成唯識論演祕 6

English (machine translation) 6

Language: English

6.2

The Treatise states: 'The Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra allows that the mind appears like two...'

According to the translation of the treatise made under the Sui, Fascicle 5 states: 'Grasper and grasped, / these two are merely light of the mind. / Light of attachment and light of faith: / in the two lights there are no dual dharmas.'

6.4

The explanation says: One who seeks vijñapti-mātra should know that grasper and grasped—these two—are merely the radiance of the mind. Likewise, the radiance of afflictions such as greed, and the radiance of wholesome phenomena such as faith—these two radiances also lack both defiled and pure phenomena [as separate entities]. Why? Because apart from the radiance of the mind there are no distinct defiled and pure phenomena such as greed.

6.5

Carefully evaluated: Relying on this, the Commentary says that the grasper and grasped are called 'appearing like two', which is consistent with the text and reasoning.

6.6

On the Treatise stating: 'conjunction is of distinct natures, not of its own nature'.

6.7

According to the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya: 'Conjunction of concordant functioning means that the citta and caitasikas function together in concordance with respect to a single ālambana. This conjunction further has multiple senses: it means conjunction of distinct natures, not of its own nature; just as citta is not conjoined with another citta, and feeling is not conjoined with feeling.' What is explained in the Yogācārabhūmi has already been cited above.

6.8

On the Treatise stating: 'Further, how could it say […] as with the sunlight,' etc.

6.9

According to the seventh fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra: 'Citta and caitasikas arise at the same time, not sequentially; just as the sun and its light exist simultaneously, distinguishing various characteristics.'

6.10

On the Commentary stating: 'They posit that the substance of the six consciousnesses is one,' etc.

6.11

A certain opinion refutes this, saying: 'This is not necessarily so. Their intention is merely to say that being cognitions they are identical, but sequentially differentiated into six consciousnesses.'

6.12

Carefully evaluated: If there are six consciousnesses, how could the simile be established? Because the substance of the four aggregates that are the illustrated subject is posited as one. If they are identical in cognition, differentiated into six according to stages, but in reality their substances are distinct, then the aggregates compared would have the same meaning of aggregate and be differentiated into four according to stages, so their substances ought to be distinct respectively, just like the consciousnesses that serve as the simile. Because of this error, they posit that their substance is one. Even if this was not their original position, they modified their thesis in response to the preceding objection, not to mention that sūtras and treatises explain the poem of one citta.

6.13

On the Commentary stating: 'The sūtra speaks of the simile of the lamp's light.'

6.14

There are briefly two interpretations: First, it says that the light of the lamp and the wick illustrate simultaneous citta and caitasikas; second, it says that just as when many lamps are lit their lights blend together, the blending together of the citta and caitasikas is also like this.

6.15

Carefully evaluated: The former interpretation is superior. Why is this so? The Yogācārabhūmi says: 'Furthermore, another sūtra says: Such phenomena are always harmonious together. And the World-Honoured Buddha, wishing to establish this meaning of harmony, taught the simile of the lamp's light.' If it is according to the latter interpretation, the simile would not be pervasive, because the lighting of lamps may be one or many, and is indeterminate; whereas the lamp's light and the wick necessarily accompany each other, exhausting the meaning of harmony.

6.16

On the Treatise stating: 'Conditions refers to conditions such as attention,' etc.

6.17

A certain opinion says: 'However, saying that apprehending form must depend on light is stated in terms of vases, potsherds, and the like that are obstructed by darkness. In truth, the eye is also able to see dark form; moreover, nocturnal creatures do not depend on light to arise, and aquatic creatures do not wait for space to produce [sight]; furthermore, within obstructed form such as lapis lazuli and sphāṭika, space is also not depended upon, and when the divine eye gives rise to consciousness, it depends on neither space nor light.'

6.18

Carefully evaluated: Perhaps nocturnal creatures also wait for light and the like. Although it is darkness relative to humans and the like, why could it not be light relative to owls and the like? Just as four views differ regarding a single object. When humans view forms beyond the obstruction of lapis lazuli, that lapis lazuli must be distant from the eye before they can see it; if it is close to the eye and there is no space between, they cannot see it either. Speaking from this, it still waits for space. The case of fish and the like is also entirely so.

6.19

On the Treatise stating: 'the body of the five consciousnesses inwardly relies on the fundamental consciousness,' etc.

6.20

Question: In terms of what meaning is 'internal' and 'external' now explained?

6.21

Answer: There are two explanations. One says: In terms of the twelve āyatanas, because the fundamental consciousness is subsumed under the manāyatana, it is called internal; attention is of the dharmāyatana, and therefore called external. Second: Only the eighth consciousness, because it is the fundamental cause for the arising of seeds and actual manifestations, is solely called internal; all other conditions, not being fundamental, are all called external. The Treatise relies on the latter explanation.

6.22

On the Commentary stating: 'Although it speaks generally of six, the three are remote and the one is proximate.'

6.23

There are two explanations: One says that the same level is called proximate, and a different level is called remote, because the three of eye, ear, and body are phenomena of lower levels; second, it says that those ceasing earlier are called remote, and those ceasing later are called proximate, because by being born in that heaven the four consciousnesses do not arise, there being an earlier and a later. The former explanation is correct; the original intention was to show that the consciousnesses that are ceased there are not all of the same level, so the words 'remote and proximate' were set down.

