If, Subhūti, you enter all false views and do not reach the other shore;

3.53

[Kumāra]jīva says: From here below, it clarifies that because he has not yet corresponded with equality, he has not escaped the manifold bondages. Therefore it says that he enters false views, abides in the eight conditions of adversity, and is identified with the defilements, possessing these manifold evils and contrary to those manifold goods. The phrases below are all things he does not attain. [Seng]zhao says: The 'other shore' is the shore of the true mark. The deluded take false views to be heterodox and the other shore to be correct, and therefore abandon these false views to go to the other shore. The fundamental nature of false views and the other shore is not different; why abandon the heterodox to delight in the other shore? Therefore, entering all false views and not entering the other shore—only then may one take food. From the six masters down to not attaining extinction, [the text] universally produces inverse discourse to accomplish great conformity. It is hoped that the gentleman of penetrating mind will have the means to recognize its profound purport and discard that which he affirms. [Dao]sheng says: If one takes teachers of false views as one's masters, one enters all false views. Reaching the other shore originally stems from right view; one who enters false views does not reach it. In conforming [to the real], entering consists in understanding the principle of false views. Once one has entered their principle, that itself is the other shore, and there is no other shore left to be reached.

3.54

"abide in the eight conditions of adversity and do not attain freedom from adversity;

3.55

[Seng]zhao says: He who sees adversity as adversity will surely abandon adversity and seek freedom from adversity. If one can not consider adversity as adversity, one can abide in adversity; not considering freedom from adversity as freedom from adversity, one does not attain freedom from adversity. [Dao]sheng says: Having entered false views, one is born in the eight conditions of adversity and does not attain a place free from adversity. In conforming [to the real], having already understood false views, one can then abide in the eight conditions of adversity, and within principle there is no longer any freedom from adversity that can be attained.

3.56

"are identified with the defilements and separated from pure dharmas;

3.57

[Seng]zhao says: If one can awaken to the fact that defilement is not defilement, then though defiled, one is pure; if one regards purity as purity, then though pure, one is defiled. Therefore, being identified with defilement and separated from purity is precisely how one is constantly pure. [Dao]sheng says: For one who enters false views and is born in the eight conditions of adversity, there are no fetters that do not arise; dragged by defilements, he cannot differentiate himself from them, and drifts ever farther from pure dharmas. In conforming [to the real], once one abides within the principle of the eight conditions of adversity, the mind is fused with the principle of defilement; this very thing is purity, and there is no longer any purity that cannot be departed from.

3.58

"[and if], you having attained the samādhi of non-contention,

3.59

[Kumāra]jīva says: Non-contention has two aspects: first, by the power of samādhi, protecting sentient beings so that contentiousness does not arise in their minds; second, according with the nature of dharmas without opposition or contention. Subhūti always considered himself to have deeply penetrated the dharma of emptiness without opposition or contention; now, if he does not conform to equality yet claims 'non-contention', he is no different from ordinary sentient beings.

3.60

"all sentient beings also attain this concentration;

3.61

[Seng]zhao says: The nature of Subhūti and sentient beings is fundamentally always one; why should Subhūti alone attain it while the multitude of beings do not? This clarifies that the nature is originally not partial. Among the five hundred disciples, Subhūti was foremost in understanding emptiness; he was always skilled in according with the characteristics of dharmas, without opposition or contention. Inwardly having no contention, outwardly he was also skilled in according with the minds of the multitude so that they had no contentions or disputes; attaining this concentration is called the 'samādhi of non-contention'. [Dao]sheng says: The preceding interrogation of his relying on concentration without equality meant that he had not attained concentration. Although the meaning lay here, it was not directly reproached; thus in the end it follows up on this matter to depreciate him. If Subhūti attains this concentration, there are no sentient beings who do not attain it. In conforming [to the real], their non-attainment is also his attainment, so there is no difference.

3.62

"[if] those who give to you are not called a field of merit;

3.63

[Seng]zhao says: When I receive their giving, I cause them to obtain great merit, and hence I am called a 'field of merit'. Yet from the grand perspective, self and other are not different: who is the one of merit? Who is the field?

