注大乘入楞伽經 7

English (machine translation) 7

Language: English

7.1

"Furthermore, Mahāmati! Ignorant common people […] / Pure, true, and free from the four propositions."

Following the preceding verse stating, "That is neither non-wisdom nor wisdom; this is called an imagined view," the text wishes to clarify that the foolish do not know the Tathāgata's true doctrine (siddhānta) and verbal teaching (deśanā); thus they are deluded by beginningless false, deviant, and parikalpic thoughts, and cannot become aware of the parikalpa of their own minds. To show that bodhisattvas, knowing these two kinds of Dharma, can understand the parikalpa of their own minds, the text next explains the true doctrine and verbal teaching.

7.3

Mahāmati said to the Buddha: "So it is! So it is! […] / Expounding various expedient teachings for their sake."

7.4

The three piṭakas, twelve divisions, and all sūtras are the Tathāgata's various different teachings given through expedient means in accordance with the differences in sentient beings' minds. Though the words differ, they accord with the One; expression and purport are both forgotten—this may be called mastery of the verbal teaching.

7.5

"As for the true Dharma, it means that practitioners […] / All bodhisattva-mahāsattvas should skillfully cultivate and train in it."

7.6

The Dharma of penetrating the true doctrine means that practitioners, in the direct perception of their own minds, have no false discrimination, do not fall into the four propositions, transcend the mind and consciousness, abide in the realm realized by self-realized noble wisdom, and are free from false causes and conditions as well as views and marks associated with subject and object grasping; the wisdom of the heterodox and the two vehicles cannot fathom it. Therefore it is called the Dharma of penetrating the true doctrine. Hence, it concludes by exhorting all bodhisattvas to diligently cultivate and study these two Dharmas.

7.7

Question: The two meanings of verbal teaching and doctrine were already explained previously; why repeat them here—is this not redundant? Answer: Previously it was in terms of the three vehicles; here it is in terms of the one vehicle. Furthermore, previously the doctrine came first and the teaching followed; here the teaching comes first and the doctrine follows. The capacities and responses differ, so it is not redundant.

7.8

Then the World-Honoured One spoke verses again: / "I teach two kinds of Dharma: / Verbal teaching and the true reality. / The teaching is shown to the common people, / While the true reality is for practitioners."

7.9

"The teaching is shown to the common people" is also rendered as "the spoken is transmitted to the ignorant"; it means that the common and foolish, lacking knowledge, are like ignorant children. Penetrating the true doctrine is not verbal; therefore it is for practitioners.

7.10

Chapter 5: Lokāyata

7.11

Then the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva Mahāmati […] "World-Honoured One! Why do you speak thus?"

7.12

Following the Buddha's preceding statement that the Tathāgatas of the three periods have two kinds of Dharma, namely the verbal teaching and the true Dharma—which implies there is verbal teaching—Mahāmati cites the Buddha's past teaching that Lokāyata mantras and disputations should not be approached, and asks the Tathāgata: Since this teaching has words, why did that teaching speak thus? Lokāyata: awaiting an exact translation, it refers to the heterodox masters of disputation.

7.13

The Buddha said: "Mahāmati, Lokāyata […] / Transmigrating through the various destinies, never escaping."

7.14

This means that all the verbal teachings of the heterodox merely ornament phrases to deceive the world; they do not accord with the real meaning, do not correspond with the principle, cannot enter into the true Dharma, and destroy both themselves and others, never attaining liberation.

7.15

"Why is this? Because they do not understand that all phenomena are seen merely of the mind […] / Afflictions such as birth, old age, sickness, death, sorrow, and lamentation."

7.16

"Why is this?" is the Buddha's own query. From "failing to understand" onward is the explanation; from "therefore" onward is the conclusion. This can be known from the text.

7.17

"Mahāmati, Śakra Devānām Indra, though widely versed in treatises, [...] because they are able to create causes for the suffering of rebirth."

7.18

This says that Indra, though supreme in both merit and wisdom, was still deluded and confused with literary phrasings by a disciple of worldly treatises who manifested in animal form; how much more so ordinary humans! That one "therefore should not associate with them" is because those worldly treatises can be the cause for the suffering of birth and death.

7.19

"Mahāmati, worldly treatises only speak of the spheres of bodily sense [...] nor do they themselves know that these are teachings that delude the world."

7.20

This clarifies that the discourses of worldly treatises speak only of the false, illusory spheres of this body's seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing. All of their hundreds of thousands of words and phrases, dividing into many sects in the later end times, all stem from Lokāyata, with different causal characteristics; each fails to realize that these are teachings that delude the world, clinging to them as supreme understanding.

7.21

At that time Mahāmati said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One, [...] does the World-Honoured One also teach the same as the heterodox?"

7.22

This questions whether the Tathāgata, in also speaking various worldly phrasings, falls into worldly treatises and not the teaching of self-realisation. If so, does he also speak the same as the heterodox?

7.23

The Buddha said: "Mahāmati, I do not teach worldly doctrines, nor is there coming or going [...] and thereby attain liberation."

7.24

The Buddha answers: I do not teach the worldly treatises' doctrines of arising and ceasing, and unlike the heterodox I do not fall into parikalpa. Awakening to the fact that the existence and non-existence of external phenomena are merely one's own mind, free from grasped and grasper, one does not give rise to false vikalpa, enters the single mind and the three gateways of liberation, and realizes the dharmatā.

7.25

"Mahāmati, I remember once dwelling in a certain place, [...] is the eleventh worldly treatise."