6.24

On the Treatise stating: 'Because the sacred teachings state that in that [state] there are no pravṛtti-vijñānas.'

6.25

Namely, the first fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā says: 'Heaven of non-conception refers to having previously attained the absorption of non-conception here, by which one is subsequently born in the heavenly abode of non-conceptual sentient beings, where there is the nature of the cessation of all citta and caitasikas that do not constantly operate.' Furthermore, the Pañcaskandhaka also says: 'the cessation of citta and caitasikas that do not constantly operate.' The Abhidharmasamuccaya is also identical.

6.26

On the Treatise stating: 'Because defilements that moisten birth must arise.'

6.27

According to the fifty-ninth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi: 'The linking of existence into continuous succession is briefly of seven kinds: 1. linking of existence through active entanglements and latent tendencies, namely ordinary beings; 2. linking of existence solely through latent tendencies, namely those who have seen the footsteps of the noble ones; 3. linking of existence entering the womb with clear comprehension, namely wheel-turning kings; 4. linking of existence entering and staying [in the womb] with clear comprehension, namely pratyekabuddhas; 5. linking of existence without losing correct mindfulness in all states, namely bodhisattvas; 6. linking of existence induced by karma, namely except for bodhisattvas; 7. linking of existence induced by knowledge, namely bodhisattvas.' Furthermore, the fifth fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya says: 'The initial moment of continuous succession of intermediate existence is exclusively unobscured avyākṛta, because it is subsumed under maturation. From this point onwards, it is wholesome, unwholesome, or avyākṛta, according to what is appropriate, excluding the mind at death.' Because the mind at death in intermediate existence is always defiled, one knows that intermediate existence does have a mind.

6.28

On the Commentary stating: 'If not, then the next […] to the first thought-moment of citta.'

6.29

Namely, the initial moment of fundamental existence is called the second thought-moment; in contrast to the preceding existence at birth, it receives the name of 'second', which indicates what is excluded.

6.30

On the Commentary stating: 'Otherwise […] because of having mind.'

6.31

This shows the reason for the exclusion: because for those born of eggs, when initially in the womb, there is no mental consciousness.

6.32

On the Treatise stating: 'namely able to induce […] the maturation result.'

6.33

Question: Regarding the six maturation consciousnesses at the initial birth in that heaven, between the two minds—having or lacking [mind]—which mind is able to bring it about?

6.34

Answer: Bringing about total retribution and particular retribution is called the condition of saṃskāra, and therefore the karma that induces the eighth [consciousness] also brings about that. If the initial six consciousnesses are wholesome and the like, this question and answer are dispensed with.

6.35

Question: Relying on the Hīnayāna school, when dying from there they are born into desire [realm]; the desire realm has five destinies, into which destiny are they born?

6.36

Answer: According to the Mahāvibhāṣā, there are three explanations in total: some say they are definitely born into hell; some say they are definitely born into bad destinies; the definitive statement is that they are definitely born into the desire realm, but the specific place is indeterminate.

6.37

On the Treatise stating: 'A certain opinion […] because of being ultimate.'

6.38

Relying on the Sarvāstivāda doctrine, the twelfth fascicle of the Nyāyānusāra states that it arises throughout both the desire and form realms. Within the form realm there are two explanations: one says it is only in the lower three dhyānas, not in the fourth, so that cause and effect are not in extreme proximity; another says it is also in the fourth dhyāna, excluding the heaven of non-conception, because having already been born in that heaven one experiences its result. The Abhidharmakośa is identical. In fascicle 152 of the Mahāvibhāṣā there are three different explanations: one says only human beings in the desire realm, because their minds are keen and have the power of instruction. The latter two explanations are identical to the two meanings regarding the form realm in the Nyāyānusāra; what the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya says is identical to the first master's explanation in the Mahāvibhāṣā.

6.39

On the Commentary stating: 'Although knowing that freedom from attachment is so in all levels,' etc.

6.40

This refutes an external objection. The intention of the external objection is: 'In the fourth dhyāna, all levels are alike in being free from the attachment to Śubhakṛtsna. When one regresses and re-attains the fourth dhyāna, attachment to the heaven of non-conception must also be abandoned. When later born, why are they not right in that heaven instead of abiding in the lower three places?' The Commentary's intended reply is: 'If freedom from attachment being the same caused them to be born there, then that heaven should not have nine abodes, because the freedom from attachment is the same. Since the nine abodes are distinct, it is clear that while freedom from attachment is the same, cultivation through perfuming is different. Although they re-attain the fourth dhyāna, they have not yet had the leisure to cultivate the absorption of non-conception before dying; so what fault is there in being born in the lower three?'

6.41

On the Commentary stating: 'Another interpretation […] it is called regression.'

6.42

Question: Can it be that just by being free from lower attachments one attains that absorption? If that were so, what fault would there be? If that were so, when first attaining the fourth dhyāna, one should attain non-conception.

6.43

Answer: When first attaining the fourth dhyāna, because one has not previously attained that absorption of non-conception, one must rely on cultivation through perfuming before later attaining it; regression is due to having attained it previously, so they are not analogous.