3.64

"and those who make offerings to you fall into the three evil destinies;

3.65

[Seng]zhao says: The harm of the five heinous deeds and the benefit of making offerings, viewed from the grand perspective, are entirely equal, without perception of difference. If one can fall through the five heinous deeds, through making offerings one also falls. [Dao]sheng says: Retribution and response fit together like the two halves of a tally; if one gives to a person of false views, it brings the retribution of false views and one falls into the three evil destinies. Retribution in accordance with false views means there is no field of merit. Since there is no field of merit, how could any name be applied? In conforming [to the real], when one ultimately obtains right view, one understands that there is no field of merit to be named, and attains escape from the three evil destinies without viewing this as different from falling.

3.66

"[if] you join hands with all Māras to become companions in toil;

3.67

[Seng]zhao says: 'All Māras' refers to the four māras. Together they form a band of companions in the toil of defilements. [Dao]sheng says: Giving that can produce a result is called karma. If one gives rise to heterodoxy with respect to karma, causing one to receive retribution in the three realms, it creates toilsome suffering for sentient beings. Thus false view and karma become companions, and afterward one obtains retribution in the three realms. As this karma constitutes toil, it is the same as what is done by Māra; hence it says 'join hands'. In conforming [to the real], once right view is attained, it is not different from being companions in the toil wrought by Māra.

3.68

"and you are equal to and no different from all Māras and all defilements;

3.69

[Seng]zhao says: Since one is their companion, how could there be any difference? It is precisely by virtue of having no difference that one can accomplish their differentiation. [Dao]sheng says: If receiving giving causes the donor to receive the retribution of false views, this harms their wisdom-life, acting as an internal and external māra. In conforming [to the real], causing them to attain equality gives rise to their mind of generous benefit, and they will surely not see it as distinct from what harms them.

3.70

"[if] toward all sentient beings you have a mind of enmity;

3.71

[Dao]sheng says: Harming their wisdom-life to act as a māra is enmity at its worst. In conforming [to the real], giving rise to that mind of generous benefit has the meaning of being a close friend, yet it is not seen as different from enmity.

3.72

"slander all buddhas, defame the Dharma,

3.73

[Seng]zhao says: As for the mind of enmity or intimacy, the intention of defamation or praise—the fine and the ugly are of a single accord; who can speak of their difference? If we say they are not different, why should one not identify with them?

3.74

"do not enter the monastic assembly, and in the end do not attain extinction—

3.75

[Dao]sheng says: The cause of doing harm stems from slandering buddhas and defaming the Dharma; such a person does not enter the count of the four assemblies. In conforming [to the real], the principle of a close friend takes praising the buddhas and lauding the Dharma as its substance, yet it is not different from slander; hence it says 'slander'.

3.76

"if you are like this, only then may you take food."

3.77

[Kumāra]jīva says: Only if you yourself know that you have faults as deep as this, can you take the food. [Seng]zhao says: One who commits grave offenses cannot enter the ranks of the worthy and noble, and ultimately cannot attain extinction [nirvāṇa]. Only if one can possess all the aforesaid evils can one take the food. Why is this? Turning away from evil and following good is simply the ordinary sentiment of men. Yet, when right and wrong pass through the mind, one is still not free from encumbrance. Therefore, those of equal vision consider retaining good to be an affliction, and so abandon good to seek the fundamental principle; they consider abandoning evil to be an encumbrance, and so approach evil to return to the root. Thus approaching evil has the efficacy of forgetting encumbrances, and abandoning good has the merit of non-defilement. Hence we know that being in accord with the good is not yet an attainment, nor is being in accord with evil a loss. The meaning of Pure Name's words seems to lie herein.

3.78

At that time, World-Honoured One, hearing this, I was bewildered and did not know what these words meant.

3.79

[Dao]sheng says: If spoken in terms of language, I would not be so; if taken according to the intention, it was already beyond my reach. Therefore, in the end I did not know what these words meant.

3.80

Not knowing how to answer, I then set down my bowl and wished to leave his house.

