金剛經纂要刊定記 6

English (machine translation) 6

Language: English

6.1

Recorded by the Śramaṇa Zixuan of Changshui

6.2

Under the fourteenth, the commentary first sets out the heading.

6.3

"If there is no bodhisattva" points to the place where doubt arises. This is the same as the twelfth coming from the eleventh; they arise simultaneously, but are severed sequentially.

"All Buddhas..." and so forth establishes the principle in accordance with the opponent. Since there is no bodhisattva, then there is no such matter: without a Buddha, bodhi is not attained, which means sentient beings do not enter nirvāṇa; this merely distinguishes cause and fruit in terms of ordinary beings and nobles. Below, where the doubt is concluded, they are stated together.

6.5

"Why..." and so forth concludes and forms the doubt. The meaning is: If there are no bodhisattvas, then who are those who deliver sentient beings and adorn Buddha lands?

6.6

"Loss of mindfulness." The meaning of the sūtra can be understood. However, "also speaks thus" takes up the text where the doubt arose, not the immediately preceding text.

6.7

"The verse says..." and so forth simultaneously explains the meaning of adorning lands in the subsequent passage; because the ideas in the text are interlinked, they are cited together. The first line sets it out, the next two lines explain it, and the last line concludes it. The meaning is: In the equality of the true realm, if one stirs thought, there is immediately error; since one gives rise to that thought, how could it not be inverted? In the sūtra, "makes such a statement" is precisely the arising of thought, which is a mental word.

6.8

"No person." The meaning of the sūtra's questioning inquiry is: Why is one who has such a thought not called a bodhisattva? The meaning of the explanation is: One is named a bodhisattva merely in terms of no-self, no person, and the purity of tathatā, not because there is some separate dharma. The text below says: If one has such a thought, one is not called a bodhisattva. The commentary's text can be understood.

6.9

"Spoken previously." The meaning of the sūtra is: For this reason, the Buddha constantly proclaims that all dharmas are free from the characteristics of a self, a person, and so forth. Yet all dharmas are fundamentally devoid of self and person; but transgressing this makes one a sentient being, whereas according with this makes one a bodhisattva.

6.10

"Loss of mindfulness." The meaning of the sūtra can be understood by following the previous [explanation].

6.11

"Explaining the reason." The sūtra's questioning inquiry is the same as before. The explanation says: What the Tathāgata speaks of as adorning Buddha lands does not involve an adorning agent or an adorned object. Then adorning and not adorning are equal without duality; this is true adorning. Now, since [the thought] diverges from this, one is not a bodhisattva.

6.12

"Explaining what constitutes a bodhisattva." The sūtra's meaning can be understood.

6.13

"The treatise says..." and so forth generally explains the preceding section. Because the verse generally sets it out before and the treatise text generally explains it after, when looking across before and after, the principle becomes evident.

6.14

"Giving rise to what..." and so forth inquires based on the treatise.

6.15

"Therefore the sūtra..." and so forth cites the sūtra to explain it.

6.16

"Asaṅga..." and so forth can be understood.

6.17

Question: "Both this and the sixth speak of adorning lands; what is the difference in meaning?"

6.18

Answer: "The former doubted taking up in contrast to non-taking; this doubts there being a person in contrast to no person. However, both this and the twelfth arise from the eleventh. Because that text said there is no one who brings forth the bodhimind, the Buddha's intention was merely to wipe away the mind of self and person, not to annihilate the bodhisattva. Subhūti did not understand this intention, and assumed that self and person were no different from a bodhisattva. For this reason, where Subhūti gave rise to doubt he said 'if there are no bodhisattvas,' while where the Tathāgata severed the doubt he said 'no person.' Both sides were implicit and never explicitly stated, until here where it is finally clarified. The sūtra text specifically says: 'One who thoroughly comprehends that dharmas lack self, the Tathāgata says is truly named a bodhisattva.'"

6.19

Under the fifteenth, the commentary first sets out the heading.

6.20

"The previous explanation of the bodhisattva..." and so forth points to the place where doubt arises. This comes from the fourteenth, because earlier it said that 'I deliver sentient beings' and 'I adorn Buddha lands' are both not a bodhisattva, which represents the meaning of not seeing self and other. Speaking comprehensively, it also comes concurrently from the direct answer to the question and from the eleventh doubt.

6.21

"If so..." and so forth concludes and forms the doubt. Because upon hearing that one does not see the characteristics of self, other, and so forth, one then assumes the Tathāgata has no wisdom eye at all; thus the doubt is formed.

6.22

"The commentary's severing of it..." and so forth is, second, citing the treatise to reveal the intention.

6.23

"The verse says..." and so forth first relates the intention in severing the doubt. The first line concedes; the second line refutes; the third line clarifies that the essence of the five eyes that are the seeing agents is permanent, hence called 'real'; the final line clarifies that the essence of the various minds that are the seen objects is unreal, hence called 'inverted.' Now, the manifold minds are the objective realm known by wisdom. Here they are assigned as the seen objective realm because the Tathāgata's knowledge and vision are not of two essences. In terms of the eye it is vision; in the mind it is called knowledge; therefore in the eighteen abidings they are combined into a single abiding.

6.24

Severing doubt. The intention is: The bodhisattva merely departs from the conceptual discrimination of subject and object, and hence is said 'not to see'; how could the Buddhas lack the true wisdom eye? This shows the direct severing of that doubt. Below, it merely provides analytical commentary following the text.

6.25

"Commentary text: five..." and so forth is, third, severing doubt relying on the sūtra.

