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Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3: (c) The Doctrine of Nirvāṇa

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s3

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(c) The Doctrine of Nirvāṇa

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The second fundamental point of difference between the doctrines of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, mentioned in the *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka*, lies in the conception of Nirvāṇa.

Hīnayānic Nirvāṇa: (I) Liberation from Duḥkhatā

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The Hinayānist considers himself afflicted with three kinds of misery (duḥkha), viz., (a) suffering due to mental and physical causes (*duḥkha-duḥkhatā*), (b) that inhering in caused and conditioned existences (*saṃskāra-duḥkhatā*) subject as they are to origin and destruction, and (c) that due to transformation of pleasurable sensations into painful ones e.g. (*vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā*)¹. He seeks release from these miseries incidental to life in any of the three worlds, Kāma, Rūpa, and Arūpa² (including the six ordinary forms of existence³) by realising the formula of the law of causation (pratītyasamutpāda) and the four āryasatyas, and the transitoriness (anityatā) and essencelessness (anātmatā) of the things of this world and the miseries to which they lead. The *Puṇḍarīka* concedes that many of the disciples of Buddha attained Arhatship or Nirvāṇa by perceiving the non-existence of anything corresponding to soul (ātmā) in any of the five categories of mental and physical elements (skandhas)⁴. The Hinayānists admit that their Nirvāṇa consists in a liberation from the three kinds of duḥkhatā, incidental to existence in the three laukikadhātus. Thus, according to the Hinayānic conception, beings obtain liberation by attaining nibbānadhātu without any residue¹. The Pāli works, canonical or post-canonical, agree on the point that this release is obtained by realising anityatā, duḥkhatā and anātmatā as well as pratītyasamutpannatā of the world.

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¹ *Sad. P.*, p. 109; *M. Vṛ.*, p. 475; *Mvyut.* 3; *Kośa*, vi, 3; Poussin, *Nirvāṇa*, p. 174; Burnouf, *Lotus* etc., p. 68; *Dīgha*, III, p. 216; *Saṃyutta*, IV, p. 259, V, p. 56. In the *Vibhaṅga-Aṭṭhakathā* (pp. 93-94) seven kinds of dukkhas are mentioned: dukkha-dukkham, vipariṇāmad., saṅkhārad., paticchannad., appaticchannad., pariyāyad., and nippariyāyad.

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² *Sad. P.*, pp. 100, 117, 132-3, *Samādhirāja* (B.T.S. ed.), p. 13; *Sūtrā.*, pp. 94, 128.

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³ *Sad. P.*, pp. 135-6; for the six gatis, see *Dīgha*, III, p. 264; *J.P.T.S.*, 1884, p. 152; *Annales du Musée Guimet*, V, pp. 514-528; *E.R.E.*, sv. Cosmogony and Cosmology.

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⁴ Cf. *Paṭis. M.*, I, p. 146.

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¹ DhP., 26: saṅkhāradukkhatāya loko anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā muñcati.

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What the Mahāyānists endeavour to point out is that the Hinayānists concern themselves with the realisation of the non-existence of a permanent entity like soul (Pudgala-nairātmya) and not of the non-existence of anything whatsoever supposed to exist (Dharma-nairātmya)². According to the Mahāyānists, this realisation attained by the Hinayānists cannot lead them to the ultimate Reality; it carries them only some distance towards the Truth, and hence Nirvāṇa in the real sense of the term cannot be said to be attained by them³. The Hinayānists, however, consider that they reach Nirvāṇa when they know that they will have no more birth as they have led the life of holiness (brahmacarya) and realised the pudgala-nairātmya. Some think, as the Laṅkāvatāra⁴ puts it, that Nirvāṇa is attained by comprehending what is really soul or personality; some others think that it is attained by penetrating into the truth that things are dependent on causes. But in fact, the Laṅkāvatāra⁵ adds, there is no real emancipation (mokṣa) without the realisation of Dharma-nairātmya. So the Hinayānists do not actually reach mokṣa; they are only tossed up and down by the properties (lakṣaṇa) of things like a log of wood by the waves.

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² Sūtrā., pp. 154-160; Laṅkā., pp. 68-69.

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³ Cf. Bodhic., p. 442: without the realisation of Śūnyatā, there may be nivṛti (quietude) but it is not permanent.

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⁴ Laṅkā., pp. 63-4.

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⁵ Laṅkā., p. 135.

(II) Passage from Nimitta to Animitta

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The Hinayānists, according to the Sūtrālaṅkāra⁶, have only personality as their basis (pudgala-nimitta) for meditation, and so they reach only Śrāvaka-bodhi or Pratyeka-bodhi and not Samyak-sambodhi, which can only be attained by making all dharmas (existent things and conditions) the basis (nimitta) for meditations¹. The Śrāvakas distinguish between a thing with signs (nimitta) and a thing without signs (animitta) and try to draw away their minds from all nimittas and apply them to the attainment of the animitta which they attain in due course. The Mahāyānists think that the dual conception of things cannot lead to mokṣa. They do not know of anything other than Tathatā (thatness of things); so to them a nimitta is equally an animitta, and consequently their knowledge, derived as it is on the basis of Tathatā alone, is free from all differentiations or dualism (dvayagrāha-vivarjiṭam)². By the remark that the Hinayānists distinguish between Nimitta and Animitta and consider that a person attains Animitta (=Nibbāna) by cogitating on the Animitta-dhātu and dissociating his mind from all things with signs, the Sūtrālaṅkāra³ refers in a general way to the practice of the Hinayānists to avoid rāga, dosa, moha and such other nimittas⁴ by which a being becomes entangled in worldly things. There are in the Nikāyas many passages of this import, e.g., in the Dīgha and Aṅguttara Nikāyas⁵ it is said that a person by inattention to all signs (of allurement) develops such a mental concentration that it may be described as animitta (without sign). But the prevalent meaning of Animitta in Pāli works is Nibbāna, the goal to be reached through the meditations (samādhis or vimokkhas) called suññata, appaṇihita and animitta. These vimokkhas help the adept to comprehend that the things of the world are essenceless (anatta), unpleasant (dukkha) and impermanent (anicca)¹. The Aṅguttara Nikāya² hints that a person puts an end to his āsavas (impurities) by dwelling on these three nimittas while the Aṭṭhasālini³ states that the five khandhas appear as frightful to a man as a dead body hung round his neck, if he understands the three lakkhaṇas (anicca, dukkha and anatta).

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⁶ Sūtrā., pp. 140.

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¹ Sūtrā., pp. 169-170.

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² For the exposition of Dharma-tattva as satatam dvayena rahitam, see Ibid., pp. 58 ff.

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³ Sūtrā., p. 169: Sarvanimittānām amanasikārād animittasya ca dhātor manasikārād animittam samāpadyante (as done by the Śrāvakas and not by Bodhisattvas).