3.81

[Seng]zhao says: Pure Name's words were contrary, yet their principle was in accord; Subhūti seems not to have reflected upon his words, and so, not knowing what this exposition meant, he set down his bowl and wished to leave. [Dao]sheng says: Having no ground to advance or retreat, he did not know how to answer, and thus was vanquished. It was said earlier that only if it were so could he take the food; since he was not so, he did not take it. Being vanquished, he had to forfeit the bowl, and so he set it down and wished to leave.

3.82

Vimalakīrti said, "Hold, Subhūti! Take your bowl and do not be afraid.

3.83

[Dao]sheng says: Fearing that he had no answer, he set down the bowl; that is again clinging to the mark of words. Wishing to untie this stagnation and allow him to take the bowl, he first said, 'Take your bowl and do not be afraid.'

3.84

What do you think? If an illusory person created by the Tathāgata were questioned about these matters, would he have any fear or not?"

3.85

[Seng]zhao says: Pure Name wished to have Subhūti broaden the way of equality, listening without mind, so that both the fine and the evil are accepted in accord. But Subhūti originally did not reflect upon his words and was deluded about what he had said; therefore he further cited an analogy to clarify it. [Dao]sheng says: The meaning is that even a created illusion could not have any mind regarding what was questioned.

3.86

I said, "No." Vimalakīrti said, "All dharmas are like illusory apparitions; you now should not have any fear.

3.87

[Seng]zhao says: If he was foremost among the disciples in understanding emptiness, since he already knew that an apparition is without mind and also knew that dharmas are like apparitions, hearing this with such [understanding], why should he be afraid? [Dao]sheng says: Since an apparition has no fear, dharmas being like apparitions should likewise not give rise to fear.

3.88

Why is that? All speech does not depart from this mark.

3.89

[Seng]zhao says: 'This mark' is precisely the mark of illusion. Speech is like an apparition, and hearing is also like an apparition; when an apparition listens to an apparition, how could there be room for fear? [Dao]sheng says: The reason he says that since all dharmas are like illusions one should be without fear, is because all dharmas are illusory apparitions, and speech is also like this. If speech is indeed like an illusion, how could words cause fear?

3.90

As for the wise, they do not cling to letters, and therefore have no fear. Why is this? The nature of letters is aloof [from letters].

3.91

[Seng]zhao says: The creation of letters arises from deluded grasping; when dharmas have nothing to be grasped, then the marks of letters are naturally aloof. They are false and provisional names; the wise do not cling to them.

3.92

To have no letters: this is liberation.

3.93

[Seng]zhao says: Liberation refers to true unconditioned liberation. Names arise from insufficiency; when there is sufficiency, there are no names. Therefore, having no letters is true liberation. [Dao]sheng says: Being no longer bound by letters, it is called liberation.

3.94

The mark of liberation is [the true mark of] all dharmas."

3.95

[Seng]zhao says: Names arise from dharmas, and dharmas arise from names; since names are liberated, all dharmas are likewise liberated. [Dao]sheng says: Earlier, by all dharmas being like illusions, he clarified the absence of letters; letters having been unloosed, he returns to awakening and understanding in all dharmas.

3.96

When Vimalakīrti expounded this Dharma, two hundred devaputras attained the purity of the Dharma-eye. Therefore, I am not competent to go there and inquire about his illness. The Buddha said to Pūrṇa Maitrāyaṇīputra,

3.97

[Kumāra]jīva says: Pūrṇa in Qin means 'Full' [mǎn]. Maitrāyaṇī in Qin means 'Good Friend' [shànzhīshí]. 'Good Friend' is his mother's name. This person is foremost among the Dharma teachers in skillfully expounding the Abhidharma treatises. [Seng]zhao says: Pūrṇa is his style name, in Qin meaning 'Full'. Maitrāyaṇī is his mother's name, in Qin meaning 'Good Friend'. His mother's name is incorporated into his name. He is foremost in eloquence among the disciples.

3.98

"You go to Vimalakīrti to inquire about his illness." Pūrṇa said to the Buddha, "World-Honoured One, I am not capable of going there to inquire about his illness. Why is this? I recall in the past, in the Great Forest, I was under a tree expounding the Dharma for some newly ordained monks.