6.26

"The physical eye": the meaning of the sūtra's questions and answers can be known.

6.27

Regarding "the mass of flesh," and so forth: this means that the four dusts [form, sound, scent, taste] are called flesh, and the subtle, pure eye-faculty abides depending on the flesh, being named "the physical eye." As the Śūraṅgama states: "The eyes are like clusters of grapes, the ears like newly rolled leaves, the nose like a pair of hanging melons, the tongue like a crescent moon, the body like the sounding box of a waisted drum, and the mental faculty like seeing within a dark chamber." The pure eye-faculty arises based on this.

6.28

"Within obstructions," and so forth: this concludes by naming [it] in terms of the delimited scope of what is seen. The eye that depends on flesh is named the physical eye.

6.29

"The Buddha possesses," and so forth: someone might ask, "Since the Buddha is the supreme sage, why would he share the physical eye with ordinary persons?" Therefore this clarifies it: however, it is only said that he possesses the physical eye in terms of his having all faculties complete; it does not mean that the Tathāgata has a body of blood and flesh. Hence the sūtra says: "Having renounced impermanent matter, he attains permanent matter, and so forth."

6.30

Regarding "at the site of the physical eye," and so forth: this means undertaking contemplative practice, visualizing external realms at the site of the physical eye; because the visualization is perfected, one sees objects beyond obstructions, which is called the divine eye, as with Aniruddha and others.

6.31

"The Large Prajñā," and so forth: this specifically speaks of the Buddha. Previously, the general explanation was merely in terms of the designation, hence saying "beyond obstructions." Here it is spoken of in terms of the Buddha-stage, hence saying "innumerable among humans," and so forth.

6.32

"Apart from seeing heaven," and so forth: this concludes and establishes the delimited scope. It also shows that the substance of the two eyes is identical, because the substance of the Buddha's eye is single yet possesses five functions.

6.33

"Fundamental": because it can generate the subsequent [cognition], it is also called the non-conceptual fundamental wisdom. True wisdom is wisdom as it is in principle; because it can illuminate the true, it is named the wisdom eye.

6.34

"Subsequent": because it arises only after the fundamental [cognition]. It is also named all-knowing wisdom, conventional wisdom, and quantitative wisdom; since it can penetrate conventional phenomena, it is named the Dharma eye.

6.35

Question: "According to the first two [eyes], the shallow comes first and the profound later; why do the third and fourth put the profound first and the shallow later?"

6.36

Answer: "The former was in terms of the sequence of the eyes; this is in terms of the sequence of realization, because penetrating conventional phenomena stems from realizing the true, and is thus spoken of as subsequent."

6.37

The commentary on the internal text has two parts. First, specifically explaining the passage at hand.

6.38

Regarding "the previous four," and so forth: the Buddha possesses this eye, hence it is called the Buddha eye. Because the first two eyes are shared with ordinary beings, the two vehicles lack the Dharma eye, and bodhisattvas, though possessing it, are still inferior; when present in the Buddha, all four are supremely extraordinary and collectively named the Buddha eye. Thus, outside of the Buddha eye, there are no four separate eyes. It is just like the four rivers flowing into the sea and losing their original names.

6.39

Regarding "all four are superior": the physical eye of ordinary beings sees within obstructions; the divine eye sees beyond obstructions; the Buddha eye sees innumerable worlds. The divine eye of the two vehicles sees only one trichiliocosm; the Buddha's divine eye sees Buddha-lands as many as the sands of the Ganges. The wisdom eye of the two vehicles illuminates only the emptiness of persons; ground-dwelling bodhisattvas also partially realize it; the Buddha's wisdom eye fully illuminates the three emptinesses and thoroughly penetrates the true nature. What is knowable to the bodhisattva's Dharma eye is not yet exhausted, each ground having its distinct limitation; for the Buddha's Dharma eye, the cognitive obscurations are exhausted, with no phenomenon unknown and no living being unsaved. Hence all four are superior.

6.40

"Further, seeing," and so forth: because what is seen is the Buddha-nature, this eye is able to see it. As the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: "The śrāvakas have much concentration and little wisdom, so they do not see the Buddha-nature; the bodhisattvas have much wisdom and little concentration, so although they see the Buddha-nature, it is still not clear; the Buddhas, Tathāgatas, have concentration and wisdom in balance, hence they see the nature clearly, like looking at an āmalaka fruit in the palm of the hand." Is this not indeed the meaning of the consummate ultimate?

6.41

Question: "Since bodhisattvas and śrāvakas both lack one of the two, concentration or wisdom, why is it that regarding the Buddha-nature, the śrāvaka does not see it while the bodhisattva partially sees it?"

6.42

Answer: "Comparing concentration and wisdom to the Buddha-nature, wisdom is the cause and concentration is the condition; because the cause is direct while the condition is indirect, it is thus. Furthermore, the śrāvaka has only one-sided emptiness wisdom and lacks middle-way wisdom, hence it is said that wisdom is deficient; the bodhisattva possesses middle wisdom, hence sees the Buddha-nature. Furthermore, among these five, only the third is an appositional compound (karmadhāraya), while the rest are determinative compounds (tatpuruṣa)."

6.43

"Asaṅga," and so forth: second, generally demonstrating [this] in connection with what preceded, having two parts:

6.44

First, citing Asaṅga's meaning for a general explanation.

6.45

"Pure and superior": because they are free from inversion and surpass all noble ones.