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⁴ Mahāniddesa, I, p. 198: Rūpanimitta, saddan., gandhan., rasan., phoṭṭhabban., and dhamman.

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⁵ Aṅguttara, III, pp. 292, 397; Dīgha, II, 100: Yasmim samaye tathāgato sabbanimittānam amanasikārā ekaccānam vedanānam nirodho animittam cetosamādhim upasampajja viharati; Paṭis. M., I, p. 91: Nimittam bhayato sampassamāno animitte adhimuttattā pavattam ajjhupekkhitvā nirodham nibbānam animittam āvajjitvā samāpajjitvā etc.; see also Vis. M., p. 672; Mahāniddesa, I, p. 198.

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¹ These three are called also lakkhaṇas (properties of worldly things). Cf. Jāt., I, p. 48 : Buddhānañ ca dhammadesanā tilakkhaṇamuttā nāma natthi, tesam aniccadukkhamanattā ti . . .

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² Aṅguttara, III, p. 319.

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³ Aṭṭha., p. 225.

(III) Removal of Kleśāvaraṇa and not Jñeyāvaraṇa

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The Laṅkāvatāra⁴ while explaining the position of the Hinayānists says that they believe in the reality of saṃsāra (worldly existence) and are frightened by its attendant miseries from which they seek release; this is only due to their ignorance of the non-existence of any difference between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. The standpoint of the Hinayānists is that the world or things around us are produced out of the five skandhas or seventy-two elements having real existence. The constituted things which originate through some causes and conditions (pratītyasamutpanna) are in a constant state of flux and devoid of any substance.⁵ The mental and physical constituents undergo momentary (kṣaṇika) changes and there is no permanent entity apart from them. It is by the removal of the notion of the existence of an ātman as identical with one of the skandhas or something apart from them that a person attains Nirvāṇa.

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⁴ Laṅkā., p. 61.

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⁵ Paṭis. M., II, p. 177 devotes a chapter to the exposition of Suñña. The general definition offered by it is that the things of the world are devoid of attā or attaniya. Then it says that the Suñña can be explained in 24 ways, viz., suññasuññaṃ, saṅkhārasuññaṃ, vipariṇāmasuññaṃ, etc., up to paramatthasuññaṃ (=Nibbāna). The various suññas may well be compared to the 18 kinds of the Śūnyatās of the Mahāyāna scriptures.

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The Mahāyānists do not admit the real existence of the skandhas or elements composing a being. They assert that the skandhas exist only in imagination (vikalpa) or are illusory conceptions (māyā) held by the so-called beings suffering from a defective vision due to ignorance. So the Truth, according to the Mahāyānists, is Śūnyatā or Dharma-nairāt-mya. The Puṇḍarīka¹ therefore says that he who knows the dharmas as devoid of ātman knows the truth. It is because one does not possess this knowledge of the essencelessness of dharmas (śūnya-jñāna-vihīnatvāt) that one is called a Śrāvaka. The Kāśyapa Parivarta sarcastically compares the Pudgala-śūnyatā of the Śrāvakas with the hole made by a termite, and the Dharmaśūnyatā of the Bodhisattvas with the infinite space (ākāśa).² Of the seven reasons adduced by the Sūtrālaṅkāra to show why Mahāyāna should be considered superior to Hinayāna, one is that the knowledge of the Mahāyānists is on a higher level, for it penetrates both Pudgala-nairāt-mya and Dharma-nairāt-mya.³ The Triṃśikā⁴ brings out very clearly the difference between Pudgala- and Dharma-nairāt-mya. It says that the realisation of the two forms of Nairāt-mya is needed for the removal of the two screens (āvaraṇa) viz., that of passions (kleśa) and that hindering true knowledge (jñeya). The passions of desire, attachment, etc. arise on account of a belief in a self; so when one realises the non-existence of self, his egoism is destroyed, and as a result his passions are eliminated. The realisation of the non-existence of the things of this world (dharma-nairāt-mya) removes the screen over true knowledge. The removal of both the screens is needed for the attainment of emancipation (mokṣa) and omniscience (sarvajñatva). The passions are obstacles to the attainment of emancipation (mokṣaprāpterāvaraṇam); hence the removal of passions leads to mokṣa. The screen of jñeya works as a hindrance to the functioning of knowledge (jñāna), i.e., in the apperception of things through knowledge. When it is removed knowledge penetrates unhindered into all objects of knowledge in detail (sarvākāra) without, however, causing attachment of any kind and this is called the attainment of omniscience or Bodhi.

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¹ Sad. P., p. 138; Kāś. P., pp. 115f.

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² Kāś. P., 114, Pañca., leaves 77, 78.

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³ Sūtrā., p. 171.

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⁴ Siddhi, p. 15; cf. Sūtrā., p. 94.

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The Hīnayānists, however, do not admit that they shake off only the kleśāvaraṇa and not jñeyāvaraṇa as stated by the Mahāyānists. They contend that by the removal of the screen of actions (karmāvaraṇa), of the effects of karma (vipākāvaraṇa) and of afflictions (kilesāvaraṇa),¹ the Arhats attain full knowledge without any veil (anāvaraṇa).² They completely eradicate from their minds the āsavas including the avijjāsava. Of the three branches of their spiritual culture, viz., sīla, samādhi and paññā, the last, according to them, brings home to an Arhat the Truth,³ which is the same for Arhats and Buddhas. The function of Paññā consists in destroying Avijjā, the veil of ignorance, the source of worldly existences, and therefore, of all miseries (dukkha). It is Avijjā, which (i) causes experience of things which ought not to be experienced, e.g., evils through thoughts, words and deeds; (ii) veils things which ought to be known, e.g., the merit of observance of good conduct and so forth; (iii) acts as a hindrance to the realisation of the fact that the five khandhas are in reality an undifferentiated heap (rasatthaṃ), and that the perceptions of the organs of sense are essenceless and that the truths are the same tathatthaṃ;⁴ (iv) drives (javāpeti) beings into the various forms of existence in the Kāma, Rūpa, and Arūpa worlds without cessation; (v) causes one to discriminate between things which in the ultimate analysis have no real difference and clouds one’s vision from the real nature of the khandhas; and (vi) blinds one to the relative nature of the world, *i.e.*, its dependence on causes and conditions (paṭicca-samuppana).¹ By the complete removal of this Avijjā through paññā, a person becomes Arhat and reaches the state which is beyond change, beyond destruction—the state of immortality. There can be no state higher than this. The Hinayānists acknowledge that the Buddhas by their extraordinary merits accumulated in the past acquire omniscience (sabbaññutañāṇa)² and many other powers unattainable by Arhats,³ but they do not admit that the Nibbāna of Buddha is different from that of an Arhat. The knowledge (ñāṇa) acquired by Arhats and Buddhas is *anāvaraṇa* (without any veil) with this difference in the case of a Buddha that his knowledge is detailed and superior in some respects to that of the Arhats.⁴

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¹ The Mahāyānists perhaps made capital out of the statements very often found in the Hīnayāna works like “Arahattamaggena sabbakilesehi vimuccatīti”. Paṭis. M., II, p. 243.