6.44

Question: After regressing from the fourth dhyāna, one again directs attention and feels revulsion toward attachment to Śubhakṛtsna before being able to induce it; why would re-attaining non-conception not be like that? If it also requires cultivation, and before having cultivated it one's life ends and one is born in the lower three heavens, by what reasoning is this disallowed?

6.45

Answer: It is because one is certain to successfully cultivate it in this life before life ends, so one is not born in the lower [levels].

6.46

Question: Between the two explanations in the Commentary, which master is superior?

6.47

Answer: A certain opinion decides that the latter interpretation is superior, without clarifying the reason.

6.48

Carefully evaluated: The former interpretation should be the sound one. Although the latter opinion says that one is certain to attain that absorption of non-conception in this life, there is no textual evidence; and if one does not attain it, what reasoning would follow?

6.49

On the Treatise stating: 'Because of revulsion toward conception […] it is not something initiated by noble ones.'

6.50

According to the fifty-third fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi: 'The preceding absorption of non-conception is not entered by trainees, nor by beyond-trainees. Why? Because in this state there is no functioning of wisdom; above this there are superior peaceful abidings and births. Furthermore, this absorption cannot attain superior wholesome phenomena that have not yet been attained, because it is an abode of delay, deception, and illusion.'

6.51

The explanation says: Like seeking the absorption of cessation, one gives rise to anāsrava wisdom; non-conception is not like this, so it says 'no wisdom'. Because the absorption of cessation is above non-conception, it is called 'above this there is a superior peaceful abiding'. Above, there are four abodes of the formless realm where one can be born, which is called 'birth'; alternatively, the five pure abodes are places of birth for noble ones, which is called 'birth'. Just as the arhat must rely on the absorption of cessation to realize [nirvāṇa] without remainder, non-conception is not so, hence it says 'cannot attain superior wholesome phenomena'. Alternatively, in the preparatory stage prior to entering cessation, one enters various sāsrava absorptions of the form and formless realms, which is called 'attaining wholesome phenomena'; non-conception is not so. Due to these many reasons, the noble ones do not enter it.

6.52

On the Treatise stating: 'causing the non-constantly operating and constantly operating defiled citta and caitasikas to cease.'

6.53

The first fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā says: 'all citta and caitasikas that do not constantly operate, and a portion of citta and caitasikas that constantly operate, cease.' The first fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the Pañcaskandhaka, and the like are identical; their difference from vijñapti-mātra is as distinguished in the Commentary.

6.54

On the Treatise stating: 'When this absorption is initially cultivated,' etc.

6.55

Before the seventh bhūmi, the attainment by the two vehicles and the like is called initial. Therefore the twelfth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi says: 'Furthermore, how does one enter absorptions by skipping? Namely, precisely because of having attained complete purity, from the first dhyāna one immediately skips into the third dhyāna, from the third immediately skips into the sphere of boundless space, from the sphere of space immediately skips into the sphere of nothingness, and so forth in reverse skipping likewise. Because it is extremely distant, none can skip past a third attainment, with the sole exception of the Tathāgata and great bodhisattvas who have transcended the second asaṃkhyeya, because they enter various absorptions at will.'

6.56

The explanation says: Saying 'purity' reveals the preparatory practice of skipping and freedom from defilement, etc. 'None can skip past a third' clarifies that none can skip two and reach the third; the rest of the text can be understood. And the Commentary says: 'Because one can only enter by skipping one level of anāsrava'; one who has not attained mastery, according to the Yogācārabhūmi, only skips one level. Therefore, when one who skips is about to enter the absorption of cessation, they gradually skip one level from the first dhyāna up to the sphere of nothingness, and then skip the sphere of neither-conception-nor-non-conception to enter the absorption of cessation, which is called skipping one level.

6.57

If so, how can it be said that one enters the absorption of cessation by relying on neither-conception-nor-non-conception?

6.58

Answer: It is stated in terms of non-skipping, or in terms of the seeds of neither-conception-nor-non-conception; the two explanations are as in the Commentary.

6.59

On the Treatise stating: 'Contemplative anāsrava'.

6.60

An opinion states: the Commentary sets aside fundamental wisdom (mūla-jñāna). The present interpretation inclusively sets aside fundamental [wisdom] and subsequent [attainment wisdom] (pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna), because within subsequent [wisdom] there is also a path of abandonment. The phrase 'roaming and observing' sets aside fundamental [wisdom] entirely and the path of abandonment within subsequent [wisdom]. Moreover, fundamental wisdom also has roaming and observing: if one says it does not, could it be that all minds of fundamental [wisdom] are able to abandon afflictions? Just as those in the stage of no-more-learning (aśaikṣa) do not abandon afflictions. For those from the eighth ground onward whose minds are purely undefiled, could it be that in every single thought-moment they are able to abandon afflictions? Therefore, what is now stated is that both fundamental and subsequent [wisdom] have roaming and observing, and there is no contradiction in their serving as the preparatory application (prayogāvasthā) for entry. All treatises state that it is due to two conditions; however, for an initial practitioner, it may be subsequent [wisdom] alone.