6.46

"The four kinds": citing the objects subsumed to clarify the delimited scopes. Just as the six consciousnesses are subsumed by the six sense-objects, subsumption by form includes the physical and divine eyes. The treatise says: 'Subsumption by form has two: first, the result of karma-dharma; second, the sphere of cultivation.' 'Dharma' is the physical eye, because it is brought about by past karmic dharmas. 'Cultivation' is the divine eye, meaning it is the result of concentration, obtained through cultivation. Both eyes equally see material phenomena; since material phenomena are the coarsest, they are explained first. The ultimate truth is the realm of the absolute truth, subsuming the wisdom eye. The worldly truth is the realm of conventional truth, subsuming the Dharma eye.

6.47

"All modes": the realms of all various differentiations.

6.48

"Subsuming all": subsuming the Buddha eye. That is, there is nothing it does not comprehend, being the all-aspect wisdom. The treatise says: 'Effortless wisdom of all modes is named the Buddha eye.'

6.49

"The ancients," and so forth: second, concluding again according to the ancient worthies. This can be understood.

6.50

In "the purity of wisdom," the five sections proceed from narrow to broad, counting successively: counting sands, counting rivers, counting realms, counting beings, and counting minds. Desiring to clarify that the Tathāgata's wisdom is subtle and able to know, it is manifested through the vastness of the realms known; this can all be seen in the sūtra.

6.51

Setting forth "fully knows": the sūtra text can be understood.

6.52

Regarding "with desire": this is defilement. "Desire" refers to the five desires, namely the five dusts of form and so forth; the mind conjoining with desire is named "with [desire]." Furthermore, "desire" refers to greedy desire, which is subsumed under mental factors; mentioning the first includes the rest, meaning it encompasses anger and so forth; the mind associating with greed and so forth is therefore called "with." The former is in terms of association with sense-objects, while this is in terms of association with afflictions; both are defilement.

6.53

Regarding "separated from desire": this is purity. That is, not associating with the objects of the six dusts and afflictions is called purity. Defiled and pure minds are each immeasurable, hence it is said "as many [different kinds]."

6.54

Explaining "fully knows": the sūtra raises the question, meaning: by what reason is he able to fully know them? The explanation means: those various minds are all deluded consciousness; because deluded consciousness is empty, it says "are not mind"; because they are empty, the true mind is not annihilated, hence it says "is called the true mind." Because their substance is identical, he is able to know them fully.

6.55

"Dayun," and so forth: explaining the reason why he is able to know. Because the various minds are a fraction of phenomena manifested within the true mind, now that he has realized the true substance, how could he not know them?

6.56

"The various minds," and so forth: citing and explaining. This can be understood.

6.57

"Different from this": because [the master Da]yun's explanation includes the true while the treatise speaks only of the deluded, they are not the same. The treatise's explanation is correct. Yet if viewed through the outline commentary, Dayun's explanation is on the contrary taken as correct.

6.58

"Please examine the various inverted consciousnesses": this explains "the various minds" in the sūtra. The Wei translation states: 'The Tathāgata explains that the abiding of various minds is all the non-abiding of mind, which is named the abiding of mind.' The treatise explains the meaning: 'various' means multiple kinds; 'abiding' refers to inversion, because all eight consciousnesses can take objects as conditions and have grasping attachment; alternatively, in terms of the first six [consciousnesses] they are called multiple kinds, continuously taking coarse and manifest objects as conditions, hence named 'abiding.'

6.59

The two lines "Because of leaving," and so forth: these explain "is all the non-abiding of mind." Leaving and not abiding are fundamentally one meaning; wisdom and true mindfulness also have no separate substance. The meaning clarifies that they do not abide in the four stations of mindfulness of the Mahāyāna; if one abides in these, that is true mindfulness and true wisdom; since they abide in the six dusts, they are inverted consciousness.

6.60

"Therefore it is called inverted": this explains "is named mind." This merely concludes by reducing them to inverted consciousness.

6.61

Explaining "not mind": the sūtra raises the question, meaning: for what reason are the various minds explained as inverted consciousness without substance? The explanation means: because they cannot be found in the past, present, or future.

6.62

"Already ceased," and so forth: explaining the reason why the three times cannot be apprehended. The treatise text, Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa, and Avataṃsaka are all identical, differing only slightly in explaining the present. The treatise says: 'Because the present is false vikalpa.' The Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa says: 'The present does not abide.' The Avataṃsaka says: 'The present is empty and calm.' Yet although the texts differ, their intent does not. However, this applies solely to the present.

6.63

Speaking of "the ultimate truth": because Asaṅga's explanation of the sūtra is consistently in terms of the two truths. Since the text on the five eyes did not say 'the eyes are not eyes,' and furthermore because the two—seeing and wisdom—are not different in substance, the ultimate truth is established at the very end. The ultimate truth is precisely emptiness and stillness; emptiness and stillness is precisely the meaning of unapprehendability; the meanings are all identical.

6.64

Commentary on the sixteenth [doubt]: first, setting forth the section heading.

6.65

"Previously explained," and so forth: pointing to the origin of the doubt. This comes from the fifteenth [doubt].

6.66

"Abiding of mind": pointing to the Wei sūtra, as cited above. "Inverted": pointing to the verse text. "All cannot be apprehended": pointing to the sūtra text.

6.67

"If so," and so forth: concluding and establishing the doubt. The meaning says: the minds of sentient beings are inverted, and merit is achieved based on the mind—could it not also be inverted? Since they are equally inverted, how could it be called a wholesome dharma? Since it is not a wholesome dharma, what benefit is there in cultivating merit?