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² Paṭis. M., I, pp. 124, 131.

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³ Ibid., II, pp. 31, 244: arhattamaggena sabbakilese saṃvaratthena sīlavisuddhi, avikkepatthena cittavisuddhi, dassanatthena diṭṭhivisuddhi.

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⁴ Paṭis. M., p. 104 explains tathatthaṃ thus: Cattāro dukkhassa dukkhatthā tathā avitathā anaññathā; dukkhassa pīlanattho saṅkhatattho santāpattho vipariṇāmattho...Evaṃ dukkhaṃ tathatthena saccam. In this way the other truths are also explained.

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¹ *Vis. M.*, p. 526.

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² *Kvu.*, xxi, 3; i. 2.

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³ For a comparison of the powers (bala) of Arhats and Buddhas, see *Paṭis. M.*, II, pp. 173 ff.

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⁴ *Paṭis. M.*, I, pp. 131 ff; II, pp. 31, 32. The Buddhas possess 14 ñāṇas, of which eight are common to the Arhats and Buddhas.

(IV) Transition from Laukika to Lokottara

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It is stated in the *Puṇḍarīka* that the Hinayānists conceive of Nirvāṇa as passing from the worldly (*laukikadhātu*) to the transcendental sphere (*lokottaradhātu*), *i.e.*, the Hinayānic Nirvāṇa is a transcendental state beyond the three dhātus free from every kind of affliction and beyond any possibility of retrogression to lower stages. The *Laṅkāvatāra*⁵ points out that ordinary knowledge (*laukikajñāna*) of the people of the world has reference to the existence and non-existence of things (*sad asat pakṣābhiniviṣṭa*) while the transcendental knowledge (*lokottarajñāna*) possessed by the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas has reference to the particular and generic characteristics of things (*svasāmānyalakṣaṇa-patitāśayābhiniviṣṭa*)⁶ penetrating through the notion of existence and non-existence of things. The distinction between laukika and lokottara as drawn in the *Puṇḍarīka* and *Laṅkāvatāra* finds support in the Hinayāna scriptures. There it is stated that the puthujjanas (non-sotāpannas) labour under the notion of individual existence in the worlds while the arhats are free from such notion, as they know that all beings are made of five skandhas devoid of an underlying permanent entity and owing their origin to causes and conditions (pratityasamutpanna), and that the common characteristics of beings are anityatā, duḥkhatā and anātmatā.

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⁵ *Laṅkā.*, p. 157.

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⁶ *Kośa*, VI, 14c.d.: svalakṣaṇa=le caractère propre; sāmānyalakṣaṇa=les caractères généraux.

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The *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, *Vibhaṅga* and other works speak of four dhātus, viz., Kāma, Rūpa, Arūpa and Apariyāpanna or Lokuttara.¹ *Kāmadhātu* is the world of beings having vatthukāma (desire for existence in any of the three worlds) and kilesakāma (proneness to passion). It comprises the eleven spheres of existence from the Avici hell to the Paranimmita heaven.² In *Kāmadhātu*, the beings possess 5 khandhas, 12 āyatanas, 18 dhātus, 32 indriyas, 9 hetus, 7 kinds of phassa, vedanā, saññā, cetanā and citta, are conversant with the 3 truths and dependent on 4 āhāras.³ *Rūpadhātu* is the world of beings without kāma (passion), their actions being subtle (sukhuma)⁴ in contrast to those of kāmadhātu whose actions are oḷārika (gross). It comprises sixteen planes of existence from Brahmaloka to Akanittha heaven.⁵ In this dhātu, the beings possess 5 khandhas, 6 āyatanas, 9 dhātus, 14 indriyas, 8 hetus, and 4 kinds of phassa, vedanā, saññā, cetanā and citta, are conversant with 3 truths and dependent on 3 āhāras. *Arūpa*- dhātu is the world of beings without kāma (passion) and rūpa (material constituents of a body). It contains the gods residing in the four spheres from the ākāsānañcāyatana to nevasaññā-nāsaññāyatana.¹ In this dhātu the beings possess 4 khandhas, 2 āyatanas, 2 dhātus, 11 indriyas, 8 hetus, one kind of phassa, vedanā, saññā, cetanā and citta, are conversant with 3 truths and dependent on 3 āhāras.

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¹ *Vis. M.*, p. 493; *Paṭis. M.*, I, p. 83.

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² *Attha.*, pp. 61-2; *Paṭis. M.*, I, p. 83. The eleven spheres are the six Devalokas, Manussaloka, Petaloka, Tiracchānayoni and Niraya.

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³ *Vibh.*, p. 404.

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⁴ *Vis. M.*, p. 475.

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⁵ These are called *Rūpabrahmalokas*. By practising the first jhāna an adept develops a state of mind which is similar to that of the denizens of the first three Rūpabrahmalokas. Should the adept die after perfecting himself in this jhāna, it is believed that he will be reborn in one of those three lokas, which are therefore called *Paṭhamajjhānabhūmi*. Applying the same reason, the second three Rūpabrahmalokas are called *Dutiyajjhānabhūmi*, third three *Tatiyajjhānabhūmi*, the tenth and eleventh *Catutthajjhānabhūmi*, and the remaining five *Suddhāvāsabhūmi*.

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¹ These four are called Arūpabrahmalokas. The adepts, as above, by practising the Ākāsānañcāyatana and other jhānas rise to the same level as the gods of the Ākāsānanta and other āyatanas.

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These three dhātus contain all the beings of the universe from the lowest to the highest plane of existence. The aim of Hīnayāna Buddhism is to reach a plane beyond the three dhātus, called the Apariyāpanna- or Lokuttara-dhātu (the unincluded or transcendental sphere. According to the Paṭisambhidāmagga² it contains those beings who have reached the four maggas and have obtained the four maggaphalas or the Asaṅkhata, i.e., Nibbāna. The Vibhaṅga³ explains that the beings of Apariyāpannadhātu possess khandhas and āyatanas similar to those of Arūpadhātu with the difference that the former are conversant with two truths (nirodha and magga), possess one additional power, viz., anaññātaññassāmitindriya and 6 hetus.⁴ Evidently, the texts have in view those sentient beings of the first three dhātus, who come to possess one of the stages of sanctification including Arhathood. The texts, however, do not explain how a being belonging to the Kāma- or Rūpa-dhātu and possessing one of the stages of sanctification can be without the rūpakkhandha and how one possessed of the Asaṅkhata or Nibbāna can continue to have the khandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, etc.,⁵ which are the attributes of the members of Apariyāpanna- and Arūpadhātu. Thus we find that the Hīnayānists seek release from the three laukikadhātus by attaining the lokuttara- or apariyāpanna-dhātu, which includes the Asaṅkhata- or Nibbāna-dhātu.