3.99

[Kumāra]jīva says: Near Vaiśālī there is a park and forest; in the forest is a body of water named the Monkey Pond. In the park and forest there are monastic dwellings; this is one of the three monasteries of Vaiśālī. Pūrṇa was expounding the Dharma there for newly ordained monks.

3.100

At that time, Vimalakīrti came and said to me, 'Hold, Pūrṇa! First you should enter samādhi to observe this person's mind, and only then expound the Dharma.

3.101

[Seng]zhao says: In the Mahāyāna, from the dharmakāya upward, one attains the unimpeded true mind; mental wisdom is quiescent and has never been out of samādhi. Because the mind is constantly in samādhi, it can universally illuminate all things without relying on deduction to know them afterward. In the Hīnayāna, the mind has limits and obstacles, nor can it constantly remain in samādhi; whatever it observes is seen when in samādhi and not seen when out of samādhi. Moreover, those of the śrāvakas whose power of samādhi is deep see the roots of sentient beings up to eighty thousand kalpas, while those whose power of samādhi is shallow see only a few lifetimes; what the mahāsattva sees reaches to the infinite. These newly ordained monks had faculties in the Mahāyāna and ought to have heard the Great Way, but he was expounding the lesser Dharma to them; therefore [Vimalakīrti] instructed him to enter samādhi.

3.102

Do not put foul food into a jewelled vessel.

3.103

[Seng]zhao says: Foul food filling hunger is the Hīnayāna teaching; containing unexcelled jewels is the Mahāyāna vessel.

3.104

You should know what this monk is thinking in his mind; do not equate lapis lazuli with crystal.

3.105

[Seng]zhao says: You should recognize the root of the thoughts of his mind; do not leave the real and the fake undifferentiated.

3.106

You cannot know the root source of sentient beings; do not arouse them with the Hīnayāna Dharma. They themselves have no wounds; do not injure them.

3.107

[Seng]zhao says: Their Mahāyāna substance itself has no wounds or blemishes; do not wound or damage it with the thorns of the Hīnayāna.

3.108

When one wishes to travel the great highway, do not point out a narrow path; do not pour the great ocean into an ox's footprint.

3.109

[Seng]zhao says: Great things should be placed in great places; why turn dragons and elephants onto a hare's path, or pour the great ocean into an ox's footprint?

3.110

Do not equate the light of the sun with that of a firefly.

3.111

[Seng]zhao says: The disparity between light and darkness is illustrated by such an analogy; why would one wish to equate them?

3.112

Pūrṇa, this monk long ago generated the Mahāyāna mind, but along the way he forgot this intention.

3.113

[Seng]zhao says: Before attaining the unproduced [dharmakṣānti], minds all experience regression and forgetting.

3.114

Why teach and guide him with the Hīnayāna Dharma? As I view it, the wisdom of the Hīnayāna is subtle and shallow, like a blind person unable to distinguish whether the faculties of all sentient beings are sharp or dull.' At that time, Vimalakīrti immediately entered samādhi, causing this monk to recognize his own past lives: that he had planted roots of many virtues in the presence of five hundred buddhas and dedicated them toward anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi.

3.115

[Seng]zhao says: Pure Name, about to open his past resolve and bring about his original intention, therefore used his power of samādhi to cause the monks temporarily to recognize their past lives, knowing themselves to have planted roots of many virtues in the presence of five hundred buddhas and to have dedicated these merits toward the unexcelled path. This was their foundation.

3.116

Immediately and clearly, he recovered his original mind. Thereupon the monks bowed their heads and paid homage at Vimalakīrti's feet. Then Vimalakīrti expounded the Dharma for them, so that they would never again regress from anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. I reflect that śrāvakas do not observe people's faculties, and should not expound the Dharma. Therefore, I am not competent to go there and inquire about his illness. The Buddha said to Mahākātyāyana,

3.117

[Kumāra]jīva says: A Brahmin clan name of South India. One who is skilled in understanding the sūtras. [Seng]zhao says: Kātyāyana is a Brahmin clan name of South India; he took his original clan name as his personal name. Among the disciples, he is foremost in understanding meaning.