6.68

Questions and answers on merit: the sūtra can be understood.

6.69

"Because of this," and so forth: explaining the reason it is great. Because the Tathāgata raises causes and conditions to ask, and Subhūti cites causes and conditions to answer: since causes and conditions lack intrinsic nature, merit also lacks intrinsic nature, and thereby becomes uncontaminated; therefore it is great. This passage merely indicates it; the text below explains it.

6.70

Reversed and direct explanation: the sūtra's meaning says: if it were merit that abides in signs, I would not say it is great; because it is merit without abiding, therefore I say it is great.

6.71

Commentary: 1. First, citing the treatise for the correct explanation.

6.72

"The verse says," and so forth: setting forth [the quotation].

6.73

"The treatise says," and so forth: explaining it. The meaning says: because the mental consciousness abides, it becomes inverted; because it is inverted, merit is entirely illusory. The Buddha's wisdom has no abiding; creating merit based on it is non-inverted; because it is non-inverted, it is entirely real. Grasping signs is contaminated merit, hence it is not said to be great. Being free from signs is uncontaminated merit, hence it is said to be great.

6.74

"Asking about merit," and so forth: second, questions and answers to resolve objections. The meaning of the question can be understood.

6.75

Regarding "accordance and discordance," and so forth: the mind of the single dharma-realm is fundamentally non-abiding and fundamentally empty and quiescent; the Buddha's wisdom is empty and non-abiding, hence called in accordance; the deluded consciousness abides and is not empty, hence called discordant. What is called 'not empty' is merely that deluded consciousness is not empty, not that it is truly not empty. If one forgets mental graspings and penetrates it, then there is nothing that cannot be understood by metaphor.

6.76

Commentary on the seventeenth [doubt]: first, setting forth the section heading.

6.77

"If all Buddhas," and so forth: pointing to the origin of the doubt. This comes from the third [doubt].

6.78

"How is it," and so forth: concluding and establishing the doubt.

6.79

"This is in terms of," and so forth: presenting the basis of the doubt. The meaning says: since it is said that the markless dharmakāya is the Buddha, why is perfecting the major marks and minor characteristics also called the Buddha? This is doubting the physical body in terms of the dharmakāya.

6.80

Manifesting the body: the questions and answers of the sūtra can be understood. The meaning of the question says: for what reason does one not see the Buddha by means of the physical body? The explanation says: because it is in terms of the paramārtha and not the conventional truth; on this account, one should definitely not see the Buddha by means of the physical body.

6.81

"Minor characteristics": the eighty kinds. The numerical categories are as usual, namely the minor marks; following the form of his body, every single one is excellent, hence the eighty characteristics are the physical body.

6.82

"Within the mirror," and so forth: clarifying by metaphor. Hence we know that if an object is inside the mirror, it is conversely unable to manifest objects; just as ordinary beings, though possessing the dharmakāya, cannot manifest the major marks and minor characteristics because an object is present. The so-called "object" is the deluded body and mind.

6.83

"The treatise says," and so forth: excluding and subsuming in terms of nature and marks.

6.84

Regarding "ultimately," and so forth: excluding in terms of substance.

6.85

Regarding "However, the major marks," and so forth: subsuming according with marks.

6.86

From "These two" downwards explains why marks and characteristics constitute a Buddha. It is like gold, which ultimately is not a lion, nor is there an absence of gold, because the lion is not apart from the gold.

6.87

From "Therefore" downwards reconciles and explains the sūtra text in terms of preservation and elimination.

6.88

Saying "non-existent" is stated in terms of the substance, explaining "is not a physical body."

6.89

Saying "existent" is stated in accord with the marks, explaining "is named a physical body."

6.90

"Accomplished" in the Wei translation corresponds to the meaning of "fully endowed" in the present text.

6.91

"Manifesting marks": the sūtra is as before.

6.92

The thirty-two marks are standard in doctrinal lists; they are the major marks.

6.93

Regarding "Each and every," etc., from the previous passage on "there are no objects within the mirror" downwards, the intended meaning is completely the same; as the preceding text has already clarified it, it is not explained separately now.

6.94

The eighteenth section of the commentary begins by stating the heading.

6.95

From "If the Tathāgata" downwards indicates where the doubt arises. This arises simultaneously with the preceding doubt within the third [section]; while they arise at the same time, their severance occurs successively; it does not come from the immediately preceding text.

6.96

If one says it comes from that [preceding text]: having already awakened to the body that is non-body, why doubt the teaching that is non-teaching? Reflecting on this, it can be seen.

6.97

"How could he not?" crystallizes the doubt. The meaning is: sound is not self-sounding but is emitted in reliance on form; since there is no form relied upon, how can there be sound that relies on it? Hence it forms a doubt.

6.98

Refuting the erroneous understanding: the sūtra text can be understood.

6.99

From "Within a valley" downwards uses a metaphor for clarification. The meaning is: because there is an external sound, an echo answers, but within the valley there is actually no maker of the echo. Preaching the Dharma is also like this: in the Dharmakāya there is actually no one capable of preaching, but because of the resonance of capacities [of beings], one subsequently sees that the Tathāgata preaches the Dharma. Furthermore, although the valley responds to the sound, it has no thought of responding to the sound; although the Buddha preaches the Dharma, he has no mind to preach the Dharma. Based on this, it is precisely due to having no thought that he can preach the Dharma. Therefore, it refutes [it] by saying "Do not say," etc.

6.100

Explaining the reason: the sūtra's inquiry means: on what grounds am I made not to form this thought? The meaning of the explanation can be understood.