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² Paṭis. M., I, p. 84.

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³ Vibh., p. 407.

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⁴ Buddhaghosa points out that in reality one cannot speak of lokuttarāni viññāṇāni.

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⁵ Vis. M., p. 545.

Nirvāṇa According to the Early Mahāyāna Works

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The Hinayānic Nirvāṇa thus according to the *Puṇḍarīka*¹ is a haven of peace and rest and is a *vimukti* (emancipation) so far as the *kleśas*² (afflictions) are concerned. It further says that there may be people who may look upon this form of existence as Nirvāṇa and regard the Hinayānists as right in their ways of thinking and practising. In order to counteract such a supposition it states that there is one and only one Nirvāṇa, not two or three, and that one is and can be attained only by a thorough comprehension of the sameness of all things (*sarvadharma-samatāvabodhat*)³. The conception of *Samatā* (sameness) has been developed in the *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, which gives five meanings of same. It says that a being after comprehending *Dharmasamatā* (sameness of things) and realising the non-substantiality of things (*dharmanairātmya*) sees that in the series of existences whether of himself or of others, there is no difference as regards *nairātmya* (essencelessness) and *duḥkha* (misery); that the desire for the removal of misery from himself as well as from others is the same; that the remedy applicable is the same for himself as well as for others; and that the knowledge attained by the bodhisattvas is the same as that attained by him⁴. The *Laṅkāvatāra*⁵ explains *samatā* (sameness) by saying that it is the sameness of the world (*saṃsāra*) and its cessation (*nirvāṇa*), *i.e.*, *saṃsāra* bears to *nirvāṇa* the same relation as waves bear to water. The *Pañcaviṃśati*⁶ explains *samatā* by the illustration of *Ākāśa* (space). It says that Ākāśa has no direction like east or west, no past, present or future, no increase or decrease, no contamination or purification. It has no origin, continuity or decay. It cannot be a subject of thought. It can neither be heard nor seen; it is neither known nor unknown. It has nothing to do with the Kāma, Rūpa or Arūpa dhātus, with attachment or non-attachment, with hatred or non-hatred and so forth. It has no concern with the various cittotpādas (i.e., the development of citta for attainment of bodhi), bhūmis (stages of spiritual progress), phalas (fruits of spiritual sanctification), or any conceptions like happiness (sukha), misery (duḥkha), quietude (śānta), excellence (paṇīta), etc. This is what is called the samatā (sameness) of Ākāśa. It is in this light that the things of the world are to be seen. What the Pañcaviṃśati contends for is that, from the standpoint of reality, the things seen, heard or known by us are, in fact, the outcome of our imagination. What we should do is to regard these things as our fancies, because they are really the same as Tathatā, of which nothing can be predicated, just as nothing can be predicated of Ākāśa.

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¹ *Sad. P.*, pp. 129, 136-7.

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² *Sūtrā.*, p. 119; *M. Vr.*, p. 519: Tatra niravaśeṣasyāvidyārāgādikasya kleśaganasya prahāṇāt sopadhiśeṣam nirvāṇam iṣyate.

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³ *Sad. P.*, p. 133; see p. 143: sarvadharmāḥ samāḥ sarve samāḥ samasamāḥ sadā, Evam jñātvā vijānāti nirvāṇam amṛtam śivam.

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⁴ *Sūtrā.*, p. 94; see p. 48: samacittatā sarvasattesv ātmaparasamatayā.

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⁵ *Laṅkā.*, p. 42: saṃsāra-nirvāṇa-samatā; *M. Vr.*, ch. xxv: na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiñcid asti viśeṣanam. For an exposition of Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa as one, see Suzuki's *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 352-6; Y. Sogen's *System etc.*, pp. 40-1.

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⁶ *Pañca.* (A.S.B. ms.), leaves 114 ff; *Śata.*, pp. 1560 ff.

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According to the Puṇḍarīka, the real Nirvāṇa is that state in which one sees things without any differentiation or dichotomy, and for the description of which all the expressions that can be used by man, relative as they are, are inadequate. The Laṅkāvatāra¹ describes the jñāna of Bodhisattvas as the lokottaratama-jñāna (super-transcendental knowledge), as distinguished from the lokottarajñāna of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas and laukika-jñāna of pṛthagjana (common persons). It consists in the realisation of all dharmas as mere reflections, having no origin and decay. Hence, no question of existence and non-existence can arise in regard to this (nirābhāsadharmapravicayād anirodhānutpada-darśanāt sad asat pakṣavigatam).

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¹ Laṅkā., p. 157.

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The Mahāyānists, however, concede the point that the Arhats can remain at peace in the state called by the Hinayānists Arahathood or Nirvāṇa but, according to them, it is a lower ideal, a selfish end, devoid of love (sneha)¹ and charity. The Puṇḍarīka² states that the arhats after attaining (Hīnayānic) Nirvāṇa do not, in fact, wish to stay there for ever; it is only a temporary rest (viśrāmo'yam na nivṛtiḥ)³. At this stage, they become capable of realising the nature of the Truth and the powers and privileges appertaining to a Buddha, who is indistinguishable from that Truth. Then they set themselves to the performance of the duties still remaining, and ultimately become Buddhas, *i.e.*, attain Nirvāṇa properly so called. They now realise that the three dhātus, from which they have so long struggled to extricate themselves, had no existence whatsoever,⁴ and were merely imaginary superimpositions (parikalpanā).⁵ The three dhātus that are seen in the ten directions are only appearances like a mirage; hence they cannot have origination, destruction or transformation, bondage or freedom, light or darkness. As they are non-existent like things in a dream or a mirage, any statement about them would be inappropriate. Unless one realises the things of this universe in this way, he cannot obtain Nirvāṇa (sarvadharma na prāptāḥ kutas tasya nirvāṇam iti).⁶ One who has developed bodhicitta never thinks himself as existing either in saṃsāra or nirvāṇa. Hence, an Arhat aspiring to comprehend the ultimate truth should not think of himself as having gone beyond Saṃsāra and established himself in Nirvāṇa. Thus the Puṇḍarīka brings out clearly the difference between the Hīnayānic and Mahāyānic Nirvāṇa.

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¹ Sūtrā., pp. 126-7: Niḥsnehānām śrāvaka-pratyekabuddhānām sarvaduḥkhopaśame nirvāṇe pratiṣṭhitam manaḥ.