6.61

Examination: Now, relying on doctrine and reason, we take the Commentary as correct. Furthermore, the designation 'roaming and observing' is not exclusively obtained by not abandoning afflictions. Even if it were so, what fault would there be? If it were so, the Buddha-stage should be solely roaming and observing, because [a Buddha] does not abandon afflictions. From this, it is known that if one does not abandon afflictions and does not contemplate the principle (tattva), it is collectively named 'roaming and observing'; therefore, in the Buddha-stage there are states that are not roaming and observing. Since roaming and observing is not subsumed under fundamental wisdom, it is clear that the preparatory application of the concentration must be subsequent-attainment wisdom. Even if fundamental wisdom were what is induced by preparatory application, what fault would there be?

6.62

Answer: Since it is called 'preparatory application', how could fundamental wisdom have the aspect (ākāra) of preparatory application? Even upon reaching the fruit of Buddhahood, although it arises spontaneously (anābhoga), one must still enter based on the characteristics of cessation; contemplating the characteristics of cessation is not the function of fundamental wisdom. Were it not so, there would be the fault of the two causes not being completely revealed. If one says that the two causes are stated based on the causal stage, this is also impermissible; why would the teaching not discuss the concentration of cessation of the fruitional stage? Nor is there any text deciding that the two are solely in the causal stage. What fault is there if, based on the fruition of mastery (vibhūtvaphala), one objectifies the characteristics of cessation spontaneously? If one says that relying on those characteristics of cessation is itself fundamental wisdom, this is also incorrect; for the Śraddhotpāda(?)-sūtra [or *Śreṣṭhila-sūtra] says 'correctly reflecting on the signless realm', and 'correctly reflecting' is stated in all texts to be subsequent-attainment wisdom. How much more so when below it states that one must realize the two emptinesses, because it is induced by subsequent-attainment [wisdom] as appropriate—how could one forcibly harmonize them according to personal inclination? By this reasoning, it is determined that one relies solely on subsequent-attainment [wisdom] as the preparatory application.

6.63

Question: Since the Peak of Existence (bhavāgra) lacks fundamental wisdom, how can it have subsequent-attainment wisdom?

6.64

Answer: There are three explanations. One says it is induced by the fundamental wisdom of the sphere of nothingness (ākiṃcanyāyatana). The second says it comes after the fundamental wisdom in the first dhyāna. The third says subsequent wisdom is born after fundamental wisdom; if one does not realize the real, one cannot clearly understand the conventional, so it need not arise directly in the immediately contiguous moment following it to be so. Hence, that stage has subsequent-attainment wisdom; the wise should reflect upon this. Furthermore, according to the twelfth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi, one enters based on two causes; that treatise asks: by what expedient means does one enter this attainment (samāpatti)?

6.65

Answer: If noble ones have already abandoned desire for the sphere of nothingness, they enter the concentration either relying on the marks of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana) or relying on the marks of cessation. Entering the concentration relying on the marks of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception means generating deep revulsion and relinquishment toward what is above this. Because the cognitive objects toward which one progresses in the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception are all extinguished, the mind then becomes tranquil and ceased. Entering the concentration relying on the marks of cessation is also like this.

6.66

Explanation: Taking the cittas and caittas of neither-perception-nor-non-perception as objects, one generates a mind of revulsion and enters that concentration; this is said in terms of initial cultivation. 'Relying on cessation' means spontaneously taking the cittas and caittas of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception as objects and generating revulsion and so forth; being similar to the former, it says 'is also like this'; this is said in terms of long practice. Another explanation: first, one takes conditioned formations as objects and generates a mind with the notion of revulsion and relinquishment; later, one takes the unconditioned as object and generates a mind with the notion of revulsion and relinquishment. The meaning of revulsion and relinquishment being identical, it says 'is also like this'; this is also distinguished in terms of initial and long-standing cultivation.

6.67

Commentary: 'Because having mind of the lower grade is superior (勝)'.

6.68

The character 'superior' (勝) is suspected to be an error and should be the character 'condition' (緣). The mindless [attainment] employs that [state] with mind as a condition, and only then arises. Furthermore, the phrasing is also abbreviated; it can be understood upon reflection.

6.69

Commentary: 'Its essence is precisely the undefiled seeds' (anāsrava-bīja).

6.70

Because it is established based on undefiled seeds, it is called 'undefiled seeds'.

6.71

Commentary: 'Not associated' (asamprayukta).

6.72

Because it is neither citta nor caitta, it is not associated.

6.73

Treatise: 'Having already attained mastery' and so forth.

6.74

Question: According to the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra, those who transcend attainments do so with a mind of the desire realm and so forth, and are able to enter and emerge from the concentration of cessation and so forth; in the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle twelve, only from the eighth ground onward and the Tathāgatas are they able to transcend concentrations. From the eighth ground onward, the manas is purely undefiled; how could it give rise to a desire-realm mind?

6.75

Answer: The correct harmonization is as in the Commentary. Another says: since the sūtra states that one gives rise to a desire-realm mind, one clearly knows that on the eighth ground one is able to give rise to the defiled; the statement that it is undefiled is spoken based on the majority.