6.101

From "The World-Honoured One" downwards: the commentary is like the text, easy to understand.

6.102

Revealing the correct view: the intention of the sūtra is like the commentary.

6.103

"Just as with the Buddha, so too with the Dharma": since the Buddha has no body, he therefore manifests a body; the Dharma likewise has no teaching, so he expediently speaks. Using the Buddha as an analogy for the Dharma, it is therefore said, "so too."

6.104

Regarding "two distinctions," the treatise says: "First, the signifiers, which are names, phrases, and syllables; second, the signified, which is the meaning." With respect to the Buddha, both of these—the signifier and the signified—are what is preached, and are generally called "Dharma."

6.105

Regarding "not apart from," etc., the treatise says: "This explains 'is named preaching the Dharma.'" The realm of the marks of phenomena is therefore named the dharmadhātu.

6.106

"Preaching the Dharma has no self-characteristic": the treatise says: "This explains 'there is no Dharma that can be preached.'" This means that marks are identical to nature, and that spoken words are conditionally arisen and without self-nature. Another interpretation: the two lines from "not apart from the dharmadhātu" downwards both explain "there is no Dharma that can be preached." This means that these two kinds [of Dharma] are not apart from the dharmadhātu, and apart from the dharmadhātu there are no distinct self-characteristics of the two dharmas that can be found; because the self-characteristics of these two dharmas are fundamentally empty and unattainable, this uses the lower line to explain the upper line.

6.107

Regarding "true preaching," etc.: when preaching the Dharma, preaching in accord with the Dharma is called true preaching of the Dharma. The Dharma is free from all names, marks, and conceptual distinctions; if one speaks in accord with this, it is preaching in accord with the Dharma. Therefore, a later passage says: "How does one expound it for others? Without grasping at marks, thus, thus, unmoving." However, in the third, fifth, and seventh sections, as well as in this place—all four places clarify that there is no preaching, but their intentions are each different. In the third, it was doubted whether the transformation body has speech; in the fifth, it was doubted whether realized gnosis can be spoken of; in the seventh, it was clarified that the Buddha has no divergent teaching; in this text, it is doubted how there can be preaching when there is no body—such is the distinction. Moreover, between the eighteenth and nineteenth sections, all the commentaries raise a doubt based on the Wei version of the sūtra. Long and Wai both say: "The doubt: Who can have faith?" Yun says: "The doubt concerning being able to have faith in the profound Dharma." Now, since the Qin version of the sūtra lacks that text, the commentary also does not recount or explain it. Now seeing that recent editions of the Qin text all contain this passage, I have briefly and essentially recounted and explained it in my notes, naming it "the doubt that, what is preached being profound, there is no one who has faith." The treatise says: "If one says that the Buddhas preach the Dharma, it is un-preached and non-preaching, not apart from the Dharmakāya." The Dharmakāya is without marks; what kind of person can believe in such a profound dharmadhātu?

6.108

Severing it: the sūtra says: "At that time the venerable Subhūti addressed the Buddha, saying: 'World-Honoured One! Will there be any sentient beings in future ages who, hearing this Dharma expounded, will generate faithful minds or not?'" This doubt is profound, asking on the grounds of lack of faith. Being foremost in understanding emptiness, his wisdom was all-penetrating; having wisdom as his life, he is therefore addressed as "Venerable" (Āyuṣmat).

6.109

"Generating faithful minds": generating the correct faithful mind of the Mahāyāna. Only when not having faith in any dharma is it correct faith; this faith accords with the noble nature. Therefore the Awakening of Faith says: "Those who have accomplished such faith and are able to generate the mind enter the group of correct determination, never falling back; they are called those who abide in the Tathāgata's lineage and accord with the correct cause." Next, it distinguishes that among persons of noble nature there are some [who believe], by way of reply: "The Buddha said: 'Subhūti! They are neither sentient beings nor non-sentient beings.'"

6.110

From "Subhūti" downwards: one ought to say that there truly are sentient beings who can have faith in this Dharma. Those who can believe are not ordinary sentient beings, nor are they not sentient beings of the noble nature. The treatise says: "'Non-sentient beings': because they do not have the substance of ordinary beings. 'Not non-sentient beings': because they possess the noble substance, they are not without the noble substance." The verse says: "Sentient beings who are not sentient beings, / Neither noble nor not noble; / Herein, the noble substance / Is the vision and knowledge of the Buddha." This is because it is the root of faith.

6.111

Next, inquiring into whether they generate faith or not, in order to explain. The sūtra says: "Why is this? Subhūti! As for sentient beings, sentient beings, the Tathāgata has explained that they are not sentient beings; they are named sentient beings." "Why is this?" is the inquiry: on what grounds does he say that they are not sentient beings, yet are named sentient beings? "Subhūti! As for sentient beings, sentient beings" is the repetition of the topic. As for speaking of them as sentient beings among non-sentient beings, the Tathāgata has explained that they are not sentient beings; they are named sentient beings. "Not sentient beings" means they are not foolish, lesser ordinary beings. "They are named sentient beings" concludes that the people who can believe possess the noble substance. The verse says: "What is expounded and the expounder are profound, / Yet there are not none who can have faith." The above sūtra text exists in the Wei translation but is absent in the Qin edition; since both treatises explain this passage, its subsequent insertion by later people is also without error, not to mention that it has the condition of karmic retribution in the unseen realm, so it should also be trusted.

6.112

The nineteenth section of the commentary begins by stating the heading.