3.118

"You go to Vimalakīrti to inquire about his illness." Kātyāyana said to the Buddha, "World-Honoured One, I am not capable of going there to inquire about his illness. Why is this? I recall in the past the Buddha briefly expounded the essentials of the Dharma for the monks.

3.119

[Kumāra]jīva says: 'Essentials of the Dharma' refers to all dharmas, which briefly stated are of two kinds: conditioned and unconditioned. Kātyāyana subsequently elaborated: the conditioned refers to the four non-permanences [impermanence, suffering, emptiness, non-self], and the unconditioned refers to the meaning of quiescent extinction. [Seng]zhao says: The Tathāgata constantly expounded briefly that conditioned dharmas are impermanent, suffering, empty, and non-self, and that unconditioned dharmas are quiescently extinct and unmoving. These two statements summarize all dharmas completely, hence he says 'briefly'. [Dao]sheng says: They serve as the ford to awakening, like going out through a door.

3.120

I then subsequently elaborated upon their meaning, namely the meaning of impermanence, the meaning of suffering, the meaning of emptiness, the meaning of non-self, and the meaning of quiescent extinction.

3.121

[Seng]zhao says: The Tathāgata's speech was never with mind, and therefore the Dharma he expounded was never with marks. Kātyāyana did not understand the profound meaning, and so after entering the room he explained them all in terms of marks. How so? The Tathāgata spoke of impermanence to remove permanence, not meaning that there is this impermanence; he spoke of suffering to remove pleasure, not meaning that there is this suffering; he spoke of emptiness to remove reality, not meaning that there is this emptiness; he spoke of non-self to remove self, not meaning that there is this non-self; he spoke of quiescent extinction to remove marks, not meaning that there is this quiescent extinction. These five may be called teaching without words and discourse without marks. Yet Kātyāyana's attainment of the ultimate was not the same, and hearing differs according to one's mind: hearing of impermanence, he grasped its flux; coming to hear of quiescent extinction, he also grasped its mark of extinction. The words were the same but the intention different; this is why Kātyāyana fell into error. [Dao]sheng says: Kātyāyana is foremost in discriminating the Buddha's words. The Buddha having first expounded briefly, Kātyāyana subsequently expounded and recounted it. He preserved the intention and did not dwell on the words, hence it is said that he 'elaborated upon their meaning.'

3.122

At that time, Vimalakīrti came and said to me, 'Hold, Kātyāyana! Do not expound the Dharma of true mark with a mental conduct of arising and cessation.'

3.123

[Kumāra]jīva says: If there is no production and cessation, then there is no place of mental activity; having no place of mental activity leads to the real mark. Because he took production and cessation to be real, [Vimalakīrti] reproved him, saying, 'Do not use a mind of production and cessation to preach the Dharma of the real mark.' This applies generally to refute the five statements below.

[Seng]zhao says: What is the mind? It is generated by delusive characteristics. What is mental activity? It is the designation for constructed functioning. Where there is a form, there must be a shadow; where there are characteristics, there must be a mind. Because there is no form, there is no shadow; because there are no characteristics, there is no mind. That being so, the mind transforms along with affairs, and activity arises because of functioning. Seeing dharmas produce and cease, the mind therefore has production and cessation; awakening to dharmas as unproduced, the mind therefore has no production and cessation. When Kātyāyana heard the meaning of impermanence, he thought dharmas possess characteristics of production and cessation. Because dharmas possess characteristics of production and cessation, his mind was affected as a shadow or echo to share in production and cessation. The real mark is profound, wondrous, and entirely beyond ordinary realms; it is not what can be known by a mind that conceives existence, nor is it what the eloquent can speak of. How could one wish to preach it with a mind and mental activity of production and cessation?