6.76

Examination: If from the eighth ground onward one allows the sixth consciousness to give rise to the defiled, then the seventh consciousness's self-grasping (ātmagrāha) would be active; how then could the Yogācārabhūmi state that 'the eighth ground and above are only constituted of the transforming consciousnesses (pravṛtti-vijñāna), and do not constitute the ālaya'? If this were based on the majority, the aśaikṣas of the two vehicles should also be the same, because it is the same phrase. Furthermore, the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra says 'at the non-retrogressing stage, one attains the abhijñā of the destruction of defilements (āsravakṣayābhijñā)', because those defilements never arise again. If one allows them to arise again, would that not contradict the sūtra? If based on the majority, then the seventh ground should be called 'destruction of defilements' and 'abandoning the ālaya', because for the most part they do not arise. If one says that the seventh ground is inferior when compared to the eighth, then the eighth should also be inferior to the subsequent grounds, and only the ninth and above should be called abandoning grasping and attaining the abhijñā of the destruction of defilements. If one says that the eighth is non-retrogressing so the seventh cannot serve as an analogy, since both equally admit the activity of self-grasping and so forth, [the eighth] should also be like the seventh and not be called non-retrogressing. If based on superiority and inferiority, again only the ninth and above ought to be called non-retrogressing. From this it is definitively known that defilements do not arise. The Commentary's harmonization is excellent. Now I offer an additional explanation: the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra's statement 'giving rise to a desire-realm mind' applies to both the real and the simulated. That sūtra only states that bodhisattvas are able to transcend all attainments and so on, and does not state that it is exclusively the non-retrogressing stage; therefore, across all grounds they are able to transcend concentrations, according to whether it is real or simulated. The Yogācārabhūmi is merely spoken from the standpoint of the person with mastery who is purely undefiled, so there is also no contradiction regarding the desire-realm mind.

6.77

Question: Citta and caitta are inherently distinguished by their realm-bindings (dhātu-pratisaṃyukta); based on what can one know that being similar to that [realm's mind] justifies establishing that name?

6.78

Answer: According to the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle sixty-nine: 'Furthermore, immediately following an unmanifested-indeterminate [mind] of the desire realm, a wholesome mind of the form realm arises; like the form-realm fruitional transformative mind (nirmāṇa-citta) of the desire realm, immediately following a wholesome mind of the form realm, this unmanifested-indeterminate mind of the desire realm arises. Furthermore, stating that this mind belongs to the desire realm should be known to be because it is of the same category as that reflected image (pratibimba), not because of its own nature.' Since it says 'because it is of the same category as that reflected image, not because of its own nature', how could it be a 'real desire-realm mind'? If it were a real desire-realm mind, why would it need to say 'of that category, not of its own nature'? Since the treatise itself explains that it is of the category of the reflected image and not of its own nature, it is clear that the transformative mind is called 'desire' because it resembles desire; were it not so, why would it say 'of the category of the reflected image, not of its own nature'? Since this is a form realm [mind] resembling the desire realm, what fault is there for a bodhisattva's resembling desire to be named 'desire'?

6.79

Commentary: 'The second explanation up to: still taking the stage of neither-perception as the basis' and so forth.

6.80

Question: Then aśaikṣas and so on should constantly abide in this, because seeds of neither-perception exist at all times.

6.81

Answer: Only when one has previously attained that concentration and later another concentration-mind induces the mindless state is this concentration established based on those seeds; how could merely possessing the seeds bring about the attainment of the concentration?

6.82

Question: According to those who transcend concentrations, in their persons there are by principle seeds of revulsion and non-revulsion; because at the time of initial practice they were weary of toil and concern, based on what is it established now?

6.83

Answer: In the causal stage, it can generally be established based on past seeds of revulsion; in the fruitional stage it is not so, because having attained the superior one abandons the inferior, and there are no seeds of revulsion.

6.84

Commentary: 'Having no aspect (ākāra) of progressing or ceasing'.

6.85

Having no progression is unlike those in training (śaikṣa); having no cessation is unlike those beyond training (aśaikṣa).

6.86

Commentary: 'Unlike other seeds, because it is not ceasing'.

6.87

This explains an external objection. The external objection can be understood. This discusses that this concentration possesses the capacity to stop the mind and so forth from arising, which is called 'not ceasing', unlike the aśaikṣa whose training has reached its limit, which is called 'ceasing'.

6.88

Commentary: 'Pertains to both the conditioned and unconditioned; within the conditioned, it pertains to both the defiled and undefiled'.

6.89

This reveals the comprehensiveness or restriction of the dharmas covered by those in training and those beyond training.

6.90

Treatise: 'Later in the upper two realms ... because of mind-made gods (manomaya-deva)' and so forth.

6.91

Question: For those before the seventh ground who have not undergone transformative death (pariṇāmikī cyutiḥ), there is neither principle nor teaching barring them from traversing back and forth between the two realms; why can it not arise later in the desire realm?