6.113

"Not attaining a single dharma" indicates where the doubt arises. This comes from the third, twelfth, and thirteenth sections, because those texts all say that one attains bodhi without any dharma.

6.114

From "How could" downwards crystallizes the doubt.

6.115

"Free from superior upon superior": for instance, the first ground compared to the stages before the grounds is called superior, but it has not left behind what is superior to it on the second ground; up to equal enlightenment, it still does not escape what is superior to it at sublime enlightenment. Only the Buddha's ultimate realization has no superior above the superior stage; hence it is said to be "free from superior upon superior." Thus, ordinary beings are free from inferior upon inferior, the Buddhas are free from superior upon superior, and the rest in between do not leave behind the superior and inferior.

6.116

Regarding "successively," etc.: it means successively relinquishing the two hindrances and successively obtaining the two fruits; because of successively relinquishing and successively obtaining, it is called "successively." The meaning is: if one successively obtains bodhi, how could one not attain a single dharma? Hence it forms a doubt.

6.117

From "In order to sever" downwards anticipates and indicates the intent of severing the doubt. Showing and manifesting, it is therefore called "manifestation."

6.118

No dharma constitutes correct awakening. The sūtra concedes the inquiry. Both non-attainment and attainment can be understood.

6.119

Regarding "in that place," etc.: this clarifies that there is not a single dharma that can be named "unexcelled." Just as Sumeru is supreme in greatness and a subtle dust mote is supreme in smallness, neither of them escapes having something superior, because they are both existent. Just as empty space is non-existent, it attains the name "unexcelled."

6.120

"The place of bodhi": bodhi is precisely the locus of realization.

6.121

Regarding "there is not a single dharma," etc.: merely when delusions are exhausted and awakening is fulfilled is it named bodhi. Apart from this, how could there be any bodhi to be attained? Equality constitutes correct awakening. The sūtra can also be understood.

6.122

"Neither increasing nor decreasing" explains "there is neither high nor low" in the sūtra. That is, residing in the noble it does not increase, so there is no high; dwelling among the ordinary it does not decrease, so there is no low. This is the meaning of equality.

6.123

"Equality is named unexcelled": the superior acquires its name by contrast with the inferior; since the inferior is not established, how could the superior exist?

6.124

From "There is no further" downwards further explains the meaning of "unexcelled." Within this question and answer, there are three meanings of "unexcelled." First, in the question, speaking of "a superior above the superior" is stated in terms of cultivation and realization. Second, having no dharma as superior is named "unexcelled," which is stated in terms of emptiness and quiescence. Third, having no superior in contrast to an inferior is named "unexcelled," which is stated in terms of the identical substance of the ordinary and the noble. The latter two are the intent within the answer.

6.125

Cultivating correct awakening. The intent of the sūtra is: although there is no dharma, and although there is equality, this does not mean that one attains correct awakening without cultivation; one must cultivate all wholesome dharmas with a mind free from self, etc., and only then can it be achieved. However, these wholesome dharmas are non-existent in terms of paramārtha and existent in terms of conventional truth. Vasubandhu differs from this; examine it.

6.126

"Revealing cause" (vyajñaka-hetu) has two meanings: first, the meaning of terminating, because prajñā can discern the emptiness of afflictions; second, the meaning of manifesting, because it can manifest the Dharmakāya. Here, "without self," etc., is precisely this meaning, also named the primary cause. Precisely due to this wisdom eliminating delusion and obtaining the Dharmakāya, it is now called the correct path; "path" has the meaning of cause.

6.127

"Contributory cause": namely, the five [pāramitās] such as giving and morality, which serve as supporting conditions for that prajñā. "Assisting" means supporting; supporting the power of that primary cause, severing afflictions and accomplishing bodhi. It is like a lamp being able to dispel darkness and reveal space, which must rely on the wick and oil as contributory conditions.

6.128

"Is correct awakening": because the Sanskrit word sambodhi is translated here as "correct awakening"; that is, the realized fruit of uncontaminated wholesomeness.

6.129

Question: "Among contaminated things there are also wholesome dharmas; why is it restricted solely to the uncontaminated?"

6.130

Answer: "Because they are cultivated through marks such as being without self, they are exclusively uncontaminated. Furthermore, because contaminated wholesomeness is not the cause of bodhi, now for the sake of bodhi it must be uncontaminated."

6.131

Question: "In the above three passages, the first two have no attainment, while the latter has realization. Since the meanings are contradictory, how can both be maintained?"

6.132

Answer: "What is called 'cultivation' is merely severing self and dharmas to manifest one's own true principle, with not a single dharma ultimately to be attained; hence these two meanings harmoniously accord with each other."

6.133

Question: "In the third, twelfth, and thirteenth sections, together with this one section—four places before and after—all say that bodhi is not attained. How do we distinguish them?"

6.134

Answer: "Although the texts before and after are similar, their intended meanings are different. In the third, it was doubted whether Śākyamuni attained the fruit; in the twelfth, it was doubted whether Sumati accomplished the cause; in the thirteenth, it was doubted whether there are no dharmas and no Buddha; in the nineteenth, it is doubted whether there is cultivation and realization. These meanings are clearly distinct; please do not confuse them."

6.135

The twentieth section of the commentary begins by stating the heading.

6.136

From "If cultivating" downwards indicates where the doubt arises. This comes from the nineteenth [section].

6.137

Then, from "then what is expounded" downwards contrasts with the preceding several passages and crystallizes the doubt. The meaning is: since it is said that cultivating all wholesome dharmas attains bodhi, why was it repeatedly stated earlier that upholding and reciting [the sūtra] attains bodhi?