[Dao]sheng says: Since the Buddha praised Kātyāyana as foremost in skillfully distinguishing meanings, how could he have made an error? It is spoken with respect to those who cling to his words, and therefore there is a shortcoming. What the Buddha and Kātyāyana illuminated was the same, yet when it came to those who did not penetrate it and grasped at it, it inevitably became different. And while the Buddha had no reason to incur reproof, Kātyāyana had the occasion of receiving interrogation—what was the reason for this? The Buddha took the exhaustion of principle as primary, and his words were bound to penetrate comprehensively. Kātyāyana had not yet reached the ultimate, and there could be divergence from the purport; thus one could take occasion through him to disparage their shortcomings. Impermanence means change leading to cessation. Suffering means losing what one loves. Emptiness means it is not one's own possession. Non-self means there is no master over it. Quiescent extinction means the absence of these four. That being so, the four are repulsive dharmas, and their absence is the delightful principle. When we trace their origin, the five were originally words used to express the reality of the principle; yet to think that it is exhausted in the realm of production and cessation is merely what the mind practices. Because the monks practiced what the mind practices, they were not liberated; only when one transcends and awakens to its purport is one right.

3.124

'Kātyāyana! That all dharmas ultimately are not produced and do not cease is the meaning of impermanence.

3.125

[Kumāra]jīva says: Whenever emptiness is spoken of, impermanence is spoken of first; impermanence is the initial gateway to emptiness. The initial gateway is called impermanence, and the ultimate is called emptiness. Although their purport is the same, they differ in depth according to their subtlety and coarseness. Why do we say this? When speaking of impermanence, one says that thought-moment after thought-moment does not abide; if it does not abide, one then binds it to abiding through existence. Although this eliminates prolonged abiding, it does not yet clarify non-abiding; this is merely coarse impermanence, not yet having reached the ultimate. Now, if this single thought-moment is made to be bound to abiding, then subsequent ones should also abide. If it abides now and abides later, then from beginning to end there would be no change; that there is no change from beginning to end is, in terms of facts, not the case. It is precisely because when it abides it does not abide that it goes toward cessation. That abiding is non-abiding is true impermanence. Originally, abiding was taken to be existence; now that there is non-abiding, there is no existence, and having no existence is ultimate emptiness. Ultimate emptiness is the wondrous purport of impermanence; hence it is said that ultimate emptiness is the meaning of impermanence. Because Kātyāyana had not exhausted it yet took it to be the ultimate, he brought upon himself the reproof of false conceptualisation.

[Seng]zhao says: This discerns the Tathāgata's original intention in his brief preaching. The Hīnayāna contemplates the production and cessation of dharmas as the meaning of impermanence; the Mahāyāna takes non-production and non-cessation as the meaning of impermanence. The name 'impermanence' is the same, yet the profound purport is transcendentally distinct. Its path is empty and subtle, certainly not what ordinary sentiments can measure; the one who wondrously grasped its purport was the Pure Name himself.

[Dao]sheng says: Speaking of impermanence is based on verifying it through the cessation of affairs. If the end indeed has cessation, could the beginning be otherwise? If the beginning is indeed so, then production is not fixed. If production is not fixedly produced, what cessation could be fixed? Since production and cessation are already not fixed, where can the true substance lie? Deducing that having nowhere to lie is the principle—this is the reality of all dharmas. If reality takes non-production and non-cessation as its meaning, how could this not be where impermanence resides? That being so, although impermanence clarifies that permanence is non-existent, it also expresses that there is no impermanence. 'Ultimate' means it cannot be otherwise.

3.126

Penetrating through the five grasped aggregates as empty and without arising is the meaning of suffering.

3.127

[Kumāra]jīva says: Impermanence destroys dharmas, which is why there is suffering. If impermanence is coarse, then its destruction is also coarse; if its destruction is coarse, it is not the ultimate of suffering. Now, wondrous impermanence leaves no dharma undestroyed; if no dharma is undestroyed, then dharmas cannot be destroyed, which is the utmost of suffering; dharmas cannot be apprehended, which is the utmost of emptiness. Contemplating from the standpoint of non-existence, there is no destruction and no suffering; going from existence to dispersal, this is why the meaning of suffering arises.

[Seng]zhao says: The five contaminated aggregates, being attached to and stained by saṃsāra, are called the grasped aggregates. The Hīnayāna takes the arising of the grasped aggregates and the consequent generation of all sufferings as the meaning of suffering. The Mahāyāna penetrates that the grasped aggregates, internally and externally, are constantly empty and originally without arising—who then produces suffering? This is the true meaning of suffering.