6.92

Answer: This merely discusses the two vehicles and does not concern bodhisattvas; for this reason it only cites the Udāyi-sūtra as proof. The Commentary relies on this principle to say 'it does not arise in the desire [realm]'. The affair of Udāyin is as stated in the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle one hundred fifty-three: 'As the sūtra says, the venerable Śāriputra addressed the assembly of monks: "One who is endowed with morality, concentration, and wisdom is able to enter repeatedly into the concentration of the cessation of perception and feeling (saṃjñāvedayitanirodha-samāpatti). If, in the present life or at the time of death, he is unable to realize the Tathāgata's noble aim, then after death, having arisen from the gods of solid food (kavaḍīkārāhāra), he is born among the mind-made gods; there he is again able to enter and emerge repeatedly from the concentration of the cessation of perception and feeling. There is such a possibility; one should know it in accordance with reality." The venerable Udāyin, sitting in that assembly, said to the venerable Śāriputra: "That a monk born among the gods with mind-made bodies is able to enter and emerge repeatedly from the concentration of the cessation of perception and feeling—there is no such possibility." A second and a third time he spoke likewise. The Buddha asked Udāyin: "What do you take to be the mind-made gods? Do you not intend to say that the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception is mind-made?" He replied: "It is so!" The World-Honoured One told him: "You are a foolish person, blind and lacking the eye of wisdom; how could you engage in debate on the profound Abhidharma with a senior monk?"' It is detailed as stated there.

6.93

Question: According to the cited sūtra, it does not state that one can give rise to the concentration of cessation in the formless realm; what makes it conclusive proof?

6.94

Answer: Because the sūtra is esoteric, the explanations of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna each differ, and their adducing of proof also diverges. Therefore, the Sarvāstivāda school says: the mind-made gods belong to the form realm, which is why the Buddha rebuked what the novice said; whereas the Sautrāntika claims that it encompasses the formless realm, and in the formless realm one also gives rise to the concentration of cessation. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle one hundred fifty-two, says: 'The Dārṣṭāntikas say that one endowed with morality, concentration, and wisdom gives rise to it from this formless realm.' There is no fault. Another opinion states: the Mahāyānists say that Śāriputra stated that both the form and formless realms are called mind-made gods and both can give rise to the concentration; therefore, the Buddha rebuked Udāyin, saying: 'The two fruits and eight grounds, as stated by Śāriputra, are all able to manifest it; why do you now take only the ground of neither-perception as the mind-made gods and say it does not arise?' Hence it is now cited to prove that the concentration arises in the formless realm.

6.95

Examination: Now observing the treatise's intention, it cites the sūtra to prove that the form and formless realms are mind-made gods; once mind-made gods are established, this can then prove entry into concentration in the formless realm. What is the reasoning of the proof?

6.96

Answer: If the formless realm were not the mind-made gods, it would not have been appropriate for the novice to challenge Śāriputra, nor should the Buddha have said: 'Do you not consider the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception to be mind-made?' According to the words of rebuke and challenge between the Buddha and the novice, it is clear that it was already accepted that mind-made gods encompass the formless realm. Next, proving the concentration: Śāriputra merely said that mind-made gods can give rise to it again; because his words made no distinction, it therefore encompasses the formless realm. If one says that Śāriputra intended only the form realm, this is also incorrect, because the text does not say so. Even if it were so, since the text does not exclude it, one clearly knows that his intent was merely for that single occasion. The Buddha's rebuke merely stated that he did not grasp the venerable one's intent, not that the formless realm lacks the meaning of being able to arise. For this reason, the author of the treatise, relying on the text and deducing the principle, cites it as proof.

6.97

Commentary: 'From "not a person of undetermined nature" up to "stated in terms of the stage of non-remainder"' and so forth.

6.98

According to that treatise: Just as a śrāvaka who directs themselves toward bodhi enters parinirvāṇa by mounting the unsurpassable vehicle through encountering conditions, in the same way, even if such a bodhisattva were abandoned by the Tathāgatas and bodhisattvas, and due to being abandoned were to meet with extremely weighty conditions for seeking parinirvāṇa through an inferior vehicle, they should enter parinirvāṇa by mounting the inferior vehicle; however, there is no place and no possibility that the Buddhas and bodhisattvas would heedlessly abandon them in such a way, and with respect to them there is definitely no such thing.

6.99

On the Commentary's statement: "What difference would there be from a person of determinate nature?"

6.100

If someone of indeterminate nature were to permanently enter [the nirvāṇa] without remainder, what difference would there be between them and one of determinate nature?

6.101

On the Commentary's statement: "Or else this passage differs from [fascicle] fifty-six," and so forth:

6.102

The intention of [fascicle] fifty-six is based on all being able to arise once [the ālaya-vijñāna] has been established; this [passage] is based on a partial aspect. That treatise says: as for its arising in the continuum of an ārya, spanning both those in training (śaikṣa) and beyond training (aśaikṣa), it arises first here [in the desire realm] and later manifests again in the form realm, because it only manifests based on a physical support; this is based on the teaching prior to establishing the ālaya-vijñāna. If it has already been established, it can manifest in all places.

6.103

On the Treatise's statement: "It requires severing [the defilements of] the three realms... because it is brought about by..."