7.26

The Tathāgata cites past events to elucidate worldly treatises extensively, speaking of Brahmā and others as makers of all phenomena. Because of the first question, he answered that it was the first worldly treatise; upon the second question, he answered that it was the second; the later four are explained together as six, and the former six plus the latter five make eleven. "Gautama" is the family name of the Buddha. Its meaning is as explained elsewhere.

7.27

"He further asked: 'Is everything predetermined?' [...] Your worldly treatises are not what I teach."

7.28

Space, nirvāṇa, and non-analytical cessation—these three are asaṃskṛta phenomena. The remaining meanings can be known; all of them are the worldly treatises of the heterodox, not the Dharma taught by the Tathāgata.

7.29

"Brahmin, I teach that because of beginningless conceptual proliferation [...] how much less would I speak of maker and non-maker!"

7.30

The Buddha teaches that all phenomena arise in the three realms of existence because of the bad habit-energies of beginningless conceptual proliferation and karmic grasping. Foolish people do not realize that these are merely what is seen by the parikalpa of their own minds; they grasp at external phenomena, or as the heterodox say, that consciousness arises from the combination of an ātman, sense faculties, and objects. The Buddha is not like this; meaning that since he knows all phenomena are entirely false, one cannot speak of having a cause or lacking a cause. Only relying on the vikalpa of grasper and grasped in false thoughts is pratītyasamutpāda conventionally posited; originally there is no real substantial entity, which is something those who cling to an ātman cannot perceive. Furthermore, nirvāṇa and the like are also merely three in count; how much less could one speak of maker and non-maker?

7.31

"Mahāmati, at that time the worldly-treatise brahmin [...] conceptualizing external objects are all worldly treatises."

7.32

Ignorance, craving, and karma being causes and conditions for the arising of the three realms, and all phenomena entering into self-characteristics and common characteristics—these are the teachings of the two vehicles (dviyāna). Down to the subtle, continuing stream of mind and consciousness not being exhausted, all of them are worldly treatises.

7.33

"Mahāmati, at that time that brahmin [...] corresponds with the meaning and principle, and is not non-corresponding."

7.34

The brahmin said: "All the disputations, various phrases and senses, and adornments of causes and metaphors of all heterodox traditions—none fail to emerge from my doctrine; all are worldly treatises. Could there still be something that is not a worldly treatise?" The Buddha answered: "There is a teaching that is not a worldly treatise. Because it is not possessed by you, it is not accepted by you, but it is not that the world does not accept it." Although it transcends disputation, it also borrows various phrases, causes, and metaphors as adornments, and only then can one awaken. Therefore he said: "It is not that it does not speak various phrases; it corresponds with the meaning and principle, and is not non-corresponding."

7.35

"He asked again: 'How could there be that which is accepted by the world yet is not a worldly treatise?' [...] It is not possessed by you."

7.36

This says that because they falsely conceptualize and give rise to attachment to un real, diverse external phenomena, failing to understand that all are the direct perception of their own minds, they cannot know that which is not a worldly treatise. The Treatise on the Awakening of Faith says: "All phenomena have distinctions solely based on false thoughts; if one is free from mental thoughts, there are no characteristics of any external sphere. Therefore, from the beginning, all phenomena are free from the characteristics of verbal expression, free from the characteristics of names, and free from the characteristics of mental conditioning; they are ultimately equal, without alteration, and indestructible. Because they are only the one mind (ekacitta), they are called suchness (tathatā)." Being able to dwell in one's own sphere, not giving rise to false mental discriminations of existence and non-existence—this is the Tathāgata's Dharma, not what is possessed by the heterodox.

7.37

"Brahmin, to speak briefly: [...] All are your worldly treatises, not my Dharma."

7.38

This clarifies that false consciousness grasping at phenomena such as going and coming are all worldly treatises.

7.39

"Mahāmati, the worldly-treatise brahmin [...] If one can understand this, vikalpa will not arise."

7.40

This says that the follower of worldly treatises made the questions above, and the Buddha answered as above, yet he still did not awaken in the least. Deeming himself sagely and wise, he withdrew without taking leave, conversely thinking that what the Tathāgata taught was incorrect.

7.41

"Mahāmati, you now also ask me about this matter [...] one only obtains material gain, not the benefit of the Dharma."

7.42

This cites the meaning of the past answer to the brahmin to conclude the response to Mahāmati's request.

7.43

Mahāmati said: "Regarding the words 'material' and 'Dharma', [...] conceptual proliferation and discrimination, the two extremes of eternalism and annihilationism."

7.44

This says that material gain increases craving, birth, old age, sickness, death, sorrow, lamentation, and suffering; one should not associate with it. In the benefit of the Dharma, one receives the Buddha's consecration and attains complete mastery over all phenomena; therefore one should draw near, serve, and make offerings to it.

7.45

"Mahāmati, the worldly treatises of the heterodox cause deluded people to fall into the two extremes [...] You should diligently observe this."

7.46

The heterodox posit that the five aggregates do not arise from causes, and therefore give rise to the view of permanence. They posit that created form, once perished, cannot arise again, which is called the view of annihilation. What the Tathāgata teaches is merely the direct perception of one's own mind, seeing neither arising, abiding, nor cessation. One is urged to diligently observe the distinction between these two, and not stubbornly cling without letting go like the heterodox.

7.47

At that time the World-Honoured One restated the meaning in verse:
"Taming and gathering sentient beings,
Subduing all evils with morality,
Extinguishing all views with wisdom,
Liberation is made to increase."