[Dao]sheng says: As a matter of fact, suffering is formed through assembly. How could what is formed through assembly truly exist? Therefore it is said that the emptiness of the five grasped aggregates is the meaning of suffering. The five grasped aggregates are the basis of suffering. Impermanence traces production down to cessation; its affairs are not uniform, and it applies generally to both contaminated and uncontaminated; therefore it is said of all dharmas. Suffering, in its very substance being non-existent in meaning, arises internally; furthermore, those who have attained the uncontaminated do not incur suffering through losing what is grasped, so it applies only to the grasped aggregates. 'Penetrating through': impermanence is verified based on the end, so it merely says 'ultimately'; suffering takes emptiness as its substance, so it says 'penetrating through'. 'Without arising': impermanence clarifies rootless transformation, its principle lying in production; suffering speaks of dharmas of provisional assembly, which is why it is paired with arising.

3.128

That all dharmas are definitively non-existent is the meaning of emptiness.

3.129

[Kumāra]jīva says: Originally, emptiness was spoken of in order to dispel existence, not that existence is removed while emptiness is retained. If existence is removed while emptiness is retained, that is not what is meant by emptiness; only when both dharmas are entirely exhausted is it the meaning of emptiness.

[Seng]zhao says: The Hīnayāna contemplates that dharmas are conditioned arisings lacking a true master inside as the meaning of emptiness. Although it can contemplate emptiness, it is unable to completely obliterate emptiness; hence it is not definitive. The Mahāyāna, when in existence, is not existent, and when in emptiness, is not empty; there is no principle it does not exhaust, which is why it is the definitive meaning of emptiness.

[Dao]sheng says: Deluded people all take all dharmas as possessions of the self. Since the principle is suffering, affairs do not obey oneself; if they do not obey oneself, they are not what one can preserve; if what is preserved is not the self, that [possession] must definitely not exist. Existence is indeed existence, yet is said to be non-existence; non-existence is indeed non-existence, so how could it exist? This complete exhaustion of both non-existence and non-non-existence is therefore the meaning of emptiness.

3.130

Being non-dual with regard to self and non-self is the meaning of non-self.

3.131

[Kumāra]jīva says: If one removes the self and has non-self, one is still not free from the self. How do we know this? Whenever one speaks of a self, it is a master. The sūtra says there are twenty-two faculties; the twenty-two faculties are also twenty-two masters. Although one says there is no true ruler, there are masters of function and operation; this is still abolishing a master while establishing a master. Therefore, only when one is non-dual with regard to self and non-self is it non-self.

[Seng]zhao says: The Hīnayāna takes clinging to the self as an encumbrance, and therefore esteems non-self. Once non-self is esteemed, it forms a duality with the self. The Mahāyāna equalises the purports of right and wrong, the two being not distinct, as the meaning of non-self.

[Dao]sheng says: Since the principle does not obey the self and is empty, how could there be a self that can control it? Then there is non-self. Non-self originally meant having no self within saṃsāra, not that there is no self of the buddha-nature.

3.132

That dharmas are originally not burning and now have no cessation is the meaning of quiescent extinction.

3.133

[Kumāra]jīva says: This clarifies the meaning of nirvāṇa. Because saṃsāra burns out, there is cessation. If saṃsāra is not burning, there is no nirvāṇa cessation. The cessation of nirvāṇa is true quiescent extinction.

[Seng]zhao says: The Hīnayāna takes the three realms as blazing fiercely, and therefore extinguishes them to seek the unconditioned. When the blazing is manifested, the name 'extinction' is born. The Mahāyāna contemplates that dharmas are originally not burning; what is there to extinguish now? Not burning and not extinguishing is true quiescent extinction.

[Dao]sheng says: Since dharmas are impermanent, suffering, and empty, awakening to this leads to eternal exhaustion in nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa means not burning again; not burning means that affairs are tranquil. One's ultimate attainment of quiescent extinction is because originally there was no real burning. Since burning is not real, could extinction alone be real?

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注維摩詰經 — Classical Chinese