6.138

From "Because of this" downwards establishes the reason why upholding and reciting do not attain bodhi. Because names, phrases, and syllables are subsumed under the morally neutral (avyākṛta), and among morally neutral dharmas there is no cause and effect, how could they induce bodhi? The sūtra's comparison can be understood from the text. Regarding "Although it is said," etc., it concedes that they are morally neutral. Regarding "Yet expounding," etc., it does not concede that they are not causes.

6.139

From "Therefore" downwards brings out the intention of the sūtra. Being able to serve as the cause for Buddhahood, it is therefore superior.

6.140

From "The Ratnagotravibhāga says" downwards further explains the reason for its being the cause. Because the sūtra expresses the true principle, through it one gains awakening and understanding, and relying on understanding one gives rise to practice, only then attaining bodhi. If not for the teaching, how would one know what to enter? Therefore the Lotus Sūtra says: 'By means of the Buddha's teaching, one escapes the suffering of the three realms.'

6.141

From "It is also said" downwards is an alternative interpretation in the treatise. "Your doctrine is morally neutral" refers to the Hīnayāna Sarvāstivāda school, which states that sound extends across wholesome and unwholesome, whereas name-, phrase-, and syllable-aggregates are exclusively morally neutral in nature.

6.142

"Our teaching is karmically determinate" means that according to the Mahāyāna tradition, the names and so forth manifested by bodhisattvas on the stages within subsequent cognition are exclusively of wholesome nature, not karmically indeterminate.

6.143

"Therefore..." and so forth means: if even what is merely indeterminate can still serve as a cause, how much more so that which is subsumed under the untainted, wholesome nature—how could it fail to attain bodhi?

6.144

Question: "How is this different from the ninth doubt?" Answer: "That one was an objection based on saṃskṛta dharmas lacking substantial reality; this one is an objection based on the karmically indeterminate not being a cause. Furthermore, that one was raised solely with respect to upholding and expounding; this one is raised additionally in relation to wholesome dharmas. They are distinctly different."

6.145

Twenty-first: the commentary first marks the section.

6.146

"If phenomena..." and below indicates the point where the doubt arises. This comes from the nineteenth [doubt].

6.147

"How..." and below concludes the formation of the doubt. Since delivering sentient beings implies higher and lower, higher and lower implies inequality. Hence it forms a doubt.

6.148

Misinterpreting the sūtra text. First, directly precluding. Second, admonishing again. This is clear.

6.149

Correct view. The sūtra's intent in raising the query is: on what grounds does it tell [one] not to conceive such a thought? The explanatory intent is: because in reality there are no sentient beings delivered by the Tathāgata.

6.150

The two lines beginning with "Equality..." establish its meaning.

6.151

The two lines beginning with "The principal tenet by name..." explain the reason for it.

6.152

The treatise says... and below further explains the latter two lines.

6.153

"Nominal designation" means there is only the name of "sentient being" but no substantial entity of a sentient being; hence it is called nominal.

6.154

"Together with the five aggregates" means that where the five aggregates come together, one speaks of a sentient being as neither identical with nor separate from [them]; hence it is said to be "together with" them.

6.155

"Not apart from the dharmadhātu": the Buddha is one who has fully realized [it] to the utmost and is already entirely the dharmadhātu; although sentient beings have not yet realized that dependent origination lacks substantial entity, they are likewise identical with the dharmadhātu. How could one use the dharmadhātu to deliver the dharmadhātu? Therefore the verse says: "Equality and so forth."

6.156

The reason. The sūtra text reveals this by negation. Stated directly, it would say: because the Buddha is free from the marks of a self, a person, and so forth, he does not see any sentient beings as objects of deliverance.

6.157

"The fault of apprehending marks..." and so forth: because one takes what is non-existent to be existent, because it does not accord with the dharmadhātu, because one does not comprehend dependent origination, it consequently becomes conceptual ideation.

6.158

"Jñeya" is Sanskrit and has two meanings: first, it means the "mother of cognition", as already explained before; second, it means the "cognitive sphere"—here, however, it is the sphere within samādhi, and this latter meaning is adopted now. The meaning is: the Buddha's cognition knows in accord with the sphere; tathatā has activity and knowing, while sentient beings lack activity and knowing. If it were explained as the mother of cognition, it would be the fundamental cognition realizing the principle of equality without vikalpa, and now contemplating sentient beings is also like this.

6.159

Sweeping away traces. The sūtra's intent is: although the Buddha said "I", originally there is no self; those who grasp at there being a self are merely ordinary beings; although he spoke of ordinary beings, there are also no ordinary beings. It is like a dreaming person seeing a tiger: neither the tiger nor the dreaming person can be found. In phenomena it is also thus: because ordinary persons grasp at a self, it says "not a self"; fearing they might grasp at "ordinary persons", it says "not ordinary". It gradually removes grasping attachments, hence it is called "successively sweeping away traces". However, in the earlier direct answer to the question, in the eleventh and fourteenth, and together with this passage—across these four places earlier and later—all speak of delivering beings without deliverance; although the phrasing is identical, the intents differ. That is, the very first directs one to deliver beings free from self; the eleventh doubts that the deliverer is an "I"; the fourteenth doubts who delivers if there is no self; the twenty-first doubts that since the true realm is equal, it is not fitting to deliver beings. The similarities and differences are manifest.

6.160

Twenty-second: the commentary first marks the section.