6.104

One opinion says: This is spoken based on wholesome citta and so forth in the Peak of Existence (bhavāgra), meaning that with respect to the mental consciousness in the Peak of Existence, its coarse activity cannot be reviled, subdued, and extinguished; it does not mean subduing defiled citta and caitasikas. Because the defiled dharmas of the Peak of Existence have not been subdued or severed at all, one can still manifest the attainment of extinction (nirodha-samāpatti). The previous treatise also stated: with respect to upper attachment in the Peak of Existence, whether it is subdued or severed is indeterminate. Furthermore, if it were based on defilement, then all the [defilements] severed by seeing in the lower eight stages, as well as the delusion regarding principles severed by cultivation, are also not subdued by worldlings (pṛthagjana) through sāsrava [means].

6.105

We evaluate this as follows: It was originally explained that the attainment of extinction requires severing the afflictions of seeing before it can arise; hence it was said that worldlings cannot subdue and extinguish the afflictions of the path of seeing, to show that they cannot attain it. Now to claim that it means not subduing those wholesome [cittas]—why speak of that? It is completely inconsistent with the intent of the treatise's text. Moreover, when distinguishing the afflictions of seeing, how could one object using the unextinguished afflictions of cultivation in the Peak of Existence? Scrutinizing this makes it laughable. Consider its other errors.

6.106

On the Commentary's statement: "Some say... is able to enter this absorption":

6.107

Question: What is that person's intention?

6.108

Answer: The attainment of extinction is attained in common by the three vehicles, whereas wisdom regarding the emptiness of dharmas belongs only to the Mahāyāna; therefore, they do not accept it.

6.109

On the Treatise's statement: "Only non-returners... can attain this absorption":

6.110

The third fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: Furthermore, stating that one enters the attainment of extinction and so forth means that except for Buddhas, solitary buddhas (pratyekabuddha), arhats, non-returners (anāgāmin), and non-retrogressing bodhisattvas and so forth, others cannot enter it.

6.111

On the Treatise's statement: "They are born in the upper eight stages as appropriate," and so forth:

6.112

Question: Being born in the upper eight [stages] as appropriate shows that it is not determined that they attain the fourth dhyāna; does this not contradict the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya? The ninth fascicle of that treatise presents a fourfold proposition, saying: If one has already separated from desire of the form realm, can all enter the tranquil liberation-absorption of the formless realm? If one is able to enter the tranquil liberation-absorption of the formless realm, has everyone already separated from desire of the form realm?

6.113

Answer: The first proposition refers to having separated from desire of the form realm based on threshold concentration (anāgamya-samādhi), yet being unable to enter the tranquil liberation-absorption of the formless realm.

6.114

Explanation: That is, an anāgāmin who does not attain the fundamental absorptions of the form and formless realms can separate from form desire but cannot enter formless absorption. The phrase 'tranquil liberation of the formless realm' refers to formless absorption; it receives the name 'liberation' by separating from suffering, pleasure, and so on; it is not the attainment of extinction. The second proposition refers to āryas who have already attained the fourth dhyāna, who do not seek rebirth in the formless realm, but produce practices of revulsion and turning away from the fourth dhyāna, constantly manifesting them, relinquishing the path of severing fetters, and relying on the path of higher progress, gradually becoming able to enter the tranquil liberation-absorption of the formless realm.

6.115

Explanation: That is, an anāgāmin who relies on the path of six practices, aspiring to the higher and reviling the lower, attains formless absorption without severing defilements of the form realm. The 'path of higher progress' is precisely the path of six practices; in contrast to the previous path of severing, it receives the name 'higher progress'; yet only by being able to enter formless liberation can one enter the attainment of extinction. The third proposition refers to this practitioner who diligently seeks separation from desire, relying on the path of severing fetters, and gradually becomes able to enter the tranquil liberation-absorption of the formless realm. The fourth proposition refers to excluding the above characteristics. The resolution is as reconciled in the Commentary; or, as a Vijñapti-mātra master says: 'I do not take the words of the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā as an authoritative measure (pramāṇa); why use it to raise an objection?'

6.116

On the Commentary's statement: "If so, worldlings should moisten [rebirth] only by seeds":

6.117

The intent of this objection is: When a non-returner subdues active manifestations, they moisten [rebirth] by seeds; worldlings are also like this. Why would they not moisten by seeds? Even if they did, what fault would there be?

6.118

Answer: Then there would be the fault that no worldling could be born into higher realms, because the seeds of the lower stages would not yet be severed.

6.119

On the Commentary's statement: "Active manifestations moisten [rebirth] for worldlings... they should be born into higher realms":

6.120

The objection means: If one says that for worldlings active manifestations moisten [rebirth], then although there are active manifestations below, they do not moisten rebirth in the higher [realms]; for āryas it is said that seeds moisten [rebirth], so although there are seeds below, they do not moisten rebirth in the higher [realms]. The answer is as explained in the Commentary. One opinion explains: For an ārya, seeds properly moisten, so having seeds [below] prevents being born above; for a worldling, the afflictions that properly moisten prevent being born above if not subdued. Those arisen through discrimination and subtle innate ones are not afflictions that properly moisten; hence, though un-subdued, one can be born above. If there are afflictions that properly moisten among those capable of moistening rebirth in the entire realm, they can also moisten rebirth. If there are none that properly moisten, the rest cannot, because they lack support.