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² Sad. P., pp. 132-3, 138, 140; cf. Pañca. (A.S.B. ms.), leaf 70b.

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³ Sad. P., pp. 142, 188. Cf. 5 kinds of Nirvāṇa in the Brahmajāla Sutta. Dr. E. J. Thomas in his Life of Buddha, p. 200 refers to it thus, "They hold that Nirvāṇa consists in the enjoyment of this life in five ways, either in the pleasures of sense or one of the four trances".

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⁴ Sad. P., p. 318.

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⁵ Sūtrā., p. 94; sa traidhātukātmasamskārān abhūtapari-kalpanāmātrān paśyati.

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⁶ Cf. Das Gupta's Indian Philosophy, pp. 425, 426, 428 referring to Gauḍapāda's definition of the Absolute. The close agreement between the views of the Sad. P., and Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍukyakārikā will be evident from the following passages: Sad. P., p. 318: Dṛṣṭam hi tathāgatena traidhātukam yathābhūtam na jāyate na mriyate na cyavate nopapadyate na saṃsarati na parinirvāti na bhūtam nābhūtam na sattvam nāsattvam na tathā nānyathā na vitathā nāvitathā. Traidhātukam tathāgatena dṛṣṭam yathā bala-pṛthagjanā na paśyanti...

Existence of Soul is Denied but Nirvāṇa is not Annihilation

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Of late, many scholars have tried to elicit from the various passages of the Nikāyas dealing with Nirvāṇa the sense which Buddha had in his mind, or at least the sense with which the earliest Buddhism started. Most of the earlier scholars, who did the pioneering work in the field of Buddhism, namely, Childers, Burnouf, Hardy were inclined to interpret Nirvāṇa as annihilation or to use the common Indian term Ucchedavāda, a dogma which was opposed to the view of the early Buddhists.¹ Professor La Vallée Poussin suggests that this conclusion of the scholars was an inevitable consequence of the denial of soul by the early Buddhists.²

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¹ Cf. Saṃyutta, iii, p. 109: Yamaka harboured the wrong view that Buddha taught that a khīṇāsavo bhikkhu kāyassa bhedā bhijjatti vinassati na hoti param maraṇā.

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² Nirvāṇa, pp. vii f.

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The conception of soul and the denial of its existence in the early Buddhist literature constitute as complicated a problem as the interpretation of Nirvāṇa. As the conception of one largely depends on the other, we shall state here briefly the position of the early Buddhists as to their conception of Pudgala (soul). The Theravādins are explicit in their statement that the five khandhas, viz., rūpa (material aggregates), vedanā (feeling), saññā (perception), saṅkhārā (impressions) and viññāṇa (consciousness) are the ultimates,

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Māṇḍukya, ii. 31, 32: Svapnamāye yathā dṛṣṭe gandharvanagaram yathā, tathā viśvam idaṃ dṛṣṭam vedānteṣu vicakṣaṇaiḥ. Na nirodho na cotpattir na baddho na ca sādhakaḥ, na mumukṣur na vai mukta ity eṣā paramārthatā.
Māṇḍukya, iv. 68: Yathā svapnamayo (māyāmayo or nirmitako) jīvo jāyate mriyate' pi ca, tathā jīvā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca.

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to which the composition of the world can be reduced. The mass (khandha or saṅgaha) of material aggregates, feeling, etc., would have remained in their original state dissociated from each other if avijjā (ignorance) had not stepped in and constituted (saṅkhata) out of them a being (sattā) with the sense of ‘I’. When and how this avijjā of the truth—that the five khandhas remain ever dissociated¹ from each other and do not form an individual—came into existence and brought endless miseries has not been told by any teacher not even by Buddha (purimā koṭi na paññāyati avijjāya).² Evidently, the five khandhas alone constitute a being and there is nothing as the sixth, which can be regarded as Attā or soul. But still one cannot deny the fact that of the five khandhas viññāṇa³ (perception) is the most active constituent and is mainly instrumental in the formation of a being (nāma-rūpa). It is produced from Saṅkhārā,⁴ which again issue out of avijjā.⁵ According to Buddhaghosa, the belief in a self arises with the ninth link (viz., upādāna)⁶ of the chain of causation. Hence, on upādāna hinge the origin and cessation of worldly existence. The belief in a self (ahaṅkāra) is nothing but the false notion of the undisciplined men of the world⁷ that one of the five khandhas is soul (attā). It corresponds to the false notion of Ahaṅkāra as conceived by the teachers of the Sāṃkhya and Vedānta. The Buddhist conception of self (attā) is therefore as much imaginary as the notion of ahaṅkāra in the Brāhmanic systems of philosophy.

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¹ Usually the Pāli texts speak of Avijjā as ignorance of the four ariyasaccas. In the Vis. M., (pp. 198, 525) it is equated to bhavataṇhā (desire for existence) and in another place (p. 526) it is explained as “khandhānam rāsaṭṭham, āyatanānam āyatanattham, dhātūnam suññattham, indriyānam adhipatiyattham, saccānam tathattham aviditam karotī ti avijjā. Paramatthato avijjamānesu itthipurisādīsu javati, vijjamānesu pi khandhādisu na javati ti avijjā. Api ca cakkhuviññāṇādīnam vatthārammanam paṭiccasamuppāda-paṭiccasamupannā ca dhammānam chādanato pi avijjā.

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² Vis. M., p. 525.

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³ Viññāṇa=six forms of perception through the six organs of sense, viz., cakkhu, sota, ghāṇa, jivhā, kāya and mano.

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⁴ Viz., puññābhisaṅkhāro apuññābhisaṅkhāro āneñjabhisaṅkhāro, kāyasaṅkhāro vacisaṅkhāro cittasaṅkhāro. Vibhaṅga, p. 135.

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⁵ For a full explanation of Avijjā, see Vis. M., p. 526.

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⁶ Vis. M., p. 569: Upādāna is of four kinds: kāmupādānam, diṭṭhupā°, sīlabbatupā°, and attavādupā°.

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⁷ Dh. S. 1217; Vibh., p. 375.