6.161

"The treatise says..." and below indicates the point where the doubt arises. This comes from the seventeenth [doubt].

6.162

"Although marks..." and so forth: because the earlier text said "is not the complete physical body" and "is not the completeness of all marks". "Complete" means fulfillment; the Qin and Wei versions of the sūtra differ.

6.163

"Yet by means of..." and so forth: because the earlier text said "is called the complete physical body" and "is called the completeness of all marks". The intent therein is that the dharmakāya is ultimately not the marks and signs, yet the marks and signs are not non-Buddha; because it is markless, it manifests, and the marks are not separate from the dharmakāya. Therefore the doubt is: since it is only because it is markless that it can manifest marks, then merely by seeing marks, one would know the markless. It is like seeing smoke in the distance and definitively knowing there is fire, because apart from fire there is certainly no smoke.

6.164

Indicating the Buddha. The sūtra's query means: can one, by inferring from marks, contemplate the markless dharmakāya Tathāgata, or not?

6.165

Discerning the root. The sūtra's answer means: one can indeed, by inferring from marks, contemplate the dharmakāya Tathāgata. Awakening to the physical body means knowing the sense that the response and transformation [bodies] are not real. Being deluded about the dharmakāya means not knowing the sense that the dharmakāya is ultimately not physical marks.

6.166

"It means..." and below presents the intent of the reply. The intent is: merely by seeing the marks and signs of the dharmakāya, one knows the dharmakāya of the marks and signs. Just as seeing the sprout of a plant or tree means one certainly knows its root, the section heading is established on the basis of this metaphor.

6.167

Ordinary and noble are not distinguished. The sūtra's intent is: a wheel-turning king also has these marks; should he be a Tathāgata? "The verse says..." and so forth means: if one looks from the root toward the branches, it is determinate; but if one looks from the branches toward the root, it is indeterminate. Take, for example, a wheel-turning king and the Buddha: although their physical marks are the same, that upon which their marks rely differs in each: the Buddha's marks are manifested by the dharmakāya, whereas the king's marks arise relying on karmic causes; ordinary and noble differ as clouds and mud, so how could there be a standard? Moreover, relying on the dharmakāya there are own-enjoyment and other-enjoyment [bodies], and further there are great and small transformations adapting to types, each being different. Just as with sprout and root, matters are also indeterminate: a newly planted tree has a sprout but no roots, while a grafted tree has different sprouts and roots.

6.168

The Buddha is not seen through marks. The sūtra's intent is: having heard that the provisional is manifested based on the real and that the provisional is not separate from the real, when one seeks the real by relying on the provisional, the real does not originate from the provisional; real virtue does not lie in marks, and fine appearances are seldom associated with true virtue. Those who judge by appearance lost Ziyu; from now on, how could I dare fail to recognize this?

6.169

Seeing and hearing cannot reach it. The sūtra text is clear. However, fearing Subhūti might further infer and know the Tathāgata through the expounding of Dharma, it therefore says that seeking him through voice and sound cannot attain him. This doubt comes from the eighteenth [doubt]; it is pre-emptively prevented now, so there is no subsequent exposition.

6.170

The Wei verse clarifies the reason why seeing and hearing cannot reach it. The Qin sūtra merely clarifies that seeing and hearing cannot reach it.

6.171

"The verse says..." and so forth is Maitreya's verse. Within it, half explains the Qin verse and half explains the Wei verse, meaning: seeing and hearing are consciousness, which can only take form and sound as objects; the Buddha is not form and sound, hence he cannot be known.

6.172

"That phenomenon" is the dharmakāya.

6.173

"The mark of tathatā" is being free from all marks; this is the mark of tathatā.

6.174

"Cannot be known through verbal explanation": because the phenomenon of tathatā transcends verbal explanation, it is solely the realm of true cognition and corresponds only to personal realization; hence it is called self-realization. The first, seventh, seventeenth, and this section all state that one does not see the Tathāgata through marks, but their meanings and intents are distinct. The first doubted the cause in relation to the fruit; the next clarified that evoking the fruit transcends marks; the next explained that the provisional is manifested based on the real; the latter clarified that one seeks the real by relying on the provisional; hence they are not the same.

6.175

Twenty-third: the commentary first marks the section.

6.176

"From the preceding..." and below indicates the point where the doubt arises. This comes from the twenty-second [doubt].

6.177

"Thereupon conceiving the thought..." and below—adopting a completely mark-transcending interpretation—points to the thesis from which the doubt arises.

6.178

"If so..." and below concludes the formation of the doubt. The meaning is: merit only accomplishes the result of marks; since marks are not the Buddha, what benefit is there in cultivating merit?

6.179

"Hence the Buddha-fruit..." and below concludes the name of the doubt.

6.180

"The treatise says..." and below cites the proof. "Loss of merit" is because it is not the cause of bodhi. "Loss of fruit" is because it is not the fruit of bodhi.

6.181

Precluding the thought. The sūtra's intent is: if you say that the Tathāgata did not attain bodhi by means of complete marks, do not conceive this thought. The phrasing appears repetitive, but the intent is not actually repetitive; it simply first narrates and then precludes. In the Avataṃsaka verse, the first half belongs to the preceding text and the second half belongs to this section. Because the meaning of the texts is interlocked, it is cited all in one place. Since it says [the Buddha] is not apart from form and sound, how could it be right to exclusively disparage marks? Disparaging marks is contrary to principle; hence it is precluded here.

First 181 of 193 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

金剛經纂要刊定記 — Classical Chinese