7.48

When the Tathāgata tames and gathers sentient beings, he always teaches the three definitive meanings of cultivation: namely, gathering the mind as morality, giving rise to concentration based on morality, and developing wisdom based on concentration; these are called the three undefiled trainings. Because of learning this path, liberation increases and one is able to realize the dharmatā. However, morality is the essence of concentration, and wisdom is the function of concentration; the verse leaves them implied, not that it does not speak of them.

7.49

"The false assertions of the heterodox
Are all worldly treatises;
Arbitrarily positing maker and made,
They cannot establish themselves."

7.50

This means they take Brahmā and others to be the maker and all phenomena to be what is made, falsely positing maker and made. The Tathāgata's dharmakāya, the real self-realised tenet, is something they cannot establish.

7.51

"Only my single self-realised tenet
Does not attach to maker or made;
Expounded for the disciples,
To cause them to abandon worldly treatises."

7.52

This says that solely on account of this single self-realised tenet the Tathāgata appeared in the world; with the images of grasper and grasped entirely absent, he teaches it for his disciples to make them abandon worldly treatises.

7.53

"The phenomena of grasper and grasped
Are mind only, devoid of existence; [...]
All are doctrines of worldly phenomena."

7.54

The above four verses briefly versify the attachments of worldly treatises in the prose, as can be known from the text.

7.55

Now, although there are ninety-six kinds of heterodox wrong views, they do not go beyond the five views and two causes. The "five views" are the five sharp afflictions among the ten afflictive envoys, as briefly explained in Fascicle Three. The "two causes" are causelessness and wrong causes. Some posit that the twenty-five principles arise from the primordial nature and so on; some posit that they arise from the combination of the six padārthas; some say they arise from Īśvara, Brahmā, and so on; or say that fine particles, space, past actions, and so on constitute the world. And the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] summarizes all their tenets into no more than four views: namely, the Sāṃkhya positing oneness, the Vaiśeṣika positing difference, the Nirgrantha positing both oneness and difference, and the Jñātīputra positing neither oneness nor difference. If one posits oneness, then one asserts that the effect exists in the cause; if one posits difference, then one asserts that the effect does not exist in the cause; the third is both existence and non-existence; the fourth is neither existence nor non-existence. All other heterodox tenets do not go beyond these. Although their variations are many, with regard to concluding their faults, they do not go beyond the two causes: positing that things arise from space and spontaneity is causelessness; all the rest are wrong causes. As for the two teachings of Confucianism and Daoism in this land, if taken in terms of ruler and minister, father and son, the three powers, and the five constants, they are the utmost transformation within this realm, which goes without saying. Furthermore, the Indian heterodox explicitly speak of the three times and also believe in cause and effect; they know to weary of birth and death and joyfully seek nirvāṇa. Yet a slight divergence from the true source leads them immensely far from the Way; how much more so for specialized schools! Good for cultivating oneself in this life alone, even if they have lifelong worries they have no concerns for other lifetimes; though they equalize birth and death and forcibly unify flourishing and withering, they merely posit spontaneity or attribute it to the Mandate of Heaven, as in the so-called: "Man models himself on Earth, Earth models itself on Heaven, Heaven models itself on the Dao, and the Dao models itself on spontaneity." If spontaneity is taken as a cause capable of producing the ten thousand things, that is a wrong cause. If one says that the ten thousand things arise spontaneously, like the whiteness of a crane or the blackness of a crow, that is causelessness. It is also said that in the Changes there is the Great Ultimate, which generates the Two Modes; the Two Modes generate the Four Images; the Four Images generate the Eight Trigrams; the Eight Trigrams determine auspiciousness and inauspiciousness; and auspiciousness and inauspiciousness generate the great enterprise. If the Great Ultimate is posited as the cause, that is a wrong cause. If it is said that "one Yin and one Yang is called the Dao," positing that the transformation of Yin and Yang can generate the ten thousand things, that is also a wrong cause. If one posits the One as vacuous non-being and spontaneity, that is also causelessness. Now, causelessness and wrong causes constitute great faults, for if things arose from space, spontaneity, and so on, they should arise eternally. Long ago, the exposition of Hīnayāna dependent origination already refuted the profound subtleties of external traditions; thus one knows that the shallowest of the Buddha's Dharma still surpasses the deepest of the heterodox. Hence we know that all disparate regions and foreign lands, entirely through delusion regarding correct causes and conditions, fall into a riot of divergent views, not yet knowing that the three realms stem from our own mind and that from ignorance arises craving, cycling endlessly. How could they know the principle of nature-emptiness, the gateway of wondrous existence, suchness following conditions, the non-obstruction of nature and characteristics, perfect harmony and mutual reflection, and multiple interpenetrations! As for assertions that vaguely resemble the Śākya teaching, they are all leftovers of the Buddha's Dharma, like the metaphor of stealing a cow in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra: unable to take properly and adding water, milk is still hard to obtain, let alone churning donkey's milk to obtain clarified butter! Either their understanding is shallow and they make false conjectures with worldly intellect, or they illicitly seek empty fame and cultivate seeds of wrong views, planting the bitter roots of hell and obstructing the deep cause of the knowledge of all modes—how lamentable! For an extensive explanation of divergent views, see the Yogācāra[-bhūmi] fascicle 6, the Prakaraṇāryavācā fascicles 9 and 10, the Vibhāṣā fascicles 11 and 12, and the Sāṃkhyakārikā-bhāṣya (Golden Seventy); the Madhyamaka-śāstra, Śata-śāstra, and others also extensively refute them.