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Vasubandhu’s appendix to the eighth chapter of the Abhidharmakośa¹ and the first section of the Kathāvatthu throw a flood of light upon the early Buddhist theory of soul. In fact, in the Nikāyas the existence of soul is not categorically denied in answer to direct questions on that point.² What the early Buddhists held was that there is no such thing as soul in the sense which had come to be widely accepted previous to the advent of Buddhism, viz., as a persisting, unchangeable entity. "In Buddhism", says Mr. Shwe Zan Aung, "there is no actor apart from action, no percipient apart from perception. In other words there is no conscious subject behind consciousness...Subject, in Buddhism, is not the self-same permanent conscious object but merely a transitory state of consciousness".³ This conception is identical with Bergson’s conception of mind or soul, spirit or ego. Mind or soul, according to Bergson, is not "some sort of permanent substantial reality on which the various states of consciousness are beaded as on a string.... The states of consciousness are each of them the entire mind in one of the phases of its continuous movement... They are not parts or fragments of the mind, members in an endless series which, for no reason, we choose to regard as a unity and call by a single name".⁴ In Buddhism, the conception of soul as a permanent entity is not only wrong but works as an obstacle to the comprehension of the unreality and transitoriness of things of this world. When Buddhism arose, the term ātman had become so very common, and so much associated with the attributes ascribed to it by the teachers of the early Upaniṣads that the Buddhists had no other alternative than to deny its existence as far as possible in order to wipe out from the minds of the people all the deep-rooted ideas. Besides, Buddhism started with the premises that everything whatsoever except Nirvāṇa is unreal;¹ so there could not be any real soul. But it could not do away with the word ātman, for the Buddhist texts tell us that the early expositors could not help using the current expressions in propounding their doctrines. They wanted to impress on the minds of the people that there is a continuity of the skandhas kept up by action (karma) but there is no persisting, unchangeable and indestructible entity to keep up that continuity. Professor Stcherbatsky puts it thus: “A personality (pudgala), in which other systems imagine the presence of a permanent spiritual principle, a soul (ātman), is in reality a bundle of elements or forces (saṃskārasamūha) and a stream of thought (santāna). It contains nothing permanent or substantial, it is anātma”.² This definition of soul struck at the root of the supposition of any permanent entity and served fully the purpose of Buddhism, viz., to show that there is nothing in the world to which one can cling as real and permanent and so he must develop a state of mind in which he must drift to the ultimate, real state called Nirvāṇa, without having anything to cling to in the intermediate process.

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¹ Stcherbatsky, Soul Theory of the Buddhists (published by the Royal Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg); La Vallée Poussin, Fr. translation of the Kośa, ch. ix.

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² E.g., Dīgha, I, pp. 185 ff; Stcherbatsky, Soul Theory of the Buddhists, (p. 846) shows that Buddha would have said ‘tam jīvam tam sarīram’ if the questioner had not meant by Jīva a soul “as a real living unit, controlling our actions from within”. As an answer in the positive or negative about such a soul would be like the discussion about the hardness or softness of the hair of a tortoise, Buddha had to be silent on the point (avyākata).

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³ Comp. of Phil., pp. 7, 8.

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⁴ Philosophies, Ancient and Modern, Bergson by J. Solomon (Constable and Co., 1911), p. 36.

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¹ The nature of unreality varies with the two forms of Buddhism, Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna; for a discussion of this, see infra.

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² Con. of N., p. 8.

Four Lines of Interpretation in the Nikāyas

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Scholars who took the passages in the Buddhist literature on the denial of soul too literally, without considering the motive for the denial of the soul made at a particular place and in reply to the query of a particular person, believed that the early Buddhists did not admit the existence of soul and that hence the finality reached by perfect beings was complete annihilation, the absence of existence altogether. There were also some scholars, not very many among the earlier group, who inclined to the view that Nirvāṇa was not annihilation but an inexpressible state corresponding to the Vedāntic Brahman. All these scholars, although they held one or other of the two views, complete annihilation or eternal, inexpressible existence, often admitted that Buddha was an agnostic and did not give a definite answer to any of the queries of a metaphysical character, viz., whether there is a soul, or what really is Nirvāṇa. Thus, the opinions of scholars can be classified as follows:—

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(i) That Nirvāṇa is annihilation;¹

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¹ Cf. Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 351 quoting the Vimalakīrtisūtra: "Non-activity and eternal annihilation were cherished by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas".

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(ii) That Nirvāṇa is an inconceivable and inexpressible eternal state;

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(iii) That Nirvāṇa has been left undefined (avyākṛta) by Buddha.² To these may be added the interpretation of Buddhaghosa

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² See La Vallée Poussin, *Nirvāṇa*, pp. 9, 87 ff.; also *E.R.E.*, II, p. 377 and his *Way to Nirvāṇa*, p. 134; Beal, *Catena* etc., p. 172. According to Colebrooke, Nirvāṇa=profound calm; " " Hardy, Burnouf, Childers, Nirvāṇa=extinction; " " Max Müller, Nirvāṇa=rest; " " Oldenberg, Nirvāṇa=supreme happiness.

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(iv) That Nirvāṇa is eternal, pure and infinite consciousness.

Nikāyas, a Mosaic of Materials of Different Times and Places

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It should be observed that all those scholars, who arrived at these conclusions, cited passages from the texts of the Nikāyas in support of their findings, and that the views taken by them in most cases followed naturally from those passages. In these circumstances, we have to admit that the Nikāyas as a whole do not present a coherent system of philosophy and doctrine, but the question is whether, in view of the fact that the Nikāyas took centuries to grow and attain a definite shape, we are entitled to expect from them a coherent system. The Nikāyas are, in fact, a mosaic made up of materials of various times and places, wide apart from each other; hence, it would not be reasonable to expect from them a coherent interpretation of Nirvāṇa. The ancient teachers, too, were puzzled in regard to the correct interpretation of Nirvāṇa, but they never attempted to discover a consistency in the passages of the Nikāyas as a whole. It will be seen from the discussions preserved in the Kathāvatthu and the Abhidharmakośa that these disputants cited a set of passages in support of their contentions, and not any particular Nikāya or Sūtra. To these ancient disputants each saying was independent, and carried the weight which a number of sayings would do. It is, however, striking that the disputants never questioned the authenticity of the passages cited by their opponents. This shows that a disputant only preferred one set of passages to another and built his theories on that set. The Nikāyas evidently are only a collection of these various passages put in a uniform setting and given the garb of the sūtras. Attempts, of course, are now being made to sift these sūtras and find out the various strata, but it is doubtful how far the efforts will be fruitful in the absence of new evidences. It may be contended that a Piṭaka is a collection of texts made by a particular school of Buddhist thought, and that consistency should be apparent or discoverable in the passages of that Piṭaka. The contention seems reasonable, but the facts are against it. Professor Poussin has discovered in the Nikāyas many passages cited by the Sarvāstivādins in the Kośa in support of their contentions, while Mrs. Rhys Davids and Mr. Aung have identified many of the citations of the opponents of the Theravādins in the Pāli Piṭaka, the collection of the Theravādins. This fact indicates that the collection of Pāli sūtras was not made with any sectarian motive and that the compilers of the Pāli Tripiṭaka included in it all the sayings that they could find out, excepting, very probably, some which went directly against their creeds and dogmas,¹ and for the rejection of which they took the plea of unauthenticity. It is now fairly well known that each Nikāya developed by itself under the special attention of a group of reciters called Bhāṇakas who confined themselves exclusively to the preservation of that particular collection.² Buddhaghosa, although an orthodox adherent of the Theravāda school, had to acknowledge that even these bhāṇakas differed among themselves regarding the use and sense of certain technical expressions.³ Thus, we see, that even the orthodox supporters of the Pāli Tipiṭakas believed that the Nikāyas did not agree in all their interpretations. We should also bear in mind the significant remark found in the Kośa⁴ that many sūtras were lost, that many of the sūtras underwent slight changes, and that new ideas and expositions were woven around them in such a way that the accretions conveyed a sense different from that of the kernel around which they were set.⁵

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¹ A hint to this effect is seen in the Dīpavaṃsa, ch. iv.