6.121

We evaluate this as follows: Are not the greed and so forth associated with the innate self-view of the sixth mental consciousness properly moistening? If you say they are, then since the afflictions that properly moisten are present, how can you say they are absent so that one can be born above? If you say 'they are not', that contradicts various teachings. If you say 'although they are, it is due to lacking the others', this is precisely the Commentary's intent; why bother to say further: 'and one cannot say that subtle innate ones are not properly moistening'?

6.122

On the Commentary's statement: "If subduing the lower eight stages or five stages," and so forth:

6.123

This refers to the previous two masters speaking of subduing the afflictions of eight stages or five stages; compared to the attainment of extinction, they are all called 'lower'. If one subdues eight stages, both kinds of unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta) are non-analytical cessation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha); if one subdues five stages, only the cessation of ideation and sensation does not obtain analytical cessation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), while the unconditioned [state] of immobility is subsumed under analytical cessation, because the afflictions of the lower four stages are all severed. The text of the Commentary is a general summary; it should be understood in this way. Some editions of the Commentary read 'one stage, five stages'; the character 'one' is an error and should be 'eight'. Some base extensive explanations on the character 'one', producing many faults and objections; hence the character 'eight' is correct.

6.124

On the Treatise's statement: "It speaks of bodhisattvas who have already entered the Far-Reaching Stage," and so forth:

6.125

That is, Yogācārabhūmi fascicle sixty-two states: Because all worldlings cannot practice it, with the sole exception of bodhisattvas who have already entered the Far-Reaching Stage (dūraṅgamā-bhūmi).

6.126

On the Treatise's statement: "Some say from the first stage... all enter this absorption":

6.127

Question: The Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya only says 'permanently subduing afflictions' and does not say 'producing the absorption'; why does this Treatise cite that text differently?

6.128

Answer: Although the text does not say it, the intent definitely allows its arising. Why is this? Answer: If afflictions are not subdued, the absorption can in no way be attained; since all afflictions are permanently subdued and do not function, why could it not arise? This Treatise adopts the intent of that treatise and states that they all arise in this absorption; there is no error.

6.129

On the Treatise's statement: "The sūtra says... the attainment of extinction":

6.130

According to the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, the seventh chapter on the limbs of the path clarifies the distinction between the first six stages and the seventh stage and beyond, compared to the attainment of extinction entered by those of the two vehicles. Thus that sūtra states: 'The Buddha said to Mahāmati: Bodhisattvas from the first stage up to the sixth stage enter the attainment of extinction, and śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas also enter the attainment of extinction. Mahāmati! Bodhisattva-mahāsattvas enter the attainment of extinction from moment to moment in the seventh stage, because bodhisattvas are all able to remain detached from the characteristics of existence and non-existence of all dharmas. Mahāmati! Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas cannot enter the attainment of extinction from moment to moment, because śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas enter the attainment of extinction by taking conditioned activities as cognitive objects, conforming to the realms of object-grasped and grasper; therefore śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas cannot enter the moment-to-moment extinction of the seventh stage.'

6.131

On the Commentary's statement: "Although the Yogācārabhūmi... there is no contradiction":

6.132

The intent of these words is: Taking those that truly take the signless realm as cognitive object and not taking those that resemble it, it therefore excludes the two vehicles; thus there is no contradiction with the meaning in [fascicle] eighty. Although both bodhisattvas and the two vehicles possess subsequent attainment [cognition], the manifestations are close or distant; thus genuine and resembling are distinguished. Now, to offer an additional explanation: from the seventh stage upwards, taking the signless realm as cognitive object also involves manifesting signs to cognize them; if not, it would not be entering the attainment of extinction based on subsequently attained wisdom. However, those of the two vehicles cannot enter that absorption from moment to moment, and hence it is called unshared. According to that treatise: Not reflecting any longer on all signs, one only correctly reflects on the true signless realm, gradually entering the attainment of extinction and extinguishing the evolving consciousnesses (pravṛtti-vijñāna) and so forth. Next, the maturation consciousness (vipāka-vijñāna) relinquishes its support; because the maturation consciousness has no grasping, the evolving consciousnesses and so forth can no longer arise, leaving only the pure, unconditioned, stainless, true dharmadhātu.

6.133

Question: Since one abides in mindlessness, how can one later emerge?

6.134

Answer: According to Yogācārabhūmi fascicle twelve: 'Question: When entering the attainment of extinction, there is no conceptual discrimination: "I shall enter the absorption, I shall emerge from the absorption." When right in the absorption, because the mind is tranquil, one is free from preparatory effort (prayoga); when about to emerge from the absorption, because the mind has previously ceased, there is also no mental engagement (manaskāra). How can one emerge? Answer: Because one has previously well-cultivated and trained one's deliberate intention. If there are activities, shapes, and marks capable of entering the absorption and capable of emerging from the absorption, one cultivates and repeatedly cultivates them; due to cultivation, one spontaneously enters and spontaneously emerges.'

6.135

Explanation: Due to the power of cultivation, although there is no conceptual discrimination, one can spontaneously enter and emerge from this absorption. Because one previously cultivated absorptions with mind, there are activities, marks, and shapes for entering and emerging from absorption; through repeated cultivation of the preparatory effort of revulsion in absorptions with mind, one spontaneously enters and emerges by the power of preparatory effort.

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成唯識論演祕 — Classical Chinese