7.56

Chapter 6: Nirvāṇa

7.57

At that time Mahāmati Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva [...] "yet the various heterodox form various discriminations."

7.58

Following from the above heterodox question: Are space, nirvāṇa, and non-analytical cessation made? Or are they unmade? The Buddha said: "Mahāmati, space, nirvāṇa, and non-analytical cessation originally have no essential nature; they are merely three in count." Therefore, he brings up what phenomenon the Tathāgata considers to be nirvāṇa, while the various heterodox each make false discriminations and give rise to views of nirvāṇa.

7.59

The Buddha said: "Mahāmati, as the various heterodox [...] Listen closely, listen closely, and I shall explain it for you."

7.60

This means that those non-Buddhists' false imaginings of nirvāṇa cannot accord with true nirvāṇa.

7.61

“Mahāmati, there are some non-Buddhists who say that seeing phenomena to be impermanent […] one does not take the seeing of destruction to be nirvāṇa.”

7.62

Some non-Buddhists say that because they cultivate contemplations such as impermanence, they do not yearn for external objects, and because the contemplation is perfected, they attain concentration. The various phenomena of form, mind, and mental factors do not appear before them, nor do they cognize or contemplate objects of the three times, because the karmic causes of ignorance and craving have been exhausted. It is like an oil lamp whose oil is exhausted and no longer gives light, like a seed that has rotted and no longer sprouts, like a fire extinguished when fuel is gone and burns no more. Because grasper and grasped do not arise, false discrimination does not occur, and they form the notion of nirvāṇa regarding this, [whether] with remainder or without remainder. This is the nirvāṇa of the śrāvakas. Because they attain nirvāṇa only through seeing the destruction of the birth and death of fragmented lifespans, they are also the same as non-Buddhists.

7.63

“Or some say that reaching the directions is called attaining nirvāṇa, when the perception of external objects ceases, just as the wind comes to rest.”

7.64

This refers to the Direction theorists (Diś-vādins), who posit that human beings are born from the directions, that human beings give birth to heaven and earth, and that upon destruction they return again into the directions; they take the directions to be permanent. The Wind Ṛṣi theorists (Vāyu-vādins) posit that wind can generate and destroy the ten thousand things, and that the nature of wind is also permanent; both of them claim this to be attaining nirvāṇa.

7.65

“Or some say that not seeing the perceiver and the perceived […] the view of permanence and impermanence is called attaining nirvāṇa.”

7.66

The Veda theorists posit that Brahmā can generate everything and is the perceiver, while the ten thousand things are the perceived. The Īśāna theorists posit that everything is generated from Īśāna; things are impermanent whereas he is permanent, and they claim that not seeing the perceiver and perceived, and not giving rise to discrimination, is called attaining nirvāṇa.

7.67

“Or some say that discriminating various characteristics […] they deeply generate attachment and pleasure, grasping this as nirvāṇa.”

7.68

The Nirgrantha (Naked) theorists make such a supposition, not knowing that characteristics manifest from the mind. It is also said that one class takes the Heaven of No-Thought to be nirvāṇa, and others take the four formless realms to be nirvāṇa; all of them hold this supposition.

7.69

“Or some say that cognizing internal and external phenomena […] whose nature exists and is indestructible, they form the notion of nirvāṇa.”

7.70

The Vaiśeṣika theorists posit that empty space and the nature of the four great elements are indestructible across the three times.

7.71

“Or some posit that self, person, sentient being, life-principle, and all phenomena have no destruction, forming the notion of nirvāṇa.”

7.72

The Eternalist theorists posit that the self and all phenomena have no further destruction.

7.73

“Furthermore, there are non-Buddhists lacking wisdom […] produces all things, taking this to be nirvāṇa.”

7.74

The Female Retinue theorists posit that there are primordial nature (prakṛti) and spirit (puruṣa), whose function transforms to produce all things.

7.75

“Or some non-Buddhists posit that when merit and demerit are exhausted […] is the real creator, taking this to be nirvāṇa.”

7.76

The ascetic non-Buddhists posit that both demerit and merit are exhausted; the Pure Eye theorists posit that all defilements are exhausted without relying on wisdom; the Māṭhara theorists posit that Maheśvara is the real creator of the birth and death of sentient beings.

7.77

“Or some say that sentient beings generate one another mutually […] because of failing to comprehend it, grasp this as nirvāṇa.”

7.78

The Nirgrantha theorists posit that at the beginning of the kalpa, one man and one woman were born, and the union of the two produced others successively, not knowing that ignorance, craving, and karma are the root; they say that all things perish and return to them, and take that to be nirvāṇa.

7.79

“Or some posit realizing the path of truth, taking false discrimination to be nirvāṇa.”

7.80

The Sāṃkhya theorists posit that the twenty-five principles are born from the unmanifest (tamas/pradhāna), spontaneously having four virtues, and claim to realize the true path of truth.

7.81

“Or some posit guṇa and that which possesses guṇa […] both, and neither, grasping this as nirvāṇa.”

7.82

The Maheśvara theorists posit that Maheśvara is of one body with three divisions having great function, and combines with that which possesses the function; falling into views of the four alternatives, they grasp this as nirvāṇa.

7.83

“Or some posit that things are spontaneously born from nature […] they immediately grasp spontaneity, taking it to be nirvāṇa.”