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² Sum. Vil., p. 15.

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³ Vis. M., p. 95: Majjhima-bhāṇaka Revatthera; p. 275: idaṃ tāva Dīghabhāṇaka-Samyuttabhāṇakānaṃ mataṃ. Majjhimabhāṇaka pana etc. See also pp. 286, 431.

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⁴ Kośa, ii. 55, p. 278 fn. sūtrāni ca bahūny antarhitāni mūlasaṅgīti-bhraṃsāt.

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⁵ Cf. Prof. Poussin's remark in his Nirvāṇa, p. 9: "La vieille tradition scripturaire (Petit Véhicule), codifiée, renouvelée, amplifiée par les écoles, est mal datée, en partie tardive, point toujours claire, contradictoire sinon dans ses dogmes du moins dans ses tendences". See also p. 133.

Nirvāṇa, the Inconceivable State, the Infinite Consciousness

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On account of this admixture of materials, it is possible to make a selection of passages of the Pāli Nikāyas in such a way as to substantiate any one of the four interpretations of Nirvāṇa to which we have referred. The passages which give the impression that Nirvāṇa is annihilation, if read in the light of other passages, which interpret Nirvāṇa as an inconceivable existence, may convey a sense different from annihilation.

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Prof. Keith has, for instance, shown that the simile of the extinction of the flame, which is one of the many important similes relied on by scholars favouring the view of annihilation, has been worked out in the *Aggivacchagotta sutta* to show that it is not extinction but disappearance in the "deep, unmeasurable, difficult to fathom" state of existence¹. Buddhaghosa has drawn attention to one or two passages in the *Dīgha*² and *Majjhima*³ *Nikāyas* which present us with quite a new interpretation of Nibbāna. The passage runs thus:

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¹ Keith, *B. Phil.*, pp. 65-6: "The comparison is indeed significant, for there is no doubt that the Indian idea of the extinction of fire was not that which occurs to us of utter annihilation, but rather that the flame returns to the primitive, pure, invisible state of fire, in which it existed prior to its manifestation in the form of visible fire".

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² *Dīgha*, I, p. 223; *Sum. Vil.* in the *I. H. Q.*, II, i.

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³ *Majjhima*, I, p. 329; *Papañcasūdanī*, I, p. 413.

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Viññāṇam anidassanam anantam sabbato pabham.
Ettha āpo ca paṭhavī tejo vāyo na gādhati,
Ettha dīghan ca rassañ ca aṇum thūlam subhāsubham,
Ettha nāmañ ca rūpañ ca asesam uparujjhati,
Viññāṇassa nirodhena etth’ etam uparujjatīti ⁴.

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⁴ Cf. the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I, p. 329) passage: Viññāṇam anidassanam anantam sabbato pabham, tam pathaviyā pathavittena ananubhūtam, āpassa āpattena ananubhūtam, etc. The *Papañcasūdani* (I, p. 413) comments on it as follows:—*Padadvayena* (i.e., *viññāṇam anidassanam*) pi nibbānam eva vuttam. *Anantan ti* tayidam uppāda-vaya-antarhitattā anantam nāma....*Sabbato pabhan ti* sabbato pabhāsampannam. Nibbānato hi añño dhammo sappabhataro vā jotimattaro vā parisuddhataro vā paṇḍarataro vā n’atthi, etc.

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On a certain occasion a bhikkhu was advised by Buddha to put his question thus:—" What is that place where (distinctions like) water and earth, fire and air have no footing, where long and short, fine and coarse, good and bad, or name and form cease absolutely?" instead of asking "Where do the four elements earth, water, fire and air disappear absolutely?". (The answer quoted above was given to it.) "It is viññāṇa (consciousness), which is signless, infinite⁵, radiant on all sides (sabbato pabham)¹ where all the distinctions mentioned above cease, and where the (constituted) viññāṇa, after cessation, disappears”. Buddhaghosa in commenting upon this passage says that the first viññāṇa is another name for Nibbāna ² while the second viññāṇa is one of the five khandhas. His interpretation, it seems, is based upon a few Nikāya passages. In the *Samyutta Nikāya*³, Buddha referring to the parinibbāna of Vakkali bhikkhu said that the wicked Māra was searching for the viññāṇa (consciousness) ⁴ of Vakkali, who had been just dead, and predicted that Māra’s attempt would not be successful because Vakkali had passed away (parinibbuto) with viññāṇa which cannot be localised (*apaṭiṭṭhita*). The sense of *apaṭiṭṭhita-viññāṇa* is given elsewhere in the *Samyutta Nikāya*⁵, where it is explained as consciousness which requires no support (patiṭṭhā or ārammaṇa) for its origin’. It arises only when the attachment (rāga) to rūpa (material elements of the body), and the other four khandhas is removed. It is unconstituted, devoid of growth and independent of any cause and condition and hence free. Being free it is steady; being steady it is happy; being happy it is without any fear of change for the worse; being fearless it attains parinibbāna.

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⁵ Buddhaghosa says that it is infinite (ananta) because it has no origin, no decay, no duration (sthiti) and no change.

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¹ J. d'Alwis' suggestion of ‘pabham’ for ‘paham’ has been preferred here. For a note on this, see *Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, II, p. 283n. Buddhaghosa, it seems, preferred the word “Papam” (from Sanskrit Prapā=a shed on the roadside for providing passengers with water, Aufrecht, *Abhi. Ratnamālā*, p. 283) to “Pabham” more for maintaining the analogy between Nibbāna and sea just mentioned before this passage. He says that just as in a great sea no landing-place is provided for seafarers, so also in Nibbāna there is no particular name corresponding to the 38 kammaṭṭhānas (bases for meditation), through which a monk aims at Nibbāna, i.e., through whatever kammaṭṭhānas (compared here to landing-places) one may reach Nibbāna, there is nothing to distinguish it in Nibbāna. See also *ante*, p. 148, n. 4. For Prof. O. Franke's notes, see his *Dīgha Nikāya* (Quellen der Religions Geschichte), Leipzig, p. 166n.