7.84

What the Spontaneity (Svabhāva) theorists posit is twofold: if they take nature as a cause capable of producing the ten thousand things, that is a false cause; if they say that the ten thousand things arise spontaneously of themselves, that is causelessness.

7.85

“Or some say that being able to understand the twenty-five principles […] protects sentient beings, and this attains nirvāṇa.”

7.86

The Kapila theorists take clear understanding of the twenty-five principles to be nirvāṇa; and [hold that] if one can uphold the Treatise on the Six Virtues to make the myriad people peaceful and happy, the nature of peace and happiness is itself nirvāṇa.

7.87

“Or some say that time produces the world, and time itself is nirvāṇa.”

7.88

The Time-Venerating theorists (Kāla-vādins) posit time as the cause capable of producing all phenomena in the world.

7.89

“Or some grasp existence as nirvāṇa […] having no distinction from nirvāṇa, forming the notion of nirvāṇa.”

7.90

Some take an existent nature to be nirvāṇa; some take a non-existent nature to be nirvāṇa; some take the two phenomena of existence and non-existence to be nirvāṇa. Or they take the ten thousand things to be agitation and nirvāṇa to be quiescence, with the non-distinction between these two being nirvāṇa. The various false suppositions of the non-Buddhists mentioned above give rise to views of nirvāṇa. Their characteristics are extensively explained in treatises such as Deva's.

7.91

“Mahāmati, there is furthermore that which differs from what those non-Buddhists teach […] as well as the mental consciousness, is called attaining nirvāṇa.”

7.92

This reveals the Tathāgata's true nirvāṇa, causing them to awaken and subsequently accord with and realize it, as the sūtra itself makes clear.

7.93

Therefore, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi distinguishes the meanings of nirvāṇa as fundamentally present or cultivated and revealed according to the practitioners of the three vehicles; altogether there are four kinds, and all others are wrong views.

7.94

First is the nirvāṇa of fundamentally pure original nature. This refers to the principle of true suchness of the characteristics of all phenomena: although polluted by adventitious defilements, its original nature is pure; it is endowed with immeasurable and subtle virtues, is without arising and without cessation, and is tranquil like empty space. It is shared equally by all sentient beings, is neither one with nor different from all phenomena, is free from all characteristics and all discrimination, cuts off the paths of reflection, and terminates the track of words. It is realized internally only by the true noble ones, and because its nature is fundamentally quiescent, it is called nirvāṇa.

7.95

Second is nirvāṇa with remainder of support. This refers to true suchness emerging from the affliction-barrier: although the basis of subtle suffering is not yet eliminated, the barrier is permanently quiescent; therefore it is called nirvāṇa.

7.96

Third is nirvāṇa without remainder of support. This refers to true suchness emerging from the suffering of birth and death: the afflictions having been exhausted, the remaining support is also eliminated, and all sufferings are permanently quiescent; therefore it is called nirvāṇa.

7.97

Fourth is the great nirvāṇa of non-abiding. This refers to true suchness emerging from the cognitive barrier, constantly assisted by great compassion and wisdom; by this means, one does not abide in birth-and-death or in nirvāṇa, benefiting and gladdening sentient beings to the end of the future, functioning yet constantly quiescent; therefore it is called nirvāṇa. All sentient beings possess the first one; the non-learners of the two vehicles may possess the first three; only the Buddha, the World-Honoured One, can be said to possess all four.

7.98

The various different suppositions of the non-Buddhists above are precisely delusions regarding this nirvāṇa of fundamentally pure original nature, falling into wrong views, each falsely discriminating to give rise to views of nirvāṇa. Above, cultivating the contemplation of impermanence, not thinking of objects, and forming the notion of nirvāṇa like the extinguishing of a lamp, is this nirvāṇa with remainder of support and without remainder of support. Above, being able to comprehend what is manifested by mind alone, entering the Buddha stage, and transcending the mind, intellect, and consciousness, is called attaining nirvāṇa. This is this great nirvāṇa of non-abiding. (Nirvāṇa was anciently translated as unconditioned, and also as extinction-deliverance. The Tang translation calls it perfect quiescence, meaning that virtues are completely present and barriers are completely exhausted.)

7.99

“Mahāmati, all those non-Buddhists' false imaginings […] you and the bodhisattvas should stay far away from them.”

7.100

This means that the various non-Buddhists' various suppositions forming the notion of nirvāṇa, since they contravene correct principle, ultimately accomplish nothing; they only increase the running about and distraction of the false consciousness, coming and going in birth and death without attaining liberation. Therefore he exhorts all bodhisattvas that they should stay far away from them.

7.101

At that time, the World-Honoured One repeated the meaning in verse: / “The non-Buddhist views of nirvāṇa / Are each discriminated differently; […] / Are foolish and false discriminations.”

7.102

This clarifies that the non-Buddhists' false views of nirvāṇa lack the means of liberation yet falsely give rise to the notion of liberation; each person has a wrong understanding, each diverging on different paths, and all are foolish and false discriminations.

7.103

“All foolish non-Buddhists / Falsely see creator and created, […] / Is the cause of truly extinguishing suffering.”

7.104

Worldly treatises and speech are the root of birth and death in the three realms; being free from worldly treatises and speech is called the cause of truly extinguishing suffering.

7.105

“Like an image in a mirror, / Though appearing, it is not real; […] / Discrimination does not arise.”

7.106

This means that the mirror of the discriminating mind manifests external objects; because they are without reality, one cannot speak of two. Fools do not know this and therefore see there to be two; if one comprehends mind-alone, false discrimination of grasper and grasped does not arise.

7.107

“Mind is just the manifold varieties, / Free from characteristic and that which is characterized; […] / Ordinary fools cannot comprehend it.”

7.108

This means that from the false mind are produced the manifold external objects; since they are produced from the falsely discriminating mind, there is no characterized or characterizing. Like the false discriminations seen by fools, although seeing, it is non-seeing. The three existences are also like this, but fools cannot comprehend it.

7.109

“Sūtra after sūtra speaks of discrimination, / But these are merely different names; / If one is free from words, / Its meaning cannot be found.”

7.110

This means that the phenomena of falsely discriminated mental constructs are merely conventional speech and completely lack real meaning; if one discards the expression and meets the purport, the meaning of false discrimination cannot be found at all.

7.111

Chapter 7: The Dharmakāya

7.112

At that time, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva Mahāmati […] “and attain skillfulness, awakening themselves and awakening others.”

7.113

Because it was clarified above that true nirvāṇa transcends mind, intellect, and consciousness, Mahāmati therefore brought up the Tathāgata's Dharmakāya, Arhat, and Samyaksambuddha that can realize nirvāṇa, inquiring about its nature of self-realization, in order that we bodhisattvas may attain this skillfulness, awakening ourselves and awakening others.

7.114

The Buddha said: “Mahāmati, as you have asked […] are such things different or not different?”

7.115

This asks: is the Tathāgata's Dharmakāya, Arhat, and Samyaksambuddha a created phenomenon or an uncreated phenomenon? Is it a fruit or a cause? Is it characterizing or characterized? Is it speech or that which is spoken? Is it the perceiver or that which is perceived? Is the Tathāgata's Dharmakāya different from such statements, or is it identical to such statements?

7.116

The Buddha said: “Mahāmati, the Tathāgata, Arhat, and Samyaksambuddha […] Why is this? Because both possess faults.”

7.117

This clarifies that whether the Tathāgata's Dharmakāya is created or uncreated, both possess faults; therefore the Buddha refutes those faults, stating in summary that it is neither.

7.118

“Mahāmati, if the Tathāgata were created, he would be impermanent; […] because it is established through an uncreated cause.”

7.119

If the Tathāgata's Dharmakāya were created, the phenomenon would be impermanent, which the Buddha does not accept; if uncreated, the phenomenon would lack substantial nature and be established through an uncreated cause; therefore the Dharmakāya is neither created nor uncreated.

7.120

"If it is neither cause nor effect, then it is neither existent nor non-existent... up to... all the semantic expressions of the Tathāgata."

7.121

If it is neither created nor uncreated, then it is neither cause nor effect. If it is neither cause nor effect, then it is neither a characteristic nor that which is characterized; thus it is said to be neither existent nor non-existent. If it is neither existent nor non-existent, then it is neither expression nor that which is expressed; thus it is said to transcend the four extremes (catuṣkoṭi). Falling into propositions is called the worldly realm; therefore, it is said that the four extremes are merely discourses conforming to the world. If that which transcends the four extremes exists merely as conventional discourse, then it is like the son of a barren woman. The son of a barren woman exists merely as a conventional expression and does not fall within the four extremes; because it does not so fall, it cannot be measured, and thus it is neither consciousness nor that which is perceived. The wise should know that all semantic expressions of the Tathāgata are also like this. How could there be phrases other than this, or identical to this, that constitute the Tathāgata's Dharmakāya?

7.122

"Mahāmati! As I have taught that all phenomena are without self... up to... the semantic expressions of the Tathāgata should be known to be likewise."

7.123

This cites past provisional teachings to illuminate the present ultimate truth. I previously taught as an expedient that all phenomena have no nature of an ātman, and thus taught non-self; it was not that the phenomena of the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas lack their own nature. Wishing to draw an analogy to the Dharmakāya being conjoined with the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas—having no intrinsic nature of saṃsāric skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, yet not lacking the eternally abiding intrinsic nature of the Dharmakāya—it therefore states: 'the semantic expressions of the Tathāgata should be known to be likewise.' Hence, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi Sūtra* (*Dichi jing*) explains two dharma-natures: first, the phenomenal dharma-nature, because its nature involves differentiation; second, the real dharma-nature, because its nature is genuine reality. The intrinsic nature of these phenomena of the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas is the phenomenal dharma-nature; the eternally abiding intrinsic nature of the Tathāgata's Dharmakāya is the real dharma-nature.

7.124

"Mahāmati! Just as a cow lacks the nature of a horse... up to... that all phenomena are without intrinsic nature is entirely like this."

7.125

For example, when cows and horses herd together, a cow lacks the nature of a horse, and a horse lacks the nature of a cow; regarding the body of the horse, one cannot say that the nature of a cow exists or does not exist, yet this does not mean the horse's body lacks its own intrinsic nature. This illustrates that when the Dharmakāya is conjoined with the phenomena of the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, regarding the Dharmakāya one cannot say that the nature of the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas exists or does not exist, yet this does not mean the Dharmakāya lacks its own intrinsic nature. Thus it is said: 'all phenomena are also like this: they lack self-characteristics, yet that they are not existent means they are existent.' Stating that they are 'not existent' means that they lack the intrinsic nature of [conditioned] phenomena; stating that they 'are existent' means that there is the eternally abiding intrinsic nature of the Dharmakāya. Yet this corresponds only to personal realization, and cannot be known by foolish worldlings. Why can they not know it? Because foolish worldlings have false conceptualizations (vikalpa), they simply cannot know it. Stating that 'all phenomena being empty, unborn, and without intrinsic nature is entirely like this' clarifies that the Tathāgata's Dharmakāya possesses the emptiness of all phenomena, being unborn, without intrinsic nature, and transcending existence and non-existence as an eternally abiding intrinsic nature; thus it says, 'know that it is entirely like this.'