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² *Sum. Vil.* (I. *H. Q.*, II, i), p. 33 : *Tattha viññāṭabban ti viññāṇaṃ; nibbānass' etaṃ nāmam*. With regard to the second ‘viññāṇa’ Buddhaghosa says “*Tattha viññāṇan ti carimaka-viññāṇam pi abhisaṅkhāra-viññāṇan ti*” (Cf. *Vis. M.*, p. 689). He holds that the viññāṇa, the last consciousness of an arhat, is abhisaṅkhāra (constituted) and that it ceases like the flame of a lamp to pass into a state of indistinguishability (apaṇṇakabhāva). Cf. Keith, *B. Phil.*, pp. 47, 48 where Prof. Keith points out that Prof. Franke's attempt to prove that there is much of negativism in early Buddhism favours the view that Nibbāna of early Buddhism was more idealistic than negativistic. See also O. Franke's notes on Nibbāna in the *Z. D. M. G.*, lxix, pp. 475–481.

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³ *Samyutta*, III, p. 124; *Dhp. A.*, I, p. 432: *appaṭiṭṭhitena ca viññāṇena Godhiko Kulaputto parinibbuto*.

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⁴ *i.e.*, *Paṭisandhiviññāṇa*, see *Vbh. A.*, pp. 161, 192f.; *Dhp. A.*, I, p. 432.

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⁵ *Samyutta*, II, p. 65; III, pp. 53–61.

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In commenting on this passage Buddhaghosa further says that an arhat never has any maññanā (thought-construction)¹ in regard to the four elements or Nibbāna or anything whatsoever, which a puthujjana or a khīṇāsava² (but not yet an arhat) has. Buddhaghosa thus tries to show that Nibbāna is inexpressible, infinite and that any attempt to establish a relation between it and a being is a delusion of the mind. He is also constrained to say that such a description of Nibbāna had to be given as a set-off to the arguments of Brahmā,³ hinting thereby that even such statements are not permissible as Nibbāna is inexpressible. From such interpretations of the Nikāya passages as well as from his exposition of Nibbāna in the Visuddhimagga, treated later on,⁴ it will be apparent that he, far from supporting nihilism, held that Nibbāna is a transcendental, indescribable state. In fact, there was hardly any school of Buddhism, which favoured the view of annihilation, and so it seems that the opinions of scholars who supported annihilation do not rest on very sure foundations. Prof. La Vallée Poussin has criticised in detail the views of these scholars. He has given the gist of their views, showing the weak points in them along with his learned dissertation on the interpretation of Nirvāṇa (Études sur l'histoire de religions, 1925). As in his work he has reviewed most of the writings of his predecessors on Nirvāṇa, we need not deal with them again. For the present purpose, it is sufficient to state his opinion and those of Profs. Berriedale Keith and Stcherbatsky, the three latest exponents of the subject.

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¹ The Nikāya passages referred to here (Majjhima, I, p. 4) were not in harmony with Prof. Stcherbatsky's theory and so they did not appeal to him. See his remarks in Con. of N., p. 42n. The “maññanā” of Buddhaghosa reminds us of one of the passages of the Prajñā-pāramitās, in which they assert that all dharmas are like dreams and that Bodhisattvas ‘svapnam api na manyante, svapnena na manyante, etc.; see, e.g., Pañca. (A.S.B. ms.), leaves 225, 399b: saṃsāraṃ saṃsārato na vikalpayati, nirvāṇam nirvāṇato na vikalpayati and so forth.

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² For distinction between an Arhat and a Khīṇāsava, see Papañcasūdanī, I, p. 42.

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³ Papañcasūdanī, II, p. 413.

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⁴ See infra.

Prof. La Vallée Poussin on Nirvāṇa

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Prof. La Vallée Poussin starts with the statement that it is possible to distinguish Buddhism on the one hand as popular and devotional, and on the other as clerical and mystic.¹ The former is meant for the laity and the latter for the monks. The popular and devotional form of Buddhism holds out the prospect of paradise to the laity. It is only a means to an end, for the layman in one of his later lives is to become a monk and take to the clerical and mystic side of Buddhism and ultimately attain Nirvāṇa. Prof. Poussin then proceeds to define Nirvāṇa. He says that Nirvāṇa is undoubtedly the highest happiness, putting a stop to duḥkha and transmigration. It implies the absence of merit as well as of demerit. It requires a purely ascetic discipline to bring the desires or passions to an end.² The monks unlike the laity do not seek paradise, for even the life in paradise ends with the exhaustion of one's good karma.³ They therefore seek a state which affords eternal (dhruva) beatitude (sukha).⁴ The very common appellation to denote this state is Amatapadam (immortality), which Prof. Poussin considers to be a very old and characteristic expression used to describe Nirvāṇa. He thinks that the notion of deliverance has been made precise in the early Buddhist literature. It is an *abode*, supreme and definite, but yet this notion has not been coloured by any positive philosophic doctrine or by speculation upon God, soul, or being in itself.¹ He, as also Dr. E. J. Thomas², refers to the fact that the early Buddhists did not speculate about such Upaniṣadic doctrine as the Parabrahman which was developed by the Vedāntists long after Buddhism. They knew only of the highest heaven called Brahmaloka. Dr. Thomas remarks in connection with the *Brahmajāla Sutta* that "among all these views there is no expressed contradiction or even recognition of the Vedāntic theory of Ātman or Brahman as the one ultimate reality" ³. Prof. Poussin also points out that it is not correct to hold that Buddhism originated purely in opposition to Brāhmanic theories. He says that there is nothing which permits us to affirm that Nirvāṇa was conceived in opposition to any Brāhmanic theory. Nirvāṇa, Immortality, or Deliverance appears to be a rudimentary idea free from all metaphysical speculations. It is connected more with myths than with metaphysics. Nirvāṇa is an invisible abode where the saint disappears, often in the middle of a flame, or in a kind of apotheosis.⁴ In short, the Hinayāna Buddhism from the time of the *Mahāvagga* to Buddhaghosa emanated, so to say, from the Yoga almost without any mixture. The Immortal State, the Inexpressible is what a saint aims at, because it is the deliverance from birth and death. It is, however, not possible to establish any relation, philosophical or ontological, between the Immortal and the world of beings who transmigrate. Immortality is the name given to Nirvāṇa; in other words, perfect happiness, extinction, detachment are terms which are devoid of doctrinal complexities, and which, in fact, appear to signify merely the extinction of the fire of desire, or, to put it in another way, constitute the road to the Immortal State, or the Immortal State itself.⁵ It is obvious that Prof. Poussin wants to contradict the longadvocated view that Nirvāṇa is annihilation. He cites several passages to show that the self-originating fire in which a saint consumed himself, as also the saint himself, was not annihilated.¹ While summarising his views, he gives the following different uses of the term Nirvāṇa:

First 123 of 451 passages. Read on

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