7.126

"Mahāmati! The Tathāgata and the skandhas are neither different nor non-different... up to... all phenomena are also like this."

7.127

This clarifies that the Tathāgata's Dharmakāya and the phenomena of the five skandhas are free from identity and difference, which is why the horns of a cow are used as an analogy. As it is with the five skandhas, so it is with the dhātus, āyatanas, and all phenomena. This is self-evident from the sūtra text.

7.128

"Mahāmati! The Tathāgata is spoken of in dependence on liberation... up to... yet there is distinction, and therefore they are not non-different."

7.129

Above, it was explained that the Dharmakāya and the binding phenomena of the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas are free from difference and non-difference; here, it further explains that it is free from difference and non-difference with the supramundane dharma of liberation. The Tathāgata's Dharmakāya is spoken of by the name of liberation, stating that the Tathāgata and liberation are neither different nor non-different. If the Tathāgata were different from liberation, he would be identical to material form and thus impermanent; if the Tathāgata and liberation were identical, then there would be no distinction between the person and the attained dharma, and practitioners would see no distinction. Yet because there is a distinction between the person who realizes and the dharma that is attained, they are not identical. Therefore, the Tathāgata and liberation are free from difference and non-difference.

7.130

"Thus knowledge (jñāna) and the knowable (jñeya) are neither different nor non-different... up to... because there is no cessation, it is like empty space."

7.131

From here below, the true Dharmakāya of the Tathāgata is clarified: knowledge is the Dharmakāya; the knowable refers to the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas. This means that the true Dharmakāya knows that all cognitive objects are free from the false views of the four extremes such as existence and non-existence, identity and difference, permanence and impermanence, and transcends all mental measurements of seeing, perceiving, hearing, and knowing. It exists only as conventional speech, and being unborn and unceasing, it is like empty space. Hence the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* says: 'If you wish to know the mind of the Buddhas, you should contemplate the Buddha's wisdom; the Buddha's wisdom has no resting place, just as space has nothing to rely upon.'

7.132

"Mahāmati! Empty space is neither created nor that which is created... up to... eternally free from all faculties and sense objects."

7.133

Taking up what preceded, this re-explains and conclusively answers the question, clarifying that the Tathāgata's Dharmakāya, the Sambuddha, is eternally free from all cognitive domains of the faculties, and cannot be falsely measured by conceptual consciousness.

7.134

At that time, the World-Honoured One reiterated this in verse:
"Transcending the measure of all faculties, / neither effect nor cause,
characteristics, that which is characterized, and the like— / all such are entirely relinquished."

7.135

Below are seven verses praising the Dharmakāya as being free from conceptual thought and transcending the two views; this one generally clarifies that 'all such are entirely relinquished.'

7.136

"The conditions of the skandhas and the Sambuddha— / neither identity nor difference can be seen.
Since there is no seer, / how could conceptual differentiation arise?"

7.137

'The conditions of the skandhas' refers to the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas; 'the Sambuddha' refers to the Dharmakāya. This states that the Dharmakāya and the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas are free from identity and difference. If there is no seer, one cannot differentiate them as having identity or difference.

7.138

"Neither created nor that which is created, / neither cause nor non-cause,
neither the skandhas nor not the skandhas, / nor mixed with other things."

7.139

This states that the Dharmakāya is free from the faults of the aforementioned phenomena.

7.140

"It is not that there exists an entity of a dharma / as seen through their conceptual discrimination,
nor is it non-existent; / the nature of phenomena is like this."

7.141

This states that the Dharmakāya is not an existent entity of a dharma as perceived through the false conceptual discriminations of those foolish worldlings. Although it is not the nature seen by foolish worldlings, neither is it non-existent. 'The nature of phenomena is like this' means that the nature of phenomena is originally also like this: free from existence and free from non-existence, ineffable.

7.142

"In dependence on existence, non-existence is established; / in dependence on non-existence, existence is established.
Since non-existence cannot be grasped, / existence also should not be spoken of."

7.143

When the expedient teachings speak of existence and non-existence, it is because they arise in mutual dependence. To dispel the grasping at existence, non-existence is taught; to dispel falling into non-existence, existence is taught. If one says that the Dharmakāya transcends all measures, since non-existence cannot be grasped, how could existence ever be spoken of?

7.144

"Failing to understand self and non-self, / they merely cling to words.
Drowning in the two extremes, / they destroy themselves and destroy the world."

7.145

This means that foolish worldlings do not know that the Tathāgata's Dharmakāya is intrinsically free from existence and non-existence. Conceptualizing a self and a non-self, clinging to words, and drowning in the faults of all two extremes, they destroy themselves and destroy others, transmigrating through birth and death.

7.146

"If one can see this dharma, / one is free from all faults.
This is called correct contemplation, / not disparaging the Great Guide."

7.147

If one can see this Dharmakāya of the Tathāgata, one is free from all faults of existence and non-existence; therefore, this is called being able to contemplate correctly, not disparaging the essentials of the Dharma taught by the Guide.

7.148

At that time, the Bodhisattva Mahāsattva Mahāmati... up to... "Why is it said to be an alternate name for the Tathāgata?"

7.149

Because it was stated above that the Tathāgata's Dharmakāya has neither arising nor cessation, and also as the Buddha formerly in the sūtras conceptually identified non-arising and non-cessation, stating that this is an alternate name for the Tathāgata; yet since non-arising and non-cessation means there is no dharma, why is it said to be an alternate name for the Tathāgata? Mahāmati therefore brought up the contradiction between these two teachings to request that the Tathāgata harmonize them: Is it non-nature? Or is it an alternate name for the Tathāgata?

7.150

"As the World-Honoured One said that all phenomena... up to... I only pray that the World-Honoured One will explain it for my sake."

7.151

If phenomena do not arise, then not the slightest dharma can be apprehended; who then is the Tathāgata? This would fall into the view of non-existence. If one says that grasping non-arising and non-cessation is an alternate name for the Tathāgata, since there is something to be grasped, this would fall into the view of existence. Therefore, he again requests the World-Honoured One to explain it for him, so that he may avoid falling into the two views.

7.152

The Buddha said: "Listen attentively, and I will explain it for you... up to... bodhisattvas of the seventh bhūmi do not understand its meaning."

7.153

Stating that my calling non-arising and non-cessation an alternate name for the Tathāgata is not [to imply] a non-dharma answers the earlier question: 'this would be a non-dharma.' That it is also not a grasping of non-arising and non-cessation answers the earlier question: 'Why is it said to be an alternate name for the Tathāgata?' That it also does not depend on conditions answers the concern about falling into the view of existence. That it is also not devoid of meaning answers the concern about falling into the view of non-existence. When I speak of non-arising as neither identical nor separate, it is an alternate designation for the Tathāgata's mind-made Dharmakāya that awakens to the co-arising varieties of the intrinsic nature of phenomena. However, regarding this non-arising and non-cessation, because the mental measurements of foolish worldlings, non-Buddhists, dull-witted adherents of the two vehicles, and bodhisattvas of the seventh bhūmi have not yet ceased, it is not their domain, and none of them can understand it.

7.154

"Mahāmati! Just as Śakra, the earth, and empty space... up to... yet there are not multiple substances, nor is it devoid of substance."

7.155

This means that although the Buddha has distinctions of names, there is ultimately no different substance separately presented. Hence, he cites Śakra and even hands and feet: although each individual thing has many names, its substance is only one.

7.156

"Mahāmati! I am also like this... up to... and do not know that they are alternate names for the Tathāgata."

7.157

The Tathāgata, having answered Mahāmati's question above, first explained it in terms of Dharma and next cited analogies to illuminate it; here he again unifies the Dharma with the analogies. 'Asaṃkhyeya' here means 'countless'; the rest of the text can be understood.

7.158

"Among them, there may be some who know the Tathāgata... up to... like the moon in the water, neither emerging nor entering."

7.159

As above, fifty names that may be known are briefly enumerated to exemplify the great number. Viṣṇu here means 'Great Strength'. Kapila is the name of a city; because the Buddha was born in that city, he was therefore named the Kapila ṛṣi. Indra here means 'Venerable'. Proper translations for Kubera and Śuka have not been seen. Names such as these fill three countless hundreds of thousands of titles; their designations differ, yet their substance is only one, without increase or decrease. Those of sharp faculties in this world and other realms can know that the Tathāgata's Dharmakāya manifests in accordance with the minds of sentient beings, without really coming or going. Like the clear moon reflecting in many waters, how could there be any emerging or entering?

7.160

"Yet all foolish worldlings whose minds sink into the two extremes... up to... do not know that these are distinct designations of the Buddha."

7.161

This means that those foolish ones fall into the views of the two extremes. Although they also attend upon and make offerings, failing to understand names and their referents, they cling to spoken words and are blind to the fact that the Tathāgata's true Dharmakāya actually has no coming or going. Instead, they consider non-arising and non-cessation to be the same as a non-dharma, failing to realize that the Buddha manifests various names in accordance with the minds of sentient beings.

7.162

"Just as with Indra, Śakra, and the like... up to... claiming that the word is identical to the referent and that there is no separate entity of the referent."

7.163

Śakra here means 'Valiant'. 'And the like' refers to the rest. Indra, Śakra, and so on are all alternate names for Lord Śakra. Through vainly trusting in verbal teachings while blind to the real substance, they grasp referents according to words among phenomena. Those foolish ones speak thus: 'The referent is just as spoken, without any difference,' claiming that the word is identical to the referent and that its intrinsic entity is non-existent. Such people do not understand that speech arises and ceases, whereas the referent does not arise or cease.

7.164

"Mahāmati! That person is foolish... up to... because it is free from existence and non-existence, and because it is unborn and devoid of substance."

7.165

This clarifies that all spoken language falls into nominal designations, whereas the true referent does not fall into nominal designations. Because it is free from existence and non-existence, without taking rebirth, and devoid of bodily characteristics, it therefore does not fall [into designations].

7.166

"Mahāmati! The Tathāgata does not speak a Dharma that falls into written letters... up to... except for those who do not fall into written letters."

7.167

Although the dharmas taught by the Tathāgata in response to capacities fill the Dragon Palace and pervade the Dharmadhātu, in reality they do not fall into written letters and verbal teachings. Written letters and spoken language are originally detached in nature, except as expedients to correctly reveal the true meaning. Those who do not fall into nominal teachings have realized the subtle intention behind the Tathāgata's teaching of the Dharma.

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注大乘入楞伽經 — Classical Chinese